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v· -I. R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Pennsylvania corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M. D., LTD., 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, individually and 
d/b/a American Women's Clinic, 
PARVIZ MODABER, 
ROBIN L. ROUNDTREE·, 
SANDRA S'rOXES, 
BARBARA LYNE~ SMITH, 
and 
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO HAVE OR MAY 
HAVE· A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
AGAINST CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.. D. , LTD. 
AND CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND D/B/A AMERICAN WOMEN'S CLINIC, 
Defendants •. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER: 
) 15325 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AMENDED MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY, by counsel, pursuant to 
Section 8.01-184, ~seq. of the 195~Code of Virginia, as 
amended, states as follows for its Amended Motion for 
Declaratory Judqment: 
1. Pennsylvania Casualty Company is a Pennsylvania 
corporation engaged in the business of issuing medical 
malpractice insurance policies in the Commonwealth of 
.. Virginia. 
.: 
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I 
;l 
!! 
[. __ _ 
t 
I 
I 
1. 
2. Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. is a Virginia 
corporation engaged, among other things, in the performance 
of gynecological services for women. 
3. Chris Simopoulos is the owner of Chris Simopoulos, 
M. D., Ltd. and, at one time, was a physician licensed to do 
practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
4. Parviz Modaber is not an insured under the policies 
but is alleged by claimants Stokes and Roundtree to have 
., been an agent, servant or employee of Simopoulos and Chris 
Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. at certain times. 
5. Robin Roundtree, Sandra Stokes and Barbara Lynette 
Smith (hereinafter nclaimants") are pursuing or intend to 
pursue claims. for medical malpractice against Simopoulos and 
Chris Simopoulos, M. D •. , Ltd. and Modaber·. 
6. Chris Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., 
have claimed coverage under the policy for these claims. 
7. Plaintiff believes that there are or may be other 
unknown persons who have or may have claims against 
Simopoulos, Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. and Modaber and 
that they may be interested in the subject of this 
ligitation. 
COUNT I 
8. On or about November 18, 1983, Chris Simopoulos and 
Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. applied for policies of 
medical professional liability insurance with Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company. A copy of the application is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. ~· ----
I 
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9. In reliance upon the representations made in the 
application by Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company is·sued two policies of 
insurance, Number HP 1286 and Number EP 1286 (hereinafter 
"the policies"). 
10. On or about September 10, 1984, in the course of 
its investigations of claims made under the policies, 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company learned that Simopoulos and 
Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. knowingly and willfully 
misrepresented material facts on that application. so as to 
induce Pennsylvania Casua~ty Company to issue the policie~. 
Specifically~ they falsely· represented~ 
(a) that Simopoulos• license to practice· medicine had 
never been revoked,. suspended or· in any way l.imit·edr and 
(b) that Simopoulos had never been convicted of a 
crime. 
(c) that Simopoulos·• staff privileges at any 
institution had never been suspended or in any way 
restricted. 
11. Contrary to these representations: 
(a) Simopoulos' license to practice medicine had been 
revoked on May 23, 1980, and was reinstated with a two-year 
probationary period in August 1981; 
(b) Simopoulos had been convicted of a felony, to-wit: 
:1 performing a second trimester abortion outside of a 
~ ; 
!I q 
!; 
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hospital, on April 16, 1980, which conviction was 
'W.· ----· 
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affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court on April 24, 1981, 
and by the United States Supreme Court on June 15, 1983; and 
(c) Simopoulos' staff privileges at Fairfax Hospital, 
Potomac Hospital and Commonwealth Hospital had been 
suspended on the occasion of his license revocation. 
12. Had Pennsylvania Casualty known the truth behind 
these misrepresentations, it would not have issued the 
policies or, in the alternative, it would have charged an 
increased premium for the policies • 
13. An actual controversy exists between the plaintiff 
and the defendants concerning the validity of the polic~es 
and their· rights or duties under the policies. 
COUN'r II 
14. Pennsylvania Casualty Company incorporates. he~ein 
the- allegations contained in paragraphs 8 throuqh 12·. 
15. Chris Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. 
knew or must have known that those representations were 
false and made them with the intent to deceive Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company concerning the true nature of the risk. 
16. Through those misrepresentations, Chris Simopoulos 
and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. misled Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company concerning these matters for the purpose of 
. : obtaining insurance coverage. 
:, 
;I 
. 1 17. Those actions and omissions of Chris Simopoulos and 
d 
!J Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. constitute fraud in the 
·I 
d q procurement of the policy. 
, . 
.. 
'i 
.: 
18. An actual controversy exists between the plaintiff 
and the defendants concerning the validity of the policies 
and the rights and duties of the parties under those 
policies. 
COUNT III 
19. Pennsylvania Casualty Company incorporates herein 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 8 through 18. 
20. Claimants Sandra Stokes and Robin Roundtree have 
alleged that they were injured by the negligence of Parviz 
Modaber, that Modaber was an agent, servant or employee of 
American Women • s Clinic,. and that American Women's Clinic is 
therefore liable for their alleged injuries. 
21. Pennsylvania Casualty Company is informed and 
believes that Modaber was not an agent, servant or employee, 
but was an independent contractor at all times relevant. 
22. An actual controversy exists between Chris 
Simopoulos, Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., Sandra Stokes and 
Robin Roundtree as to whether plaintiff has a duty to defend 
or indemnify Chris Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., 
Ltd. for claims made by these claimants for the negligence 
of Modaber. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company respectfully requests that the Court 
: determine the rights and duties of the parties under Policy 
Number HP 1286 and Policy Number EP 1286 and that the Court 
q declare: 
.. 
: 
(a) That the policies are void ab initio1 
[:s-J 
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! 
I 
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5, 
(b) That Pennsylv~nia Casualty Company has no 
duty to defend or indemnify Chris Simopoulos, Chris 
Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., their agents, servants, employees 
or associates, for any past or future claims made on behalf 
of the claimants or persons unknown; 
(c) That the defendants have no rights whatsoever 
with respect to the policies; 
(d) That the defendants be enjoined from 
prosecuting any action for coverage, indemnity, garnishment, 
or like action against Pennsylvania Casualty Company arising 
out of or related to the actions or inactions of Chris 
Simopouloa and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. under the· 
policies; and 
(e) That such other relief as is appropriate- be: 
granted. 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY 
By~~Y\~-__ 
Of Co\iiiSe 
Rosewell Page, III 
Christopher C. Spencer 
McGUIRE, WOODS & BATTLE 
1400 Ross Building 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing 
Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment was hand delivered 
or mailed, postage fully prepaid, this ( (rjiA.._day of 
December, 1984, to Chris Simopoulos, M. D., 7352 Thistledon 
Trail, Fairfax Station, Virginia, 22039; Chris Simopoulos, 
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M. D., Ltd •. , 14904 Jefferson Davis Highway, woodbridge,. 
Virginia:, 22L?l; Robert L •. Samuel, Jr., Esquire, SACKS, . · 
SACKff·~·~·:· .. ~~KIN, First American Bank Building, Post Office 
.·.:;···f· 
Box 32~1, Norfolk, Virginia, 23514; Richard Fox Aufenger, 
III, Esquire, BASHARA & HUBBARD, 414 West Bute Street, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 23514; and to H. Joel Weintraub, Esquire, 
DECKER, CARDON, WEINTRAUB, THOMAS & HITCHINGS, One Main 
Plaza East, Suite 900, Norfolk, Virginia, 23510, William D. 
Dolan, III, Esquire, DOLAN, TREANOR, MURRAY & WALSH, 4141 
North Henderson Road,. Plaza Suite 3, Ar.lington, Virginia, 
222.0'3~ and Joseph. A .. ~ennington,. Esquire·, 333 w·. Freemason 
s·ueet:, Suit:e 102, Norfolk,.. Virginia,. 23:510·. 
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~?11AH111 <tnnsylvanla Casualty Com,.. .. a 
" r ~~ 415" ifieldRoad/P.O.Box53/CampHIII,PA17011 f"a-1422 
APPLICATION 
Medical Professional Liability 
..2S:..asaue 
_Quote Only 
• • 
Expiration Date of Current Coverage: --.....;;~~--------P-+-~.,....-------------­
Requested Effective Date of Coverage: --"-----..a.~---......,--/t-J-I-"""--+---------------
1. List your current and past p~ofessionalliabil.lty insurance carrter(s): 
Name: Sr ~ilL-
Name:-------------------------- Dates Insured: -------
2. MedicaJSchool: i}A.Jn/. a(! AT!/#AI$ DateCompleted: _/_.~ ...... ~-"---
lntemlhipt Date Completed: ------
Residency: p . ,r;(!~E QP.JII'Il1<! 1A.It! , #J!r,(jllt!l.t. p..:r, DateCompleted: ------
3. Are you an employee (salary or commission) of any institution(s)? _Yes ~ 
lfyes. show-name(st of lnstitution(s) below. 
NamR--------------------------- Certificate of Insurance· (COl) ~-quired? _Yes· _No Nam&-------------------------- COl required? -Yes _No 
4. Are you an employee otthe Federal or a State Government? _Yes ~No 
5. AreyouinactMtMitltaryServlca? _.,_ ~ ..J. {.; r.;J i~ 
a What is your specJaJty? t(frde~IIH" Subspecialty? _____ .. __ v_~~:J~'~-----
7. What is the natura of your current practice? (Please be specific. Also include any atypical patients or group(s) of patients.) 
<SfMK'aLctS'/ 
8; ·Are you Board CertlfiectP .){_ Ys -No If yes, date certified: /f(l ... _ 
Specialty for which certified: ....:(/~4~-..:;Y:l-1~~-'-/-----------------------
9. List each institution where you have admitting privileges and estimate the number of patients admitted at each durir•g the 
Past year. lftlltutlon No. of P.elenta COl Requfrod: 
Name: lkra#l~ /?srcr4'- _Yes _No 
Name: rA1~F# Jk..s& rAL _Yes -No 
Name: C<WidrJIPiLTH ])"~7l~t.S fllse. _Yes -No 
1 o. Hours per week you engage in private practice: · 
11. States you practice in (estimat: the percentage of your practice in each state): ~ Jt:O 9& __ ... _% ----·-'fl» 
12. Estimate the number of hours per week you engage in outside interests/hobbies: ----
13. What percentage of your practice includes: 
--~ NO SURGERY -other than incision of boils and superficial abscesses or suturing of skin and superficial fascia. 
similar minor procedures encountered in a normal family-type practice. Administration of anesthesia by topical 
or bY means of local infiltration is included. -
--'*' MINOR SURGERY-includes above and general practitioners and specialists performing normal vaginal deliver-
fa and assisting in major surgery on their own patients. 
/CDq& MAJOR SURGERY-includes above and general practitioners and specialists performing vasectomies. appen-
dectomies, tonsilectomies, adenoidectomies and assisting in major surgery on other than their own patients. and 
Caesarean sectlone. i ·-- 8 
14. How many hours per week do you practice in an Emergency Room? 0 · -· -· 
15. Check procedures below you perform (not those performed in extraordinary emergencies): 
_canta.c Cl.theterizatiOit ;':; -Naoaeptal Rel*r ·· -Radiation Therapy 
_OrganT,.,....... _caeurean~ -RadloiiOtopel'herapy 
-APIMftdeetO!ftl• -Abortion... -Diskogram ... 
-Plastic Surgery(lf spectaJty Ia ENT) ~ TAA'a · -Eiectroconvulllve Therapy-
_Face Uft8· -D&C'a· -Pneumoencephalogram•· 
_Mammopluty- -Tubai-Ugattona.. _Myelogram• 
~Radical Neck DIIIHtlorta.: · -General, Spinal or Caudal An ...... · -Endoecopy 
_Myrtngopluty,- (Circle)-· -Colonoacopy 
_ Tympanopl ... ~· -·. - -Injection of Silicon.. . -Acupunotur8' 
_chemabruion. -NeedlaBiopay (specify typea) _Other Procedures (list) 
_varlcou Vein Strlpplng-
_Dennabraalon- -Radiopaque Dyelnj~ona 
18. Has your license to practice medlci~:J your permit to prescribe or dispense drugs ever been denied, revoked, suspendect· 
or In any way limited? -Yes o If yes, give details on back of Application. • 
17. Have your staff privllegH at any institution ever been suspended or In any way restricted?· _Yes. ~o If yes, give 
details on back of Application~ . · 
18. Have you ever been denied malpractice coverage? _Yea ...2!.No. · If yes. give details on back of Application. 
19. Haa any claim or suit been brought against you on account of alleged· malpractice. e"or or mistake in the past five years? 
_Yes _No If yes, Indicate below (for each incident): (a) malpractice-Insurer; (b) date of. incident (c) year suit waa 
Instituted or- claim madr. (d) claimant;. (e) statua ot diSposition; (f). amount paid or current reserve:. and (gl summary of 
incident. · · 
.-·::.. .. . ..... 
• "~~ 4':' .. . . -,·· .. 
··~ .•· 
20. Has suit been threatenect, but no action talc .. in the, put three years?·· _Yes. X'No-- ·,,yes: indicate the-a)· anct. 
details: . . 
21. Have you had a problem with or been traatecl.for alcoholism, narcotic addiction or mentallllness'l _ Y-. X.No If· 
yes, please explain: · · 
22. Have you now or have you eXr had a chronla illness or physical defect that impairs or could impair your ability to practice 
your specialty: _Yes . No: If yea, ple~e explain: _. ---------------------
23. Have you ever been convicted of a crime (otheJ than amo~or vehlcla.citation)? _. _Yes XNo If yes. please explain: 
24. Current practice: 
a. Follow-up care and/or instructions given to the patient are: 
~Oral ~Preprinted _Handwritten _Hospital Form 
Please attach copies of any forms and educational materials used. 
b. Briefly explain your current informed consent practices/procedures: -----------------
Please attach forms and educational materials used .. / 
c. Estimated formal or informal c;~zrtations with other physicians in the past yea.r. I~ Requested: 
d. Hours of continuing education -plated in the past year: ?a . -· 
-"""'-"--.
7 Provided. 
SA 
COVERAGE OPTIONS 
VIRGINIA SUPPLEMENT 
Coverage A-Individual Physicians ProfHalonal Uablllty 
NOTE: See brochure for description of cowerag• and rat ... 
25. What is the nature of your current coverage? 
Llndependent (Individual) Physician Policy • 
_Institution Policy Name of Institution: 
--------.-----------------------------------------
26a. Primary limits requested (each medical Incident/annual aggregate) (check one): 
_$100,000/$300.000 Xs1,000.000IS3.000.000 _other (specify): S -----' -----
26b. Excess policy limits (check one if you desire excess coverage): 
_$1,000,000 ~$2.000.000 _$3,000.000 _$4.000,000 _$5,000,000 
2Sc. Do you request Defendants R~imbursementcoverage? ~Yea -No 
If,-. limitsrequeeted (daily benefit/unuallimlt) (checkane): 
_$300/$3,000 (premium $30) _2(_S500/S5.000 (premium $50) 
28d. Do you have any employees, other than physicians. for whom coverage as additional insureds is requested? 
_Yes )(.No If yes. complehrquestlon-12&under UCoverage a-corporation, AsaociatiorTor Partnership Uability ... 
26e. If you presently have claims-made coverage, please indicate the effective date of your tint claims-made policy: 4- .,....~ '7 .r' 
If you have not yet purchased the extended reporting period endorsement (or "tail") for your current coverage. do you 
request PCC Prior Acts coverage? ~Yes _No 
26f. I hereby certify that. if I am requesting PCC Prfor Acts coverage, I have no knowledge of any pro~ionalliability claims , 
which have been ~serted against me or any corporation, association or partnership for which I am making application. or 
of any occurrence or circumstance likely to result in such a claim, on or after the requested initial effective date of the Prior 
Acts coverage. except as indicated below. (Please give a brief description of each such claim, occurrence or circumstance. 
Ptease note that no coverage can be provided relative to same under the applied-for policy, and notice of such claim. 
occurrence or circumstance should be provided to your current carrier or program administratdr if such notice has not 
already been given):-----------------------------------------------------------
I certify that the above Is true to the b•t of my knowledge, Information and belief, and that the failure to 
provide a true and, to the best of my ability, accurate responee to the question• set forth above may result In 
the voiding of any contract of lneurancelaueclln reliance on thla application anc:llor the denial of claims under 
any policy lsaued. 
Date 
. ,--. ........ 9 
• 
-- \ 
COVERAGE. OPTIONS 
Coverage A-Individual Physicians Professional Liability 
(SEE SUPPLEMENTAL PAGE) 
Coverage &-Corporation, Asaoclatlon or Partnership Professional Liability 
27. Do you·r.gqueat prof~lonalliabillty coverage for the professional corporation, association .or partnership? ~Yes __ No 
If. Y•• are.you. an owner in whole or in part or an employee of this e it ? -2(..owner _Employee What are the 
own~s·oames? .s s; J. 
.... :;.·"·{ 
28.- Do you have any employees, other than physicians, for whom coverage as additional insureds is requested? _Yes .XNo 
If yes, list the number of such employees: 
---X-ray Technicians 
___ Shock Therapy Technicians 
---Laboratory Technicians 
___ Pulmonary Technicians 
___ Inhalation Therapists 
---Physical Therapists 
___ Psychologists 
__ _.Psychotherapists 
___ optometrists 
___ opticians 
---Physician Assistants• 
___ certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNA's) 
---Certified Registered Nurse Practitioners• 
---Registered Nursei 
---Licensed Practical Nurses 
---Other (number and type): 
• 
• If Certified Registered Nurse Practitioners or Physician Assistants are. listed, submit details of education, training, experience and duties. 
Pte ... list phyalciana and 1urgeona with the above entity for whom malpractice coverage Ia d•lrecl and attach separat• 
~~edAp~Uonc _________________________________________________________ _ 
• 
AGREEMENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
I, the undersigned, AGREE: 
(a) to implement reasonable risk management and incident reporting programs; 
(b) to actively participate in the risk management and incident reporting programs in effect at the hospitals in which I practice: 
(c) to report potential claims to the Company: 
(d) to allow the Company to perform such inspections as may be necessary for the evaluation of potential liability expos•!·\-~ 
and claims. 
I AUTHORIZE any professional societies, prior or present business or medical associates, licensing boards, hospitals, govorrt-
mental entities, corporations, partnerships, organizations, institutions or persons that may have any record or knowledge 
concerning any of the statements and answers made herein to release such information to the Company upon request. l 
authorize the use of a copy of this authorization in place of the original. 
I understand and agree that the Company may issue insurance on the basis of the representations made in this Application. The 
information contained herein is true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. No material circumstance or 
information related to the questions asked on this Application has been withheld or omitted. 
I understand that if claims-made coverage is terminated at any time, additional reporting periods (tail coverage) may be 
purchased and I must exercise such right by written notice no later than thirty (30) days after coverage termination. 
Insurance Broker/ Agent: 
o--. w~ o,IU,.,.. a.,." 
1920 OPITZ IOWVARD 
WOODBIIDG&r VIIGINIA 22191 
,.. ·--
! 10 ·~ --
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Plaintiff 
v. 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M. D., LTD., 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, individually and 
d/b/a American Women's Clinic, 
PARVIS MODABER, et al 
CASE NUMBER 15325 
ANSWER AND GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT PARVIS MODABER 
NOW COMES the defendant, Parvis Modaber, by counsel, and 
for his Answer And Grounds Of Defense to the Amended Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment states as follows: 
1. On information and belief the defendant believes that 
• 
the allegations in Paragraph 1 are correct. 
2. The allegations in Paragraph 2 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
3. The allegations in Paragraph 3 of the Amended Motion 
For D~claratory Judgment are admitted. 
11 
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4. With respect to ~aragraph 4 of the Amended Motion For 
Dc~laLatory Judgment this defendant admits that Stokes and 
Roundtree have alleged that he was an agent, servant or employee 
of Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd. at certain times. 
This defendant denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 4 
of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment. 
5. The allegations in Paragraph 5 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
6. This defendant has no knowledge as to the allegations 
in Paragraph 6 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and can therefore neither admit nor deny said allegations and 
calls for strict proqf thereof. 
7. The allegations in Paragraph 7 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
8. This aefendant has no knowledge as to the allegations 
in Paragraph 8 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and can neither admit nor deny same and calls for strict proof 
thereof. 
9. The allegations in Paragraph 9 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
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10. This defendant has no knowledge as to the allega-
tions in Paragraph 10 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment and can neither admit nor deny said allegations, and 
calls for strict proof thereof. 
11. This defendant has no knowledge as to the allega-
tions in Paragraph 11 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment and can neither admit nor deny the same and calls 
for strict proof thereof. 
12. The allegations in Paragraph 12 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
13. The allegations in Paragraph 13 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
14. In response to the allegations in Paragraph 14 of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment the defendant in-
corporates his answer in Paragraphs 8 through 12 herein. 
, 
15. This defendant has no knowledge as to the allega-
tions in Paragraph 15 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment and can neither admit nor deny the same and calls for 
strict proof thereof. 
16. The allegations in Paragraph 16 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
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17. The allegations in Paragraph 17 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
18. The allegations in Paragraph 18 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
19. With respect to the allegations in Paragraph 19 of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment this defendant 
incorporates herein its answer as contained in Paragraphs 8 
through 18 herein. 
20. The allegations in Paragraph 20 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
21. With respect to the allegations in Paragraph 21 of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment this defendant has 
no knowledge as to what the plaintiff was informed and believes, 
but this' defendant affirmatively alleges that at all times 
relevant he was an agent, servant, or employee of Chris 
Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., and Chris Simopoulos, Individually 
and d/b/a American Women's Clinic. 
22. The allegations in Paragraph 22 of the Amended Motion 
For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
23. Plaintiff was barred from arguing that the insurance 
14 
UWOf'ICU 
DEatER. CARDON 
E1N1'1lAUB. THOMAS 
A HITCHINGS 
NOUOI&, vntGIICL\ 
policies are invalid by the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. 
WHEREFORE, Parvis Modaber respectfully requests that the 
Court determine the rights and duties of the parties under 
Policy No. HP1286 and Policy No. EP1286 and that the Court 
declare: 
(a) That the policies are valid; 
(b) That Pennsylvania Casualty Company has a duty to 
defend or indemnify Chris Simopoulos, Chris Simopoulos, M. D., 
Ltd., and Parvis Modaber, and their agents, servants, employees 
or associa~es, for any past or future claims made on behalf 
of.the claimants or persons unknown; 
(c) That such other relief as is appropriate be granted. 
PARVIS HODABER 
• 
H. Joel Weintraub, p.d, 
Decker, Cardon, Weintraub, Thomas & Hitchings 
Suite 900, Plaza One Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Answer 
And Grounds Of Defense On Behalf Of The Defendant Parvis Modaber 
was mailed this day of January, 1985 to Chris ·simopoulos, 
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M. D., 7352 Thistledon Trail, Fairfax Station, Virginia 22039; 
Chris Simopoulos, M. D., Ltd., 14904 Jefferson Davis Highw~y, 
Woodbridge, v1rg1n1a ~L~~l; Kobert L. Samuel, Jr., Esquire, 
Sacks, Sacks & Larkin, First American Bank Building, Post Office 
Box 3291, Norfolk, Virginia 23514; Richard Fox Aufenger, III, 
Esquire, Bashara & Hubbard, 414 West Bute Street, Norfolk, 
Virginia 23514; William D. Dolan, III, Esquire, Dolan, Treanor, 
Murray & Walsh, 4141 North Henderson Road, Plaza Suite 3, 
Arlington, Virginia 22203; Joseph A. Pennington, Esquire, 333 
West Freemason Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, and to Rosewell 
Page, III, Esquire and Christopher D. Spencer, Esquire, McGuire, 
Woods & Battle, 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219. 
, 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Pennsylvania Corporation 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M. D., LTD., 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, Individually and 
d/b/a American Women's Clinic, 
PARVIZ MODABER, 
ROBIN L. ROUNDTREE, 
SANDRA STOKES, 
BARBARA LYNETTE SMITH, 
and 
CASE NUMBER 15325 
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO HAVE OR MAY HAVE 
A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M. D., LTD. 
AND CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
d/b/a AMERICAN WOMEN'S CLINIC, 
Defendants 
ANSWER TO AMENDED MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
NOW COMES the defendant, Barbara Lynette Smith, by counsel, and for 
her Answer to the Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed against her 
herein, answers and says as follows: 
L The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 1 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
2. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 2 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
3. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 3 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
4. It is admitted that Barbara Lynette Smith has alleged that Parviz 
Modaber was an agent, servant or employee of Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, 
M.D., Ltd., as alleged in Paragraph Number 4 of the Amended Motion 
. 17 
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for Declaratory Judgment. The remaining allegations of Paragraph Number 4 of 
the Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
5. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 4 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted • 
6. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph Number 6 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
7. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph Number 7 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
8. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph Number 8 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
9. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 9 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
10. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph Number 10 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
11. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations .contained in Paragraph Number 11 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
12. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 12 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
13. The allegatio~ contained in Paragraph Number 13 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
14. This defendant incorporates her answers set forth in Paragraphs 8 
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through 12 herein in response to the allegations of Paragraph 14 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment • 
15. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph Number 15 of the Amended Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment and calls for strict proof thereof. 
16. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 16 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
17. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 17 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
18. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 18 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
19. This defendant incorporates her answers set forth in Paragraphs 8 
through 18 herein in response to the allegations of Paragraph 19 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 
20. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 20 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
21. This defendant specifically denies that Modaber was an independent 
contractor at all times relevant as alleged in Paragraph Number 21 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge 
or information to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 
21 of the Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment and therefore calls for strict 
proof thereof. 
22. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 22 of the Amended 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
-
L This defendant alleges as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff is 
. 19 
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barred from asserting that the insurance policies as aforesaid issued by the said 
plaintiff are invalid by the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant, 8arbara Lynette Smith, respectfully requests 
that the Court determine the rights and duties of the parties under Policy No. 
HP1286 and Policy No. EP1286 and that the Court declare: 
(a) That the policies are valid; 
(b) That Pennsylvania Casualty Company has a duty to defend or indemnify 
Chris Simopoulos, Chris Simopoulas, M.C., Ltd., and Parvis Modaber, and their 
agents, servants, employees or associates, for any past or future claims made on 
behalf of the claimants or persons unknown; 
(c) That such other relief as is appropriate be granted. 
Richard Fox Aufenger, In, Esq. 
Bashara & Hubbard 
414 West Bute Street 
P.O. Box 3626 
Norfolk, Virginia 23514 
BARBARA LYNETTE SMITH 
~ /'/ ~,-/'<:1 / v /· c:~~ .. /'; ·- ~_,- -:a____._ By,.%'""'"'-..ot.c-·f .. / '"'-:-......- -
of Counsel 
I hereby certify that I have this I L. day of February, 1985, mailed a 
true copy of the foregoing to: Christopher c. Spencer, Esq., McGuire, Woods 
& Battle, 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia; Stanley E. Sacks, Esq., Sacks, 
Sacks &: Larkin, First American Bank Building, P.O. Box 3291, Norfolk, Virginia 
23514; H. Joel Weintraub, Esq., Decker, Cardon, Weintraub, Thomas & Hitchings, 
One Main Plaza East, Suite 900, Norfolk, Virginia 23510; Joseph A. Pennington, 
Esq., 333 W. Freemason Street, Suite 102, Norfolk, Virginia 23510; William D. 
Dolan, m, Esq., Dolan, Treanor, Murray & Walsh, 4141 North Henderson Road, 
Plaza Suite 3, Arlington, Virginia 22203. ....., 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY, * 
a Pennsylvania Corporation, 
* Plaintiff, 
* 
v. 
* 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD., 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, Individually and * 
d/b/a American Women's Clinic, 
PARVIZ MODABER, * 
ROBIN ~. ROUNDTREE, 
SANDRA STOKES, * 
BARBARA LYNETTE SMITH, 
and * 
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO HAVE OR MAY 
HAVE A CLAIM FOR f{BDICAL MALPRACTICE * 
· · AGAINST CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
AND CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, INDIVIDUALLY * 
AND d/b/a AMERICAN WOMEN'S CLINIC, 
* Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 15325 
ANSWER TO AMENDED MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
NOW COME the defendants, Robin L. Roundtree and Sandra 
Stokes, by counsel, and for their separate Answers to the 
Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment filed against both of 
them herein, answers and says as follows: 
1. 
the Amended 
2. 
the Amended 
3. 
the Amended 
The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 1 of 
Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 2 of 
Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 3 of 
Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admi~ted. 
• /~!:!-
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4. It is admitted that Robin L. Roundtree and Sandra 
Stokes have alleged that Parviz Modaber was an agent, servant 
or employee of Simopoulos and Chris Simopoulos, M.D., Ltd., as 
alleged in Paragraph Number 4 of the Amended Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment. The remaining allegations of Paragraph 
Number 4 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are 
denied. 
s-
5. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number/ of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
6. The defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph Number 6 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and call for strict proof thereof. 
7. The defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph Number 7 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and call for strict proof thereof. 
8. The defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph Number 8 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and call for strict proof thereof. 
9. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 9 
of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
10. The defendants are ~ithout sufficient knowledge o~ 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
22 
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Paragraph Number 10 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment and call for strict proof thereof. 
11. The defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph Number 11 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment and call for strict proof thereof. 
12. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 12 of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
13. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 13 
·· of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
14. These defendants incorporate their answers set forth 
in Paragraphs 8 through 12 herein in response to the allegations 
of Paragraph 14 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment. 
15. The defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph Number 15 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
.. Judgment and call for strict proof thereof. 
16. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 16 
:• 
.. 
of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are denied. :i 
17. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 17 
! ! of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are denied. 
.. 18. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 18 
. , 
.. 
· of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
19. These defendants incorporated their answers set forth ; 
in Paragraphs 8 through 18 herein in response to the allegations 
23 
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of Paragraphs 19 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment. 
20. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 20 
of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
21. These defendants specifically deny that Modaber was 
an independent contractor at all times relevant as alleged in 
Paragraph Number 21 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment. These defendants are without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained 
in Paragraph 21 of the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment 
and therefore call for strict proof thereof. 
22. The allegations contained in Paragraph Number 22 of 
the Amended Motion For Declaratory Judgment are admitted. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1. These defendants allege as an affirmative defense 
that the plaintiff is barred from asserting that the insurance 
policies as aforesaid issued by the said plaintiff are invalid 
by the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants, Robin L. Roundtree and Sandra 
Stokes, respectfully request that the Court determine the rights 
and duties of the parties under Policy No. HP1286 and Policy No. 
EP1286 and that the Court declare: 
(a) That the policies are valid; 
(b) That Pennsylvania Casualty Company has a·duty ta 
defender indemnify Chris Simopoulos, Chris Simopoulos, M.D., 
24 
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Ltd., and Parvis Modaber, and their agents, servants, employees 
or associates, for any past or future claims made on behalf of 
the claimants or persons unknown; 
(c) That such other relief as is appropriate be granted. 
Girard c. Larkin, Jr., Esquire 
SAKCS, SACKS AND LARKIN 
405 First American Bank Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
ROUNDTREE and 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing Answer to Christopher c. Spencer, Esquire, counsel 
for the plaintiff, this 28th day;jf Januar~, 1985. 
0.~ ./ (' g L •. '-<'-'< (. -
Girard C. Larkin, 
I . 25 . ·~·--
i1 V I R G I N I A : 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM 
PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY, 
a Pennsylvania corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. AT LAW NO. 15325 
., CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
et al. 
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Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ORDER 
THIS CAUSE came on this day to be heard upon the 
plaintiff's Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment duly 
filed; the Answers of the defendants, Parviz Modaber, Robin 
L. Roundtree, Sandra Stokes, and Barbara Lynette Smith 
thereto; the evidence heard ore tenus by the Court; the 
memoranda of law submitted by the plaintiff and the 
defendants, Modaber, Roundtree, and Stokes; and the argument 
of counsel. 
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it appears to the Court 
L 
the plaintiff, Pennsylvania Casualty Company, is 1;.: 1~ that estopped from relying upon the material misrepresentations 
! 
il 
.. of fact contained in the application for insurance which was 
·· submitted by Chris Simopoulos, M.D. and Chris Simopoulos, 
;1 M.D., Ltd., to avoiq the two (2) policies of insurance, No. 
j! HP1286 and No. EP1286. 
!I 
" 
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li 
I. 
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WHEREFORE, it is hereby ADJUDGED, ORDERED and 
! 
·: DECREED that said policies of insurance are not void ab 
:: ·~ initio, and that the relief prayed for by the plaintiff in 
·· its Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment be, and it 
hereby is, denied, to all of which counsel for the plaintiff 
·: objects and excepts. 
---
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We Ask For This: 
{'~ ~rL~. 
Counsel for Robin L. Rountree 
and Sandra Stokes 
·~#·';·',/.·-'I I 
- ,~ ..,-/~I' -.-~~ • / _.,-; ,/ ./ .-·/ ••• •. • ,1# ' •• ·' ~ . // ,. ... ,..'/•· 
Counsel for Parviz Modaber - ' 
_,, ... ,.--· 
c.,./ 
Seen: 
ENTER: f.!_ I k; f ~· 
*** 
7 Now, the evidence will be I think very strong that 
8 the conviction of Dr. Simopoulos in April of 1980 for performin 
9 an illegal abortion was ~~ well publicized a criminal case in 
10 the State of Virginia there ever has been. It was covered by 
11 all the major newspapers, local newspapers, T.V. and radio. An 
12 the follow-up coverage on the appeals was just as thorough. In 
13 fact, on June 15, 1983, the day that the Supreme Court of the 
14 United States upheld the felony conviction, Dr. Simopoulos went 
15 on T.V. I believe it was Channel 7, ABC in this area and was 
, 6 interviewed about the conviction being upheld. 
*** 
·- .__ 
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Testimony of Robert Rousseau 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - DIRECT 
*** 
22 Q Mr. Rousseau, state your name for the record. 
29 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - DIRECT 
A Robert Rousseau. 
2 Q By whom are you employed, sir? 
3 A Prince-Wood Insurance Service, Inc. 
Q How long have you been employed by Prince-Wood 
5 Insurance Service, Inc.? 
A 6 A little over 18 years. 
7 Who owns Prince-Wood Insurance Service, Inc.? Q 
A 
9 Where is it locpted? Q 
10 woodbridge, Virginia. A 
Q 
12 Inc.? 
13 It's a property casualty and life insurance agency. A 
Q 
15 employee of Prince-Wood Insurance Services, Inc. began to write 
16 medical professional liability insurance on Dr. Chris Simopoulo 
17 and his corporation Chris Simopoulos, I4.D. Limted? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Did there come a time when you began to solicit 
20 applications for the Pennsylvania Casualty Company? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Did you solicit applications for medical professional 
30 
2 
3 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - DIRECT 
liability insurance for the Pennsylvania Casualty Company? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Could you tell us approximately when you began to 
4 solicit applications for medical professional liability insuran 
s for Pennsylvani~ Casualty Company? 
6 A In late 1983. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
*** 
Q Mr. Rousse~u, I offer you now a document that has 
previously been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1. It is 
entitled, "Application for medical professional liability," and 
ask if you can identify it as the application of which you 
31 
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forwarded Pennsylvania Casualty Company on behalf of Chris 
2 Simopoulos? 
3 A Yes, it is. 
*** 
9 Q -- can you iden±ify for use whose handwriting the 
10 information on the first page is in? And I will ask you to 
11 exclude for a moment the red circle around the license number 
12 effective date, the red handwriting on the right -- on the 
13 requested effective date of coverage, and the handwriting that 
14 is in the block across from line 6, it seems to say "Classifi-
15 cation 6." And can you tell me whose handwriting that is in? 
That•s mine. 16 
17 
A 
Q All right, sir, and as we look at the next pages, 
18 can you tell us which of those entries is in your handwriting? 
19 And if you can just by number that will be fine. 
20· A 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24~, 24C and D, 27. 
21 Q All right, sir, and there is some other handwriting 
22 on that. There appears to be a siqnature line under the term 
32 
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agreement and authorization. Can you tell us whose handwriting 
2 that is? 
3 
4 
A 
Q 
Dr. Simopoulos. 
Did you present this application to Dr. Simopoulos 
s prior to the time that you submitted it to Pennsylvania Casualt 
6 Company? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 
Did Dr. Simopoulos sign the application in your :presenc ? 
Yes, he did. 
Do you recognize that as the signature that 
11 Dr. Simopoulos placed on that application? 
12 
13 
A 
Q 
Yes, I do. 
If you would look, sir, at the center page of what ha 
14 been previously marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 entitled, 
15 "Covered Options Virginia Supplement," can you tell us by numbe 
16 which of the questions there were filled in in your handwriting. 
17 
18 
A 
Q 
25, 26A, 26B, 26C, 26D, 26E, that's it. 
At the bottom of that particular page there is an 
19 applicant's signature. Can you tell us whose signature that is. 
20 
21 
A 
Q 
Dr. Simopoulos. 
Did you present that page to Dr. Simopoulos on 
22 November 18, 1983? 
33 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Did you witness him sign that application? 
Yes, I did. 
Is it an interval part of the application that has 
5 been previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1? 
6 A 
Q 
Yes, it is. 
Now, sir, you have indicated that certain of the 
8 information contained on this application was filled out by you. 
9 Could you identify for us. which of -- what of that information 
10 was filled out by you i~·Dr. Simopoulos's presence, if any? 
11 A The license number and effective date of his license. 
12 ~'Jhat was the question? ~vhich part of was filled out in his 
13 presence? 
14 
15 
16 
In his presence, yes. 
That was and numbers 11 through .27. 
You have given us numbers 11 through 27 were filled 
17 out in his presence. would you describe to the Court how you 
18 went about filling out this application from Dr. Simopoulos ?· 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Those particular questions? 
Yes, sir. First of all where were you when you didit. 
In his office. 
All right, sir, and would you describe for the Court 
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what you did when you filled it out? 
2 A We reviewed each question and then he provided 
3 the answers. 
4 Q Did you review each of the answers that you have fill 
s in on that application with Dr. Simopoulos? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q Did he, in fact, give the answers which you filled in. 
8 A Yes, he did. 
9 Q Did you at the_~ime that you received those answers 
10 believe them in your mind to be true? 
11 A Yes, sir. 
12 Q Now calling your attention specifically to question 
13 number 16 on Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1, the question reads, 
14 "Has your license to practice medicine or your permit to 
15 prescribe or dispense dr~gs every been denied, ~evoked, 
16 suspended or in any way limited?" and the block "no" is x'd 
17 in, is that correct? 
18 A Correct. 
19 Q Did Dr. Simopoulos in response to that question 
20 answer "no"? 
21 A Yes, he did. 
22 
Q With respect to question number 17 on Plaintiff's 
35 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - DIRECT 
Exhibit Number 1 which reads, 11 Have your staff privileges in 
2 any institbtion every been suspended or in any way restriced?" 
3 the block "no" is x'd in, is that correct? 
4 
5 
A 
Q 
That•s correct. 
Did Dr. Simopoulos respond "no" when you profounded 
6 that question to him? 
7 
8 
A 
Q 
Yes, he did. 
With respect to question number 23 which reads, "Have 
9 you even been convicted of a crime other than a motor vehicle 
10 citation?" the block "no" is x•d in, is that correct? 
Correct. 11 
12 
A 
Q When you put that question to Dr. Simopoulos, did he 
13 respond in the negative? 
14 Yes, he did. 
15 
A 
Q With respect to those specific questions, Mr. Roussea , 
16 did you believe in your mind at the time you received those 
17 answers from Dr. Simopoulos that they were true? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 
Now upon the completion of this application, 
Mr. Rousseau, did you in fact submit it to the Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company? 
A Yes. 
36 
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Q Subsequent to the time that you submitted this appli-
2 cation to the Pennsylvania Casualty Company, were there issued 
3 to or. Simopoulos medical professional liability policies both 
4 primary and excess? 
5 A Yes, they were. 
*** 
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Q All right, sir, and with respect to question 260, 
2 uno you have any employees other than physicians for whom 
3 coverage is additional and insurance is requested?" You checke 
4 there "rio," is that correct? 
5 
6 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
Did Dr. Simopoulos in reviewing this particular 
7 coverage options Virginia Supplement with you direct that you 
8 include those answers to questions 26A through E? 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
Yes, he did. 
Now also on the coverage options Virginia Supplement 
11 we see 26F, nz hereby certify that I am requesting PCC prior 
12 X coverage. I have no knowledge of any professional liability 
13 claims which have been assigned against me or any corporation, 
14 association or partnership which I am making application, or an 
15 occurance of circumstances likely to result in such a claim on 
16 or after the requested initial effective date of prior x covera e 
17 except as indicated below ... Did you review that particular 
18 question with Dr. Simopoulos? 
Yes, I did. 19 
20 
A 
Q Did he respond that he had any outstanding claims or 
21 knowledge of any claims? 
22 A No, he didn't. 
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*** 
6 Q Now, Mr. Rousseau, I offer you documen~s which have 
7 been previously marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Numbers 2 and 3 
a and ask you if you can identify them as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 
9 as a policy that was is'sued to Chris Simopoulos, M.D. Limited 
10 by Pennsylvania Casualty Company and it is known as Policy 
11 Number HP1286? 
12 A Yes, it is. 
13 Q And I will offer you now a document that has been 
14 previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 3, which appears 
15 to be an endorsement number 3, and ask you whether or not that 
16 was an endorsement that was issued with the policy? 
17 A Yes, it was issued for the same concurrent date. 
18 Q Can I ask you whether or not with respect to· Plaintiff' 
19 Exhibit Number 3, that endorsement was subsequently withdrawn 
20 at the request of the insured? 
21 A Yes, it was. 
*** 
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*** 
8 Q Mr. Rousseau, you are an independent agent rather tha 
9 an employee of Pennsylvan~a Casualty? 
10 
11 
A 
Q 
12 agent? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That is correct. 
It has been 18 years since you have been an independe t 
That's right. 
And you have your own company Prince-Wood? 
correct. 
Have you always worked in woodbridge, Virginia during 
17 that 18-year period? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
What is the business address in Woodbridge, Virginia? 
1920 Opitz Boulevard. 
When you met with Dr. Simopoulos and completed the 
application, you have noted a building address for Dr. Smopoulos 
40 
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at 14904 Jefferson Davis Highway, Woodbridge? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
How far is that location from your business location? 
Quarter of a mile. 
Quarter of a mile. 
Approximately. 
You have seen his business there on occasions prior 
8 to the 18th of November? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Now on the application there is also some other effie 
11 that are listed, 916 West Broad Street in Falls Church, Virgini 
12 is one. How did you ~~ceive that information? 
13 A Dr. Simopoulos. 
14 Q There is an address of 2460 Little Creek Road, East 
15 Little Creek Road in Norfolk, Virginia. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
That's correct. 
Ho-.., did you get that information? 
Dr. Simopoulos. 
Q Have you ever been to the address 916 West Broad Stre t 
in Falls Church? 
A 
Q 
address? 
No. 
About how far is that address from your business 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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A 30 miles, 25 or 30 miles, approximately. 
Q The second page I believe of the application has at 
the top question number 15. Did you question number 15 with 
Dr. Simopoulos? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q was this question ignored or were there answers given 
to question 15? 
A It was not ignored. There was only the need to answe 
in the affirmative if f ~7ad it correctly. 
Q Did you know what kind of a doctor Dr. Simopoulos was. 
A That's correct. 
Q Sorry? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What kind of a doctor did you understand that the was. 
A OB-GYN. 
Q All right. You say you don't need to answer question 
15 if it doesn't apply? 
A That's the way I read it. It says, "Check procedures 
below you have performed." 
Q Now, the middle column has a provision for Caesarean 
sections and abortions and DNC's, tuboligations. Did you ask 
Dr. Simopoulos specifically each one of those types of procedures 
41 
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A We went over every one. 
2 Q Did Dr. Simopoulos have a trade name on his business 
3 at Jefferson Davis Highway? 
4 
5 
A 
Q 
Trade name? 
Yes, sir. Didn't he in fact trade as the American 
6 Women's Clinic? 
7 
8 
9 
A 
Q 
}. 
Not to my knowledge. 
Not to your knowledge. 
That was the one I believe if I understood to be in 
10 Falls Church. 
11 Q You understood that he traded as the American Women's 
12 Clinic in Falls Church? 
13 A I believe. I am not sure. There was a trade name up 
14 there, yes, but to my knowleJge there was no trade name in 
15 'lioodbr idge • 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q What did you understand that he did at the American 
1
-"omen' s Clinic? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Which.is where? 
Falls Church. 
That was suppose to be a family practice. 
Family practice? 
Urn-hum. 
l ----
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Q Now you had I believe indicated that only recently, 
2 that is in 1983 had you begun soliciting malpractice insurance, 
3 is that right? 
No, that is not right. 
s 
A 
Q I•m sorry. How long have you solicited malpractice 
6 insurance? 
7 
8 
A 
Q 
Probably 16 years. 
16 years. But it was only 1983 that you began 
9 soliciting for the Penris~~vania Casualty Company? 
10 A That's right. 
11 Q The type of form used by Pennsylvania Casualty Compan , 
12 is that similar to forms used by the other companies? 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
Within reason, yes. 
Is there anything on the form used by Pennsylvania 
15 Casualty Company that was not familiar to you? 
No. 
You knew how to complete that form? 
Yes, I did. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q The 18th of November, 1983, you went to Dr. Simopoulos 
at his office? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
How did that come about? 
43 
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A I don't know what you mean by that. 
Q Did you just show up. unannounced; was there an appoint-
ment set up? 
A No. I don't show up unannounced. ~~e set up appoint-
S ments, yes. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Who initiated that? 
I did. 
You did that? 
Yes. 
When did you initiate the meeting with Dr. Simopoulos? 
What date? 
Approximately. 
Apparently somewhere around the 18th, before -- prior 
14 to the 18th. 
15 Q You were familiar with his office being a quarter of 
16 a mile from you that there was a doctor that worked there, am I 
17 correct? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
There was a doctor that worked there? 
How did you know Dr. Simopoulos to give him a call? 
I had him insured. 
You had previously had him insured? 
Sure. 
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Q What kind of other insurance did you write for 
2 Dr. Simopoulos? 
3 
4 
A 
Q 
Other than professional? 
Okay, let's start with the professional. What kind 
5 of professional insurance did you write for him? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Medical malpractice. 
What company was that with? 
Previoulsy? 
Yes, sir. 
Saint Paul. 
Did you write any other insurance for Dr. Simopoulos? 
Yes, I did. 
What other kinds did you write for him? 
His property insurance. 
What property was insured? 
His home, his Broad Street location, his Norfolk 
location, Florida. 
Q You had met Dr. Simopoulos in person prior to 
November 18, 1983? 
A Yes. 
Q The professional insurance was with Saint Paul. How 
long had that been in effect? 
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A I am going to say approximately '75. 
2 Q 1975, approximately, was when that insurance commence ? 
3 A With my agency. 
4 Q With your agency. 
5 A That's right. 
6 Q All right. Did you have a copy of the Saint Paul 
7 application for insurance to compare this one with? 
8 A Die I have one to compare it with? 
9 Q Yes, sir. 
10 A I probably did but I don't know that I compared them. 
11 Q You don't recall comparing the two? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Why did he switch from Saint Paul to Pennsylvania 
14 Casualty? 
15 A Price. 
*** 
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*** 
17 Q When you met Dr. Simopoulos at his office, did you 
18 actually, the two of you sit down in the Doctor's office itself. 
19 A His private office. 
20 Q His private office. And you and he were alone for 
21 about how long a period of time? 
22 A Half an hour. 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
~ 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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Q Was anybody else present when you reviewed these 
various questions with him and got the answers that you got fro 
him? 
A No. 
Q Did you ask Dr. Simopoulos how he handled three 
different offices, one in Woodbride, one in Falls Church and on 
on Little Creek Road in Norfolk? 
A Yes. 
Q How did he exp~ain his practice to you? 
A He had a gentleman, a doctor handling one in Falls 
Church, and he indicated he handled the Woodbridge and Norfolk 
office by himself. 
Q Do you keep a rate book at your office in Woodbridge 
that lets you answer a doctor's question about what his rates 
will be? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Is that a rate book that is given to you by ~~sylVcmi 
Casualty Company? 
A A rating sheet, not a book. 
Q So you are able to compare that rate with the Saint 
Paul rate? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q The newspaper in the Woodbridge area, that would be 
2 the newspaper of general circulation, am I correct that that 
3 would be the Washington Post? 
4 A That would be one of them. 
s 
6 
7 
Q 
A 
Q 
a office? 
9 
10 
11 
A 
Q 
A 
One of the newspapers of general circulation? 
Yes. 
Do you get that paper either at your home or at your 
No. 
What papers do you subscribe to? 
Potomac News. 
*** 
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*** 
19 Q Now on the applicati~n on the bottom of the page 
20 following questions 27 .and 28, there is a provision headed, 
21 "Agreement and Authorization.". ~qhat is that provision for? 
22 . A It is basically an agreement to cooperate with the 
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insurance companies and whatever other organizations he may be 
2 involved in basically. 
3 
4 
Q 
A 
Cooperate to do what? 
Cooperate to just like it says, to implement 
s reasonable risk management and report claims, let the company 
6 perform inspections. 
*** 
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*** 
Q Mr. Rousseau, I understand that you have been writing 
malpractice coverage for approximately the last 15 years, is 
that correct? 
A 
Q 
That•s right. 
Up until you started writing for Pennsylvania 
Casualty, did you write for any company other than Saint Paul? 
A Not medical malpractice. 
Q What percentage from say 1975 through 1983, what 
percentage of your insurance business is devoted to malpractice 
coverage? 
A Probably -- in total premium? 
52 
-2 
3 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - CROSS 
Q In total premium. 
A 
Q 
Probably 5 percent, 6 percent. 
Now in number of policies? Would it be less than 
4 5 percent? 
5 A Number of policies, yes, definitely. 
6 Q Dr. Simopoulos had been insured by your office or by 
7 Saint Pa.ul through your office since 1975 continuously up until 
8 the time his new application was taken, is that correct? 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
·rha t ' s correct • 
I understand that you called Dr. Simopoulos and 
11 initiated with him the possibility of changing companies to 
12 Pennsylvania Casualty? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A I don't know if I initiated that aspect of it. It's 
a well known fact that the Pennsylvania Casualty was considered 
the best premium. That is know throughout the whole medical 
profession. 
Q Did you contact Dr. Simopoulos and tell him, 11 I am 
now writing for Pennsylvania Casualty and you and you can save 
money through the premium with this company"? 
A I don't remember if I did that or not to be honest 
with you. Whether he called me and said, "Hey, can you get me 
Pennsylvania Casualty?" 
,... --·- 53 
Q Do you know who initiated the change in insurance fro 
2 Saint Paul to Pennsylvania Casualty? 
3 
4 
s 
A 
Q 
No, because --
You testified earlier that you had --
MR. PAGE: Excuse me, can he answer the question, 
6 Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: He hadn't finished. Objection sustained. 
a Finish answering the question. 
9 THE WITNESS: I think the price dictated the contact. 
10 I don't remember which way it went. 
11 
12 Q 
BY MR. LARKIN: (resumed) 
Did you testify earlier that you had contacted 
13 Dr. Simopoulos initially? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
contact? 
A 
Q 
For the purpose of that appointment, yes. 
Prior to that you don't know who had initiated the 
I don't recall. 
To your knowledge was Dr. Simopoulos, did he carry 
insurance through any other local agency? 
A 
Q 
Not to my knowledge. 
I understand you testified that you had in addition to 
his malpractice insurance the coverage on his home and coverage 
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on a number of other pieces of property that he owned, is that 
2 correct? 
3 A Yes, I do but I don't know that it is all his propert , 
4 no. 
5 Q Did you testify that you had the coverage on the 
6 property located in Norfolk where the American Women'sClinicwa 
7 located? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
The building, yes. 
Did he own the_?uilding in Norfolk? 
To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
The application that you took from Dr. Simopoulos, wa 
12 that to extend professional liability coverage to the business 
13 that was located in Norfolk? 
14 
15 
A 
Q 
It included coverage for Dr. Simopoulos there, yes. 
I believe you testified earlier that there was anothe 
16 doctor who was handling that office? 
17 
18 
19 
A 
Q 
A 
No. 
I'm sorry, he was handling the Norfolk office? 
That's correct. 
*** 
~-- 55 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - CROSS 
*** 
2 Q Mr. Rousseau, when you filled out this application, 
3 you listed the Falls Church property address, is that correct? 
4 
s 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
Was it your intention based on your discussions with 
6 Dr. Simopoulos to provide liability coverage for the business 
7 that was being operated by him at that address? 
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*** 
2 THE WITNESS: The intent of this policy was to cover 
3 Dr. Simopoulos, Dr. Simopoulos, M.D. LTD. and nothing else. 
*** 
s Q You show his Falls Church ad~ress on the application, 
6 do you not? 
7 
8 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
And I believe you previously testified you knew that 
9 that business that was op~rated there was know as the American 
1 o ~iornen ' s Clinic • 
11 A tfllatever the name of it was. I don't know. He had 
12 a name for it. 
13 Q What did you understand the business of the American 
14 Women's Clinic located in Falls Church,.Virginia to be? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It was a walk-in medical clinic. 
Was it an OB-GYN clinic or a family practice or --
A family practice as I understood it. 
A family practice. ·Did you understand Dr. Simopoulos 
19 to spend any of his time there? 
20 A No. 
21 
22 
Q 
office? 
What interest did you understand him to have in that 
57 
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A He owned the business. 
Q He owned the business. 
A And he owned the building. 
Q Did you discuss with him at the time you took this 
application whether or not the employees who worked there would 
be covered under this liability policy? 
A Yes, but they weren't employees. 
Q What did you understand them to be? 
A Independent con~~actors in most situations. 
Q Did you remind him that he did not need coverage for 
his independent contractors? 
A I didn't advise him one way or the other. 
Q Who made the decision not to include those independen 
contractors under this policy? 
A There were part time -- as I understand it they were 
part-time employees there and they had their own professional 
liability. 
Q Did he advise you that they had their own professiona 
liability? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Going back to the application a moment, on page 15 
I mean on the second page, number 15 where it says, "Check 
58 
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procedures below you perform." And I understand that you went 
2 over each one of these with the doctor and you did your 
3 understanding from his was that he did not perform any of these 
4 procedures? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That is correct. 
He told you he was an OB-GYN doctor, did he not? 
That's correct. 
What did you understand him to what did you under-
9 stand his practice to be_~omprised of as an OB-GYN physician? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I don't. know. I am not a doctor. 
Did you ask him what he did? 
Yes. Surgery, we got into surgery. 
All right, sir. 
That was the extent of it. 
Did he tell you what kind of surgery? 
No. 
Did he tell you he performed abortions? 
No. 
Did he tell you he delivered babies? 
I don't recall whether he did that or not, no. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q You didn't understand that an OB-GYN doctor, or you 
didn't know that an OB-GYN doctor delivered babies? 
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A I know that an OB did, yes. 
2 Q Were you aware that OB-GYN physicians delivered babie 
3 by Caesarean section? 
4 A Yes. 
*** 
22 Q He indicated to you that a hundred percent of his 
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practice was major surgery, is that correct? 
2 
3 
A 
Q 
4 perform? 
5 
6 
7 
8 ways. 
9 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
What type of major surgery did you understand him to 
I didn't ask him what type he performed. 
This is a doctor I'm sorry, go ahead. 
It is a question that can be answered one of three 
I understand that this is a doctor that you had at 
10 that time insured for a period of 8 years, is that correct? 
11 
12 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
Did you know or. Simopoulos on a social basis as well 
13 as on a professional basis? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
No, sir. 
Did you ever see him socially at all? 
No, sir. 
During the 18-year period that you insured him throug 
l8 your agency, how often did you see him? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Once a year, maybe twice a year. 
Would that be in your office or in his office? 
It would have been either one. 
His office that located close to you, what was the 
.- -- 61 
, 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - CROSS 
name of his practice at that location? 
2 A As far as I knew "Chris Simopoulos." 
3 Q Did he have any type of a sign out front that indicatE 
4 his practice? 
5 A Not that I know of, no. 
6 Q How did you know that his practice was located t~ere? 
7 Was there anything to direct the public to that location? 
8 
•·· 9 
A 
Q 
Not to my knowledge. 
Throughout the.period of time that he was insured by 
10 Saint Paul, to your knowledge were any claims made against him 
11 alleging medical malpractice at any time? 
12 A Not to my recollection, no. 
*** 
22 Q Mr. Rousseau, had you seen anything in the newspaper 
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or on T.V. in 1980 through 1983 regarding Dr. Simopoulos's 
2 conviction of performing an abortion to a second trimester 
3 other than that hospital? 
4 A I had heard about the trimester abortion, but that 
s was the end of it. I don't recall when it was. 
6 
7 
Q 
A 
You had heard about it? 
That's right. 
8 Q Had you heard about it prior to the time that you too 
9 this application in 1983~-
10 A That I don't recall. I don't think so. 
11 Q Thinking back, when was the first time that you can 
12 recall being aware of his conviction of performing an abortion? 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
I didn't know he was convicted. 
Had you heard that he had been charged with performin 
15 an abortion? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A 
Q 
A 
The one in Norfolk, yes. 
What about the one in the Northern Virginia area? 
I don't recall that I heard about it unless it was 
in the last few months. 
Q At the time you took this application from 
21 Dr. Simopoulos, were you aware that he had ever had any crimina 
22 charges placed against him as a result of his medical .practice? 
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A No. 
2 Q Were you aware at that time that his staff privileges 
3 at any hospital had been revoked? 
4 A No, I was not. 
s Q Or had been suspended? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Were you aware at that time that his license to 
8 practice medicine had been suspended for any period of time? 
9 A No, I was not. 
Q Do you make any investigation yourself with regard to 
11 a particular applicant for malpractice coverage? 
12 
• 13 
A 
Q 
No. 
Prior to going to Dr. Simopoulos's office to fill out 
14 this application, had you reviewed his file in your office that 
15 dealt with his coverage under the Saint Paui policy? 
16 A No, only to the extent of some of these biographical 
17 or questions as far as his graduation. 
18 Q You did get out the Saint Paul policy to get some of 
19 the biographical information before you went to his office? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Had you filled in a portion of the application before 
22 you went to his office? 
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A Yes, his name and University of Athens, basically 
2 1 through 4 or 5. 
3 Q On the front page there where it says, "License 
4 number and effective date," did you write the license number 
5 down before you went to his office? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
No. 
That is circled in red. Do you know who circled that. 
I do not. 
Then across from number 1, that is MB7 12/19/83, do 
10 you know what that stands for? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
No, I don•t. 
Did you place that on there? 
No. 
"Dates insured, 9/22/75 to 12/1/83," did you place 
15 that on there? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Was that information that you had obtained from the 
Saint Paul folder? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Was that coverage under the Saint Paul policy extende 
to ~over Dr. Simopoulos through the month of December of 1983? 
A It was issued to cover him from 9/22/83 to 84, a full 
year. 
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Q At the time ~- in question number 1 where it says, 
2 "List your current and past professional liability insurance 
3 carriers," under "dates insured," you filled out "9/22/75 to 
4 12/1/83," isn't that correct? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
Was his policy to terminate on 12/1/83? 
It was at that time but it did not. 
It was extended to cover him through the month of 
9 December, 1983? 
10 A It didn't have to be extended. It already covered 
11 that period but it was terminated after 12/1/83, yes. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
II 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
When was it terminated? 
1/1/84. 
Did you do the necessary steps to terminate it? 
Yes, I did. 
*** 
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*** 
4 Q Question number 24 under current practice section B, 
5 "Briefly expla~n your current perform consent practices/ 
6 procedures," did you discuss that with Dr. Simopoulos? 
7 A Where? 
8 Q Number 24, current practice, subquestion B, "Please 
9 explain --" 
10 A Yes, definitely. 
11 Q You did not fill that in. Did he tell you he didn't 
12 have any practice? 
13 A No. He mentioned the oral and the preprinted 
14 instructions. 
15 Q You didn't feel it was necessary to fill in paragraph 
16 section B, is that correct? 
17 
18 
A 
Q 
Not if he didn't tell me. 
Question number 2 8, "Do you have any employees other 
19 than physicians for whom coverage is additional insurers is 
20 requested?" The answer to that is "no," is that correct? 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
Underneath that in the list of eroployees they include 
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registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, others, number an 
2 type. Was there anyone else working in the Woodbridge office 
3 other than Dr. Simopoulos? 
4 A The only person that I was aware that was working 
s there was a receptionist. 
6 
7 
8 
Q 
A 
Q 
There were no nurses there? 
Not to my knowledge. 
How about his ~orfolk offjce that he indicated to you 
9 he worked out of, did you.ask him if he had anybody working 
10 there? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, and he indicated he worked that office by himsel . 
Did he tell you he had a receptionist at that office? 
No, he didn't. 
Did he tell you how he split his time between that 
15 office and the Woodbridge office? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
Roughly l".e said severaJ. days a week in Norfol!:. 
Mr. Rousseau, going back to the first page of the 
application across from number 6 there, "What is your specialty?" 
there is the "CL-6" looks like DKU or something, 2/20/83, is 
that your writing? 
A 
Q 
No, it is not. 
Do you know what that means? 
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A I have no idea. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Do you know who placed that on the application? 
I do not. 
ROBERT ROUSSEAU - REDIRECT 
*** 
Mr. Rousseau, how many policy holders approximately 
9 did you have in November, December, January of '83/84? 
10 
11 
A 
A 
Total policy holders in the office? 
Yes. How many different policy holders did you have 
12 that you had to service in your office? 
13 
14 
A 
Q 
1600, 17 maybe, approximately. 
You didnt' have what is known as binding authority 
1s for this company, did you? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A 
Q 
No. 
When you received an application you submit it to t~e 
company and then the company would let you know whether or not 
coverage would be extended to your policy or your client, is 
that correct? 
A That is correct. 
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s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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*** 
THE COURT: How did you find out the company was goin 
to accept, that is Pennsylvania Casualty was going to accept 
this application which was dated November 18, 1983? What 
acceptance did the company advise you that they were making of 
this application? 
THE WITNESS: I.got a note from one of the company 
10 representatives that they were issuing -- it had been approved 
11 and they were issuing 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
THE COURT: Then the policy came out the first of •a4. 
THE WITNESS: That•s correct. 
THE COURT: January 1 of 1 84. 
THE WITNESS: That•s correct. 
THE COURT: The po~icy was with Saint Paul I believe 
17 you said or had its initial inception September 22, •75, and it 
18 anniversary date was September 22nd o= each there afterwards, 
19 was it not? 
20 THE WITNESS: That•s correct. 
21 THE COURT: Do you know whether or not Saint Paul, di 
22 they withdraw that policy or give notice that they we~e going t 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
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withdraw that policy? 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
No, they did not. 
They didn't advise that? 
I returned it myself. 
You returned the policy to them? 
(Nods head) 
But it did run for three and a half month ? 
That's correct. 
When did you first start writing for 
10 Pennsylvania Casualty? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19;•· 
THE WITNESS: Approximately November, '83. 
THE COURT: Did you decide to withdraw from Saint 
Paul, the doctor from Saint Paul before you got Pennsylvania 
casualty or after you signed on with them? 
THE WITNES~: After. 
THE COURT: So you apparently realized that you were 
looking for -- you had to get another carrier with a lesser 
premium, is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
*** 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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*** 
THE COURT: Let's put it this way: Did you feel like 
you had to get another carrier in order to salvage your clientele. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you start shopping =or a 
lesser expensive carrier~ 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Once you found Pennsylvania Casualty, 
did you at that time make the decision to go from Saint Paul to 
Pennsylvania with Dr. Simopoulos? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: What kind of trainin~ did Pennsylvania 
casualty give you as a perspective as a new agent for them? 
THE WITNESS: In what respect, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: For writing policies? 
MR. PAGE: Excuse me, Your Honor. He didn't write th 
polices. He wrote applications. 
THE COURT: All right, applications, writing a9plica-
tions? What training did they give you for whatever purposes 
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after you signed on as their agent? 
2 THE WITNESS: There was v~ry little training as such. 
3 But the field rep obviously did come down and bring the contract 
4 and my supplies, and reviewed their particular forms, their 
s particular application forms. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Did anybody stress the importance of at 
least putting something into these questions that were enumerate 
here so that one could be able to tell whether or not they had 
been overlo<?ked, ignored or a response made to them? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know that there wa.s any particul 
emphasis placed on that. 
THE COURT: The reason I say that is we have gone to 
15 on several occasions and there is absolutely nothing answere 
on question number 15, is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT:. One of those in there and you knew he 
was a gy~ecologist, that was his specialty and he was certified 
in OB-GYN and he had 100 percent of his major surgery 100 
percent of his practice devoted to major surgery, and in that 
enumeration is Caesarean sections, right. But in paragraph 15 
you did not or he did not check Caesarean sections. 
'I•HF; 'iii'I'NBSS: Your Honor, I believe at the time this 
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application was taken, he had given up his OB practice and that 
2 is the reason it was answereu as gynecology. 
3 MR. PAGE: Your Honor, that is the problem I have wit 
4 the whole line of questioning. We are here today on the 
s question of whether this company was entitled to rely on 
6 specific and affirmative information 
7 THE COURT: I have got to -- Excuse me for cutting 
8 you short but I have got the agent for the company, and no one 
9 has denied he is the· age~~- The whole issue is going to boil 
10 down to whether or not this com~,any is bound by this agent's 
11 conduct,and credibility is very definitely a part of that. Tha 
12 is what I have got to decide and that is one of the reasons I 
13 am asking these questions because you gentlemen haven't covered 
14 them to my satisfaction yet. If you wish to note your exceptio 
15 to it, fine. Your exception is duly noted. 
*** 
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12 Did you at any time feel as though the doctor was 
13 maybe not answering you correctly, or didyouquestion him as to 
14 whether or not he was on these matters, in particular the 
15 questions that were left completely blank such as question 19, 
16 question 15, question 26 -- I don't know that that's the case -
17 26F? I am just looking at the ones that have not been 
18 answered. Question 12, that is not answered at all. Were you 
19 concerned that you were not getting the answers to these 
20 questions, or did the doctor just not answer you, or did the 
21 doctor answer it and you not p~t it down? 
22 THE WITNESS: That question there might have been 
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overlooked. I don't know. 
*** 
11 Q You made a commision on writing this policy, didn't 
12 you, Mr. Rousseau? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1984. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Have you had to pay back that commission? 
Yes. It was only credited as it pays. 
As it pays, and so what portion has been paid? 
On this policy? 
Yes, sir, the one that went into effect January 1, 
Whatever the period was up until it was terminated. 
*** 
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Testimony of Eugenia Dorson 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
EUGENIA DORSON - CROSS 
*** 
Q From time to time is the State Board of Medicine 
contacted by insurance carriers seeking information with regard 
to --
MR. SPENCER: Judge, -- excuse me, he has not complete 
the question. 
BY MR. LARKIN: (resumed) 
Q with regard to applicants who are seeking policies 
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ior medical malpractice coverage? 
2 MR. SPENCER: Judge, I would object on the grounds of 
3 materiality. The law in Virginia is clear that the insurance 
4 company is under no duty to make any inquiry concerning the 
s representation concerning the application, Winchester Insurance 
6 Company verses 
7 THE COURT: The Supreme Court changes the law from 
8 time to time by its decisions, and the only way they get a 
9 chance to do that is for.~omebody to get it up. ~hat is to say 
10 by the attorney and I hope to meet the Judge who is not afraid of 
11 being reversed because that is the only way the new law is made; 
12 old laws to be given a chance to be reviewed. It might not be 
13 the case in this case because I suspect it is going up either 
14 way. But be that as it may, your objection is denied. 
15 MR. SPENCER: Please note my exception. 
16 THE COURT: Exception duly noted. 
*** 
19 Q The question was, Ms. Dorson, from time to time to 
20 your knowledge is the State Board of Medicine contacted by the 
21 various insurance companies to seek information on perspective 
22 physicians who are applying for an application for medical 
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malpractice coverage? 
2 A We are contacted but we do not know the purpose of 
3 why we are contacted. We are asked for the status of a license, 
4 if they are licensed or not licensed. 
s Q You are also contacted by insurance carriers who 
6 inquire of you as to whether or not a particular physician has 
7 had any disciplinary actions taken against them? 
8 A If they inquire we ask them to write in. 
9 Q If they do inq~~re you provide that information to 
10 them? 
11 A Yes, sir .. 
12 Q To your knowledge was any inquiry made by Pennsylvani 
13 Casualty Company with regard to Dr. Simopoulos prior to January 1 
14 1984? 
15 A I cannot answer that because I did not research the 
16 file. 
*** 
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Testimony of Rebecca Gregory 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
1 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
REBECCA GREGORY - DIRECT 
*** 
Would you state your full name for the record, please? 
Rebecca Gregory. 
How are you employed, Ms. Gregory? 
I am director of the Medical Staff Services of 
Commonwealth Hospital. 
Q As a Director of Medical Staff Services at Commonwealt 
Hospital, are you custodian of the hospital medical -- hospital 
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records concerning physicians who have staff privileges at the 
2 hospital? 
3 
4 
5 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, I am. 
Commonwealth Hospital is in Fairfax? 
Fairfax.r.ity. 
*** 
so 
14 
15 
16 
Q 
A 
Q 
REBECCA GREGORY - CROSS 
*** 
You were working at the hospital in 1980? 
Urn-hum. 
Apart from the documents in the file, were you aware 
17 of Or. Simopoulos's conviction? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. SPENCER: Objection, Your Honor, for the reasons 
stated. This witness is not a part of the community. What she 
knew about Dr. Simopoulos is absolutely immaterial to this case 
as far as what Pennsylvania Casualty Company did. 
THE COURT: I understand that. Objection overruled. 
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MR. SPENCER: Please note our continuing c>bjection to 1 
2 this line of questioning. 
3 THE COURT: No, sir, I will not do that. You are goi 
4 to get on your feet and object every time you want to object. 
s I am not going to qive a continuing objection to this Court's 
6 ruling until I know what you are going to object to. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. SPENCER: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: All right, go ahead and answer the 
question, ma'am. Did yo~ have any personal knowledge of it? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
*** 
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Testimony of Maynard Stufft 
MAYNARD STUFFT - DIRECT 
*** 
22 Q By whom are you employed, Mr. Stufft? 
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A Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company, Pennsylvania 
2 Casualty Company. 
3 Q What is your job with the.Pennsylvania Casualty 
4 Company? 
s 
6 
A 
Q 
Vice President of underwriting. 
Are you the senior person of the underwriting depart-
7 ment? 
8 
9 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
How many people.do you have in your underwriting 
10 department? 
11 
12 
A 
Q 
I have 8 underwriters and one manager. 
Tell the Court how long you have been functioning in 
13 the underwriting business, Mr. Stufft. 
14 
15 
A 
Q 
A total of 28 years. 
Would you please describe for us what your background 
16 in the underwriting business is? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A I was with Pennsylvania National Insurance Company 
for 20 years in various underwriting capacities. Eventually 
I was vice-president of underwriting for that company. I came 
with the Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company in August of 
1977 in that same capacity. 
*** 
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*** 
18 Q I think I misspc:»ke. I think I asked if you had an 
19 agreement for them to allow them to write policies. Are your 
20 agents in Virginia allowed to write policies? 
21 A No, they are not. 
22 Q Do they, Mr. Stufft, have bir.ding authority? 
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A No, they do not. 
'·~:.•'·.!.~ 
2 Q Could you tell the Court why Pennsylvania Casualty 
3 Company does not extend binding authority to its agents? 
A Yes. We are writing a very volatile line of business 
5 health provider malpractice insurance. We reserve all the 
6 underwriting decisions to our underwriters. 
7 Q Mr. Stufft, when an application for medical profes-
8 sional liability policy is submitted to Pennsylvania Casualty 
9 Company, to whom is this submitted within the company when it 
10 first comes in? 
11 A It first comes in through our mail department and it' 
12 forwarded to the underwriters services unit. 
13 Q All right, sir, I have here a document that was 
14 previously been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1. I am 
15 going to offer you this document ane ask if you can identify 
16 it as an application for medical professional liability insur-
17 ance on a Pennsylvania Casualty Company form? 
18 A Yes, this is our application for medical professional 
19 liability including the Virginia Supplement. 
20 Q Did you at my request, Mr. Stufft, before coming here 
21 today review the files of Pennsylvania Casualty Company to 
22 determine whether or not there was contained in those files an 
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2 
3 
application from a -- signed by Dr. Chr"is Simopoulos or Chris 
Simpoulos, M.D. Limited? 
Yes. 
4 
A 
Q Can you identify that document that you have in your 
S hand as the application that you found in the Pennsylvania 
6 Casualty Company's file? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, it is. 
Was it in your underwriting file? 
In our underwrLtinq file. 
Now, Mr. Stufft, I would like for you to look at 
11 this, and there has been some question early on with respect 
12 to the red writing on this application that is to the right of 
13 the requested effective date of coverage. Can you look at that 
14 and identify it for me, please, sir? 
15 A Yes. That's the change in the request of effective 
16 date to 1/1/84, and it is initialed by the underwriting 
17 manager. That is MDT, l1att D. Townsend, dated 12/19/83. 
18 Q Mr. Townsend is an underwriting manager. Does he 
19 report directly to you? 
20 
21 
A 
Q 
Ye~, he does. 
Was he a~ployed as an underwriting manager at 
22 Pennsylvania Casualty Company in the time period November, 
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December, January of 1983 and '84? 
2 A Yes, he was. 
3 Q All right, sir, there has also been some questioned 
4 raised of handwriting on Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 that 
s appears on line 6 approximately in the area of subspecialty. 
6 Could you -- do you know whose handwritin~ that is first, sir? 
7 A Well the initials I know. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Q 
A 
0 
A 
Q 
All right, sir, whose initials are they? 
Debra K. Vanderwall. 
Who is Debra K. Vanderwall? 
She is an underwriter in my department. 
Was she an underwriter in your department in the peri d 
13 of time from November, December of 1983 and January of 1984? 
14 
15 
16 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, she was. 
Can you read what she wrote in that particular space? 
She wrote, "Class 6," her initials and dated it, 
17 "12/20/83. 11 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q All right, sir, and what does "Class 6" mean to you 
as vice president of underwriting for Pennsylvania Casualty 
Company? 
A That's the rating classification that would be ap~lie 
to this specialty, specialty of gynecology. 
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Q Can you determine from your review of this document 
and the material that we have just ·reviewed whether this parti-
cular application was reviewed by the underwriting department 
at Pennsylvania Casualty Company? 
A 
0 
Yes, it was. 
All right, sir, now did there come a time after this 
7 application had been made available and been reviewed by the 
8 Pennsylvania Casualty Company when the Pennsylvania Casualty 
9 Company made the decision to issue certain policies insurin~ 
10 Chris Simopoulos, M.D. Limited pursuant to that application? 
11 
12 
A 
Q 
Yes, we did issue a policy. 
I will offer now a document that has been previously 
13 marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 4 and ask you if you can 
14 identify that document as the policy that was in fact issued 
15 to Chris Simopoulos, M.D. Limited? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And I will ask you further to look at the second page 
18 of that Exhibit and see if the policy number is HP1286? 
19 A That is the policy number and this is the policy that 
20 was issued. 
21 Q Have you determined prior to coming here today that 
22 this was the policy issued by Pennsylvania Casualty Company 
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pursuant to the application that is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
I notice the poli~y number is HP1286. What does the 
4 HP stand for? 
5 
6 
A Health provider. 
MR. PAGE: Your Honor, I would like to have a documen 
7 marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 18. 
8 
9 
10 0 
THE COURT: Plaintiff's 18. 
BY MR. PAGE: (~esumed) 
Mr. Stufft, I am going to offer you now a document 
11 that has previously been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1 
12 and ask you if you can identify that document for me? And I 
13 would suggest to you that you look on the third page from the 
14 bottom of that document. You might find the page that should 
15 on the top, which is the declaration page. 
16 A Yes, this is the policy. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
All right, sir. That policy has what number? 
EP1286. 
iihat does the EP stand for? 
Excess policy. 
Have you identified that prior to coming here today 
as the excess policy that was issued to Chris Simo?oulos, M.D. 
-......... 90 
-. 
MAYNARD STUFFT - DIRECT 
Limited pursuant to the application filed for Chris Simopoulos, 
2 M.D. Limited by Chris Simopoulos, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit 
3 Number 1? 
4 A Yes, I have. 
*** 
20 Q Now I would like to return if we could, Mr. Stufft, 
21 to the application, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1, and 
22 ask you whether your company in issuing policies of health 
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-
care provider comprehensive liability and excess policies rely 
2 on the applications that are submitted to it for those policies? 
3 A Yes, we do. 
*** 
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9 
.Q What I would li~e to do first, Mr. Stufft, is to ask 
10 you to look at the application, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit 
11 Number 1, and I would like to call your attention to specifical y 
12 question number 16 on that particular application. And I am 
13 going to ask you why it is that your company places that parti-
14 cular question on the application? 
15 
16 
A This is an indication. It tells us definitely whethe 
or not there has there is presently a license or if it is 
17 denied, provoked or suspended or limited in any way. And we 
18 ask for the details of any such revocation suspension. That is 
19 an important underwriting question because it gives us a past 
20 history of the physician and especially gives us information 
21 if there ever has been a revocation or suspension of the licens . 
*** 
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*** 
··~ 
2 Q Mr. Stufft, with respect .to the application and 
J Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1, question number 17, "Have your 
4 staff privileges at any institution ever been suspended or 
s in any way restricted?" Why do you as that particular question. 
6 A We ask that question on our application in order to 
7 determine if there may have been any possible situations which 
8 would have caused the hospital or other health care provider 
9 institution to suspend o~.restrict the privileges. And we need 
10 to know that information in order to make an evaluation of the 
11 risk of the individual physician that he miqht be presenting 
12 to us from an underwriting standpoint. 
13 Q Mr. Stufft, I now would like to call your attention 
14 to question number 23 on the Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1, and 
15 ask you -- the question is: "Have you ever been convicted of a 
16 crime other than a motor vehicle citation?" And I will ask you 
17 why your company includes that question on its application for 
18 professional liability coverage? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A We need to determine if there has ever been a convic-
tion of a crime because, again, it increases our risk if there 
was conviction of a crime from the standpoint of credibility 
of the physician in the event we have to defend them for a 
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malpractice case in the future, and as to their overall attitu e 
2 towards the law itself • 
. ~ ..... · 
*** 
19 Q Mr. Stufft, with respect to question number 26, I wil 
20 ask you to assume that -- I'm sorry, question number 23, "Have 
21 you ever been convicted of a crime?" which is on Plaintiff's 
22 Exhibit Number 1. I will ask you to assume that Dr. Simopoulos 
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who filled in this application had inqicated that he had been 
2 convicted of a crime and that that .crime was the performance of 
3 a second trimester abortion, and. I will ask you whether under 
4 those facts your company would have written a policy or given a 
s policy to Dr. Simopoulos? 
6 
7 
Y~. WEINTRAUB: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. That is a positive 
8 question. 
9 
10 
MR. WEINTRAUB·: No, Your Honor. 
THE.-.COURT: That is the positive side of it. Cbjection· 
11 is overruled. Your exception duly noted. Let's go on, sir. 
12 He turned the question around. He turned it around and he made 
13 it proper in my opinion, and I have overruled your objection. 
14 Your exception duly noted. Answer the question, sir. 
15 
16 
THE WITrmss: We would not have issued a policy. 
THE COURT: The question simply and purely -- had 
17 there been a "yes" answer rather than a "no" answer, would the 
19 policy have been issued. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
THE WITNESS: If I may, it would depend on the circum 
stances, and under the circumstances that were described to me 
in the question.we would not have issued a policy. 
THE COURT: There weren't any circumstances described 
96 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
" 
MAYNARD STUFFT - DIRECT 
in my question. Had this have been answered "yesn instead of 
"no," question 23, nothing more, if the X had been a "yes" 
rather than "no," would you have issued that policy? 
THE WITNESS: We would have asked for more informatio 
on that 1'yes" answer, not knowing what that conviction was. 
THE COURT: All right, go from there. 
BY MR. PAGE: (resumed) 
8 Q All right, Mr. Stufft, with respect to answer number 
9 16 on Plaintiff's Exhibi~ Number 1, had that question been 
10 answered in the affirmative as opposed to the negative, would 
11 your company had issued the policies HP1286 and EP1286? 
12 MR. WEINTRAUB: I have the same objection to that 
13 question, Your Honor. 
14 
15 
THE COURT: All right, objection overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Again, we would have needed the details 
16 of the denial, revocation or suspension of the license. 
17 
18 Q 
BY MR. PAGE: (resumed) 
And if you had determined in obtaining those details 
19 that the license had been revoked as a result of a conviction 
20 of a felony in the practive of the physician, would your compan 
21 then have issued the policy? 
22 A No, we would have not. 
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*** 
4 Q Now with respect to question number 17 on Plaintiff's 
5 Exhibit Number 1, "Have your staff privileges at any institutio 
6 ever been suspended or in any way restricted?" if that question 
7 had been answered in the affirmative as opposed to the negative 
8 would your company have issued the policy HP1286 and EP1286 to 
9 Chris Simopoulos, Limite~ and the physicians therein listed? 
10 A Again, if the answer is "yes" we would have needed th 
11 details of the reasons for that suspension or restriction of 
12 staff privileges and we would have asked for more information. 
*** 
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*** 
Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Stufft: Who assessed the 
underwriting policy for the company? Let me ask you this: Do 
you participate in the setting of underwriting policy for the 
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Pennsylvania Casualty Company? . 
Yes, I do. 
How long have you participated in that policy? 
Since I have been with the company in 1977. 
~5 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
How long have you been vice pr~sident of underwriting. 
Since 1983. 
Who is it in the company that makes recommendations 
tohiremanagement now and since 1983 with respect to the 
company's underwriting po~icy? 
A I do. 
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Q Mr. Stufft, based on your review of the underwriting 
file with respect to the policies HP1286 and EP1286, did 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company have in its file information that 
suggested that Chris Simopoulos, M.D. had in fact had his licen e 
revoked prior to November of 19831 had in fact had his staff 
privileges revoked at an institutions prior to November of 1983· 
had in fact had his privileges, his license to practice there-
after limited after being revoked and then limited prior to 
November of 1983? Was that information in the file of 
21 Pennsylvania Casualty Company? 
22 A At the time we wrote the policy? 
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Q Yes, sir. 
A 
Q 
No, it was not. 
All right, sir. And when did Pennsylvania Casualty 
Company first become aware that Chris Simopoulos, ~1.D. had been 
convicted of a felony? 
A In September of mid 1984. 
Q tihat was the mechanism by which they became aware of 
that fact? 
A There was a claim, a malpractice claim filed and we 
became enliqhted of that conviction at that time. 
Q Did that information come from the attorney to whom 
you forwarded that file? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
When was it after receiving that information that the 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company sent out reservations of rights 
letters and directed that this particular declaratory judgment 
action be filed? 
A Sometime in the second week of September, I believe. 
*** 
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*** 
8 Q Mr. Stufft, I will now offer you a document that has 
9 been previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 19, and ask 
10 you if you can identify that document as the notice that 
11 Pennsylvania Casualty Company received concerning Dr. S~os' 
12 conviction? 
13 A Yes, it was. 
.~.:: -~ ~· 
14 MR. PAGE: Your Honor,I would like to move the admis-
15 · II sion of Plaintiff • s Number 19 into evidence. 
16 THE COURT: Any objection? 
17 MR. WEINTRAUB: No. May I ask counsel the date of 
18 II that letter again? 
19 MR. PAGE: Your Honor, it is dated August 31, 1984 
20 11 and it shows it was received in Pennsylvania Casualty Claims 
21 11 on September 4, 1984. 
*** 
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*** 
~--~-4 Q Mr. Stufft, would you tell the Court what Pennsylvan·a 
s Casualty Company did upon the receipt of that information? 
6 A We instituted cancellation of the policy, and 
7 instructed our attorneys to seek a declaratory judgment. 
8 Q All right, sir, and did you also send out reservation 
9 of rights letters to tho~~ people who were known to have made 
10 claims with respect to the policy? 
11 A Yes, we did. 
*** 
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*** 
6 Q Mr. Stufft, with respect to applications for medical 
7 professional liability coverage, when those applications reach 
8 the underwriting department, under what circumstances are they 
9 in fact referred to an u~9erwriter? 
10 A Under the guidelines where there are any questions 
11 and that we have previously identified in which they would be 
12 "yes" answer, a positive answer; situations where there are 
13 more than -- 5 or move physicians insured on one policy; any 
14 back dating of coverage. In other words, anything that would 
lS be out of the ordinary,that should be referred to an underwrite 
16 for further questioning or to make a decision at that time to 
17 issue or not issue a policy. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
THE COURT: How about if the questions weren't 
answered on your application? 
THE WITNESS: That would be within the underwriter's 
judgment as to whether or not it would be necessary to go back 
and determine answers for those questions, or whether they are 
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sufficient -- there is sufficient information available in the 
remainder of the application to make a decision. 
*** 
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*** 
0 Mr. Stufft, in the period between November,. 1983 and 
March of 1984, did you as vice presidept of underwriting at 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company and did the company under your 
guidance consider material information that suggested that a 
physician had been convicted of a felony associating with his 
practice? 
A Yes, we did. 
9 Q All right, sir,.and did in the period of November and 
10 December of 1983, and January through March of 1984, did the 
11 Pennsylvania Casualty Company consider material information 
12 with respect to the revocation of a physician's license? 
13 
14 
• 1 s 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
0 
Yes, we did. 
Why did you consider that material? 
A In the first place a physician can't practice medicin 
without a valid license. And secondly if the license had been 
revoked and subsequently was reinstated!and the physician was 
now again practicing, that would reduce the credibility of that 
physician in the· event that we had to defend him in the future 
and also would indicate some question on his ability to practic 
medicine. 
Q With respect to the prior question that I asked you 
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concerning the commision of a felony in his practice, why did 
you and your company consider that .information to be material? 
A Because that shows either ignorance or disregard for 
the law and would reduce the credibility of the witness or of 
the physician. It also if such a felony would bring about a 
malpractice claim, there would be no defense for such a claim 
because of the violation of the law. 
Q Mr. Stufft, with respect to the revocation or limita-
tion of hospital privileg~s, did your company and did you in th 
period of November and December, 1983 and January through March 
of 1984 consider information with respect to the revocation or 
limitation of hospital privileges to be material in your under-
writing position? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q Why did you consider them to be material? 
A Again, it give us an indication of the question in 
the physician's past practice and we need to know the reasons 
for such suspension or revocation of privileges, understanding 
that those privileges would have been removed by the credential 
committee of the physician's peers of the hospital. It would 
give us an indication that there was a problem withthat physician 
which increases our underwriting risk. 
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*** 
20 THE COURT: What I am concerned with, Mr. Page, is 
21 that while admittedly Mr. Stufft is testifying to what the 
22 general policy is, and I have no question that he helps to set 
. 109 
the policies during the period of time that this policy -- or 
2 help set the policy of the company .during the period of time 
3 during which this application was being considered and subse-
4 quently when the policy was actually issued. But we have two 
5 individuals that issued this policy. I don't know what they 
6 may have done. Whether they looked at this thing and saw that 
7 question number 10 hadn't been answered and just chose to 
a ignore that, question number 15 hadn't been answered and chose 
9 to ignore that, or ques.tion number 19 hadn • t been answered and 
10 chose to ignore that. Or whether they did it on the advice of 
11 somebody superior to them. Although I am going to overrule 
12 your objection, I think you still fall short of some truth 
13 that you have got to have to meet those Virginia cases. 
14 All right, sir? 
15 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. PAGE: All right, Sir, I understand. 
THE COURT: I will note your exception to my rulinq. 
*** 
Q Mr. Stufft, if you assume that the responses to 
questions 15, 16 and 23 on Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1, if you 
assume that the responses to those questions are in fact misre-
presentations, would you and did your company in the period 
110 
MAYNARD STUFFT - DIRECT 
between November, December, 1983, and January and February of 
2 1984 ·consider such misrepresentations to be material? 
3 
4 
A 
Q 
Yes, we do. 
All right, sir, and why did you -- would you consider 
5 those misrepresentations to be material? 
6 A Because all of those questions indicate to an 
7 underwriter the degree of risk that an applicant presents to th 
a company, and they have to make their judgments with that 
9 information. 
10 Q And is it the policy of the Pennsylvania Casualty 
11 Company to rely upon affirmative responses or responses to 
12 questions on applications for medical and professional liabilit. 
13 policy in determining whether to issue policies? 
14 A Yes, it is our policy. 
*** 
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Q Mr. Stufft, if you look at Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 
1 in its original form, basically how is it maintained in the 
file? 
A It is kept with the underwriting file. 
Q There is a -- basically what you have on page 1 are 
14 separate requests for information, is that correct? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q On the top of the next page as you open the policy 
you have then questions 15 through 24, is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q The coverage options in the Virginia Supplement, 
questions 25 through 26F follow immediately after 24, do they 
not? 
A That's correct. 
Q And they are maintained in the center of the policy 
directly after the second page? 
A Of the application. 
Q Of the application, I'm sorry, thank you. And finall 
questions 27 and 28 under coverage options are on the last page, 
is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now with respect to Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2, 
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first of all with respect to the amount of coverage desired 
2 we see that those options, that information is sought under 
3 coverage options under the Virginia Supplement, is that correct. 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q The information concerning that is on questions 25 
6 through 26, is that correct? 
7 A Right. 
8 Q 26E I guess. 
9 A 26A.through 26~, right. 
10 Q Does the policy which is Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2 
11 reflect the information for example concerning coverage which 
12 is listed on 26A, 100- to $300,000? 
13 A $1 million, $3 million. 
14 Q Thank you. And that information is directly below 
15 the information that is on page 2 which contains questions 16, 
16 17 and 23, isn't that correct? 
17 A That's correct. 
18 Q And as you open the policy -- the application, I'm 
19 sorry, to look at the coverage options under Virginia Supplemen 
20 you basically have before you page that contains questions 15 
21 through 26F, is that correct? 
22 A That's right. 
113 
.... 
" 
MAYNARD STUFFT - DIRECT 
Q All right, sir, and with respect to the first page 
2 of the policy we see that that particular page has notations 
3 on it from two people in the underwriting department, is that 
4 correct? 
5 A That's correct. 
*** 
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6 Q You have answered some questions about some of the 
7 numbered questions on the application form. 
8 A Yes. 
- :!~ ... ; 
9 Q ~illy the company_ puts them on the form. I want to ask 
10 you some questions about some of the other numbered questions. 
11 On the second page at the top, question number 15, why does 
12 the company put this question on its application for insurance? 
13 A To determine if the surgical -- how to clasify him 
14 with the surgical procedures that are listed under question 15. 
15 
16 
Q 
A 
What is the significance of its classification? 
Classification is a rating classification. It 
17 determines the premium the physician pays. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q 
A 
Is it significant if this question was left blank? 
Not on this application because there is only one 
classification for a OB-GYN physician. 
Q Regardless of what has been filled in here, that woul 
have been the same classification? 
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A That's correct. 
2 Q Go down to question number 19, why does the company 
3 put question 19 on its application? 
4 A To that questions has to do with any claims or 
5 suits that were brought against the physician for alleged mal-
6 practice in the state for the past five years, and we are looki 
7 for the past history of the physician with regard to malpracti~ 
8 claims. 
9 
10 
Q 
A 
Why is that im~?rtant? 
It gives us an indication of the practice of the 
11 physician, whether or not he has been subjected to malpractice 
12 claims in the past, and what the results of those past actions 
13 have been. 
14 
15 
16 
Q 
A 
Q 
Does that affect the risk that the company faces? 
Yes, it does. 
Now is it significant that question 19 doesn't have 
17 an answer of either "yes" or "no"? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A In this particular application it would not be signi-
ficant because of other information contained in the applicatio . 
Q Might that not be the fact that the insured had 
previously been insured by Saint Paul if you look at question 1. 
A No, it would have nothing to do with that. It 
116 
-MAYNARD STUFFT - CROSS 
specifically would have to do with question number 20 in which 
2 that question was answered. There·had been no suits threatened 
3 in the past five years. 
4 Q But he could have a claim but not a suit, isn't that 
5 correct? 
6 A If there had been a suit threatened, that is addition 1 
7 information that we would need. There could be a claim without 
8 a suit, correct. 
9 Q In which case question 19 would have to be answered 
10 if there was a claim.but no suit? 
11 
12 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
Wouldn't the lack of any answer "yes" or "no" then be 
13 significant? 
14 A It would be significant but in the absence of any 
15 details being listed there, we have to assume that there were n 
16 past claims. 
17 Q So where there is no answer -- there is an absence of 
18 any answer, you assume the answer would have been no? 
19 
20 
A 
Q 
In this particular question we would have. 
Now question 24B, why does the company place that 
21 question on its application form? 
22 A That question has to do with the informed consent 
117 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
MAYNARD STUFFT - CROSS 
practices and procedures of a physician. 
from a risk management standpoint. · 
That is important 
Q When you say "risk management," do you mean that the 
company may made suggestions to the pnysician as to what type o 
informed consent he should give to patients? 
A Yes, we provide a physician's risk management guide to 
our insured physicians. 
Q And of course am I correct that lack of informed 
9 consent would be signifi~~nt to the risk the company faces, 
10 wouldn't it? 
Yes, it would. 11 
12 
A 
Q Is it significanb that question 24B would be left 
13 unanswered? 
14 A It's signficant in that there needs to be risk manage 
15 rnent work done with the physicians such as those who has none. 
16 0 Page 1, question 1 asks about current and past 
17 insurance. Why does your company place question 1 on its form? 
18 A Again, to determine the historical record of who his 
19 malpractice carriers might have been in the past. 
20 Q Was it significant that he had prior coverage with 
21 Saint Paul? 
22 A Yes. 
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Q Now do you know where M.D. Townsend is? 
2 A Where he is, yes. 
3 Q Where is he? 
4 A Well I am not sure I know where he is today. He is 
s on vacation this week. 
6 Q He is on vacation. Is he still an employee of --
7 A Yes, he is. 
8 Q -- the company? And O.K. Vanderwall, is she still 
9 employed by the company? .. 
10 A Yes, she is. 
11 Q What office does M.D. Townsend work out of? 
12 A Our Camp Hill office. 
13 Q Camp Hill. And what office does D.K. Vanderwall work 
14 out of? 
A 15 Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. 
Q 16 Am I correct that the Virginia agent mailed this appl·-
17 cation to Camp Hill, Pennsylvania? 
18 A That's correct. 
19 Q It would not go to another location? 
20 A No. 
21 Q What office do you work out of? 
22 A Camp Hill. 
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7 Q Mr. Stufft, the ap9lication that is prepared, this is 
8 your company's form, is it not? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That's correct~-
The questions on here were prepared by your company? 
That's right. 
Does your company qive the aqent any training or do 
13 they give him any instruction as to how to complete the form? 
14 A Through the marketing department they get a kit that 
15 contains the applications, the programs that we have available, 
16 physician rate card, and so on. They are not given any specifi 
17 instructions as to how to complete the application. That seems 
18 to be pretty straight forward and self explanatory. 
19 Q To your knowledge are the agents advised to get an 
20 answer to all the questions? 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
Not to my knowledge, no. 
Your company wouldn '. t put the question on the applicati 
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if it didn't! want an answer to it, would it? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
In determining the risk with regard to a particular 
potential insured, isn't it important to you to know whether or 
not they previously had medical malpractice liability coverage 
with another insurance company? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it is. 
An individual who had been insured by Saint Paul 
Insurance Company -- and ·Saint Paul incidentally is one of the 
larger medical malpractice insurance carriers, are they not? 
A 
Q 
Yes, they are. 
An individual who had been insured by Saint Paul 
continuously since September 22, 1975 up until the time that 
this application was taken, that would be important for you to 
know, would it not? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it would. 
That would indicate to you that Saint Paul had felt 
18 that the individual was a good risk, would it not? 
19 A It would -- yes, it would. 
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Q The fact that the policy was still in effect at the 
time this application was taken, that indicates to you that 
Saint Paul considers the individual a good risk, is that not 
true? 
A Not necessarily because we don't know at that point 
whether or not Saint Paul may have refused to renew and that's 
why the physician ia applying to us. 
Q In this particular case you were aware, were you not, 
that Mr. Rousseau was changing over some of his insures to your 
company? 
A Yes. 
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Q Can you explain to me then why the application itself 
contains a provision, "I authorize any professional societies, 
prior or present business or medical associations, licensing 
boards, hospitals, governmental entities, corporations, 
partnerships, organizations, institutions or persons that may 
have any record or knowledge concerning any of the statements 
or answers made herein t~ release such information to the 
company upon request. I authorize the use of a copy of this 
authgrization in place of the original." Why did your company 
put that in the application if you weren't going to make any 
inquiries? 
A We may decide to make an inquiry in a specific case b t 
we also find that from a psychological standpoint the physician 
is more prone to answer the questions honestly and completely 
with that statement on the application if he thinks we may be 
doing some other checking. 
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---· . ----··-- -
s Q Wouldn't it be important for you to know whether or 
6 not any claims had been made and settled within the past three 
7 years without suit being threatened or filed? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q That would then be information that would have been 
10 elicited under number 19, would it not? 
11 A That's correct. 
12 Q Dr. Simopoulos at the time this was filled out in 
13 view of the fact that 19 is unanswered, his prior company could 
14 have settled five prior malpractice cases or more, could they 
15 not have? 
16 A They could have. 
••• 
20 Q I mean isn't that something that would be material 
21 to your company to know? 
22 A Yes, if that had occurred. And that's possible given 
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the fact that there is nothing in there, that is possible that 
2 that is another misrepresentation •. I do .not know if 
3 Dr. Simopoulos ever had claims while he was with Saint Paul. 
4 THE COURT: Excuse me a second. Is that a misrepre-
5 sentation by the doctor, or is that something that your agent 
6 failed to do ··because you don • t even know whether they overlooke 
7 the question, do you? They could have just as easily skipped 
8 this question, unintentionally overlooked it, isn't that right? 
9 THE WITNESS: W~ll that questions is so -- takes up 
10 so much space that we have to assume that they are going to 
11 give·us claims information. And the thousands of applications 
12 that we process, if there is -- it is public record that there 
13 were claims in the past, and that information is always given 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
to us in detail. So the absence of that answer there is an 
indication to me that there were no claims. 
THE COURT: t7hy didn • t he put "yes" or· "no" in there? 
Why did he just eliminate that entirely because "yes 11 and 11 no" 
is by itself and just ask the questions, and if he hadn't put 
anything in you would have the same response, wouldn't you? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct but.again from a 
psychological point of view to force an anst-ter into the "yes n 
or "no" category does have its benefits. We have a difficult 
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time --
2 THE COURT: Do you ever get one in that says, 
3 "Nonapplicable," or just a "N/A"? 
4 
s 
THE WITNESS: I would assume that we probably would. 
THE COURT: At least you would know when they got in 
6 there that they didn't overlook it, don't you? 
7 
8 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: You don't know.that they iidn't overlook 
9 15, do you? 
10 
11 
12 
THE WITNESS: I do not know that. 
THE COURT: Or 19? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: Or any of these others for instance 10, 
14 11 Hours per week you engage in private practice?" That is what 
15 you were insuring him for, wasn't it? And he didn't even answe 
16 that one. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
THE WITNESS: That's right. We don't know that -- we 
don't know how many hours a week, but we know what his practice 
is and insuring as· .. .many doctors as we do, we have a very good 
track record of what it is. 
THE COURT: Would it make a difference --
l~R. PAGE: Your Honor, can he finish his question? 
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You are 
THE COURT: No, he can't ·finish his question. He is 
' editorializing and I didn • t ask him for an editorial. Have a 
I; ~ 
seft, ·sir. 
~ .. ~;.,  ... 
Would it have made any difference to you whether he 
was only practicing two hours a week, or whether he was putting 
in 60 hours a week or just 40 hours a week? 
THE WITNESS: No, not from a rating standpoint. It 
9 makes absolutely no diffe~ence. 
10 THE COURT: But it makes a difference to you in ratin 
11 whether he is a gynecologist which is the maximum rate as I 
12 understood it? 
13 THE WITNESS: It's not the maximum rate, but it is a 
14 specific rate for a gynecologist. 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
16 THE WITNESS: Neurosurgeon has a higher rate for 
17 example. 
18 THE COURT: He answered, "~"7hat percentage of your 
19 practice includes _,. .. and he says, "No surgery, minor surgery, 
20 major surgery, a hundred percent major surgery," which includes 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: -- Caesarean section. Now that rates high 
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than a gynecologist's rate, is it not? 
THE WITNESS: No. It's the same rate. 
THE COURT: It is the same rate as a gynecologist? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: So major surgery, would that include 
6 open-heart surgery? 
7 
8 
THE WITNESS: Not for a gynecologist, no. 
THE COURT: I understand all doctors testify that 
9 any time you anesthetize .. that is major, is that right? 
10 THE WITNESS: If you -- Doctors normally consider 
11 major surgery as anything that puts the patient completely under. 
12 THE COURT: tihen you anesthetize him, put them to 
13 sleep, that is major? 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: So that rate is the same as a gynecologis 
16 rate in your company? 
17 
18 
THE WITNESS: For a gynecologist, yes. 
THE COURT: But do you know whether or not or is your 
19 underwriting staff instructed when questions like this are not 
20 answered on these applications that they make further investi-
21 gations? In other words use that portion of the application, 
22 which is the agreement and authorization, to check this out? 
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Are they instnucted and trained in that regard? 
THE WITNESS: They are instructed to use their judg-
ment in those areas where they can develop the information 
themselves from the application. There is certain critical 
a~eas, however, where they are also instructed that those 
questions must always be answered. 
THE COURT: l~at are those critical areas in this 
application? 
THE WITNESS: The past professional liability area. 
Of course name and address, that sort of thing we need. From 
an underwriting standpoint, we need enough information to 
clasify it so we need to know the nature of the practice, nurnbe 
7; their specialty, number 6; and the number 13, "Whether or 
there is surgery, minor surgery or major surgery.'~ In the 
event, for example, the specialty was that of a general surgeon 
then the underwriter would need to make sure that the P,rocedure 
are checked under question number 15 because that may effect 
the rating classification depending on what procedures are 
performed by a general surgeon. Question 16 must always be 
answered: 17 must always be answered; and 18 must always be 
answered. Number 19 is to be answered if there are any claims. 
There are instructions there that if there is anything out of 
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the ordinary that is to be referred and questioned further. 
THE COURT: If there are any claims they are to answer 
3 "yes ... If there are not any claims aren't they suppose to 
4 answer "no"? 
s THE WITNESS: They are -- we are not asking the 
6 underwriter to evaluate that on the basis of 11 yes 11 or 11 no." ~·;e 
7 are asking them to evaluate that on the basis of any claims 
a information from the past history that is evidenced under that 
9 question. 
10 THE COURT: How can they make a valued decision on 
11 that if they don't have the information? 
12 THE WITNESS: They need to assume on the basis of 
13 the entire application that there are no past claims if none 
14 have been listed. Because the information that is required 
15 if the answer would be "yes," is very specific as to who the 
16 malpractice insurer was, the date of the incident, the year of 
17 suit and so on. 
*** 
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fis~ 
*** 
20 THE WITNESS: But in this particular case we kne\i 
21 that this agent was transferri.nq business to our company that 
22 formerly had been with Saint Paul. So there is information of 
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a general nature that is available to our company in working 
2 in any particular area with out agents. So that would not have 
3 been a particular concern other than it does tell us what 
4 initial effective date we have to put on our policy since it is 
s a claims·made policy, and the physician did request for excess 
6 coverage. 
*** 
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MAYNARD STUFFT - CROSS 
Q Going back one moment to the application, when the 
2 application indicates that 100 percent of the doctor's practice 
3 involves major surgery and then 15 lists certain procedures 
4 that you ask him to determine whether or not he performs any 
5 of them, those procedures, isn't it important for you to know 
6 whether or not the doctor is engaged in any practice of medicin 
7 or performs any procedures outside of his specialty? 
8 A Yes, it would be. 
9 Q That is what one of the things 15 is designed to 
10 elicit, is it not? 
11 A 15 is primarily to assist us in achieving the 
12 proper classification. So taking the thing on a whole, that 
13 information is well known to us by knowing his specialty. 
14 Q But if the doctor was performing surgery or technical 
15 procedures such as listed in 15 which were outside of his 
16 specialty, wouldn't that change his rating or his classificatio ? 
17 A Not in this case because the obstetrics/gynecology 
18 rate is the next to the highest rate. So the only one that 
19 would affect that is if there was any neurosurgery indicated 
20 anywhere, which is the only rate that is higher. 
21 Q But it would be important for you to know whether he 
22 was engaged in any neurosurgery activities, would it not, or 
~ procedures? 
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·,\ A Yes. 
2 Q Do you know whether or ndt Dr. Simopoulos paid the 
3 premiums as they came due on this particular policy? 
4 A To the best of my recollection he did. 
s Q Notice was never given of cancellation because of non 
6 payment, was it? 
7 A The underwriting file doesn't contain any notices of 
8 termination for that. 
9 Q Have any of those premiums been refunded or attempted 
10 to be refunded to Dr. Simopoulos? 
11 A Not at this time. 
12 Q The company still retains the premiums, is that corr 
13 A That's correct. 
*** 
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7 Q To your knowledge did your underwriters review this 
s particular application prior to the time that they issued the 
9 policy? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A Yes, they. did. 
• -l 
MR. t{EINTRAUB: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: He has already answered when he said that 
the two underwriters initialed the policy -- the application. 
That was indicative of the fact they caused the policy to be 
issued based upon the ·application. It is already in evidence. 
THE WEINTRAUB: The fact that they initialed the 
policy, yes, Sir. 
hasn't it. 
THE COURT: No. Initialed the application. 
MR. WEINTRAUB: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: And authorized the policy to be issued. 
MR. WEINTRAUB: Yes,_Sir. 
THE COURT: The question has already been answered, 
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*** 
THE COURT: I have a couple. You mentioned when 
Mr. Larkin took you back over and he asked you the question of 
whether or not your underwriters were instructed to contact 
another carrier to find Q~t whether they had any problems with 
this, and you said that you had never personal~y done that. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: But are they notinstructedwhen they see 
13 something l~ke that, and I am talking about question number 1 
14 on Exhibit Number 1 which is the application, that you said 
15 seeing the date of September 22, 1975 to December 1, 1983 cause 
16 you some concern. Now are your underwriters or your assistants 
17 under you, are they instructed to contact your agent to find 
18 out whether or not he knows anything more about it than this, 
19 or to check further into this? 
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. They would be instructed to do 
21 that, but in this particular case we knew what the situation wa 
22 going to be. 
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THE COURT: You·knew what it was going to be? 
THE WITNESS: Um-hum. 
THE COURT: What was it? 
THE WITNESS: The agent, our-marketing representative 
s had contacted the agency and had determined that he was going t 
6 start converting his Saint Paul business over to our company. 
*** 
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THE COURT: There·are a number of questions that 
2 weren't answered. ·And there is nothing to indicate that these 
3 
4 
s 
6 
questions were even asked of Dr. Simopoulos or if he filled 
this out in his own handwriting that he didn't overlook them 
unintentionally. 
THE WITNESS:· ¥es. 
7 THE COURT: There were questions which you previously 
8 said some of them at least are important questions, and they 
9 are at least on the appl~~ation. Doesn't your underwriter 
10 staff have some obligation to find out from the agent as to why 
11 these questions were ignored? 
12 
13 
14 
THE WITNESS: Yes, they do. 
THE COURT: Could you explain why it is not done? 
THE WITNESS: Number 1, the underwriter has to use 
15 his professional judgment in evaluating the risk that he has 
16 assumed for the company. And if in that underwriter's opinion 
17 those questions are satisfactorily in his own mind responded to 
18 or in the absense of an answer he can find that answer as a 
19 result of other questions that might have been asked on the 
20 application, or other information that he might have available, 
21 then those questions would not be followed up. 
*** 
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MR. PAGE: Your Honor, that is the last witness that 
we have available today. It is 5:30 and there has been some 
11 question as to why we didn't have perh~ps Ms. Vanderwall on 
12 station, and I would be pleased to have Ms. Vanderwall here in 
13 the morning at 9 o'clock for her testimony with respect to the 
14 fact -- and I believe it will be that she reviewed this policy, 
15 relied on the information and in fact -- I mean reviewed this 
16 application and relied on the information contained therein 
17 in issuing t~e policy. And I will be happy to bring her down 
18 in the morning at 9 o'clock. I can't get her here any sooner 
19 than that. 
*** 
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THE COURT: Does counsel wish to have her here to be 
cross-examined·? I am sure she wouid know -- In effect Mr. Page 
has proffered what her testimony would be. 
MR. PAGE: I have proffered it, Your Honor. And, 
in fact, I will say that I have discussed this with her and we 
made a judgment to bring Mr. Stufft in, the senior man in the 
underwriting department because the case seemed to suggest that 
the further down the line you get, the more trouble you get in 
to with whether or not it.is the company that is speaking. So 
I would be pleased, as I say, -- I will proffer that her testi-
mony would be that she reviewed the application; in fact made 
notations on it and that she relied on the responses that were 
there in issuing the policy. 
*** 
1.40 
" 
7 MR. LARKIN: Your Honor, in discussing this with 
8 Mr. Page, I understand his proffer to the Court if this young 
9 lady or if the undeiw.ri.ter:.was here, her testimony would be in 
10 regard to issuing the policy she relied upon the information 
11 contained in the application including the answers to the three 
12 questions that we have discussed, I guess 16, 17 and 23. That 
13 she relied upon the entire application and in view of that we 
14 wouldn't require that she be here because of that. 
15 THE COURT: All right, sir, then you.have concluded. 
16 The Plaintiffs rest? 
17 MR. PAGE: Yes, Your Honor. There is one piece of 
18 information that was raised, I believe, in response to your 
19 questions to ~tr. Stufft I would like to put in through him 
20 because it deals with the Saint Paul question and it is simply 
21 that the application itself shows that on 12/1/83 date under 
22 number 1 on page 1 with respect to the Saint Paul coverage, it 
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is clear the Saint:Paul coverage extended a month beyond that 
2 because the effective date of this .particular policy, this 
3 application was for new effective dates of 1/1/84 and I 
4 would be happy to call him back for that. 
s THE COURT: It is not necessary for the Court's 
6 purposes because Mr. Stufft responded and answered my question 
7 to my satisfaction when he said he knew his underwriter was in 
8 the process of changing his physicians over from Saint Paul to 
9 Pennsylvania Casualty. 
10 MR. PAGE: All right, Sir. Then the Plaintiff rests 
11 at this time. 
12 
13 
THE COURT: The defendants have no evidence to offer? 
MR. WEINTRAUB: we·are not going to have any evidence, 
14 Your Honor. 
License No./Effective Date~· iiiiiiiii:~_,-r....-.... J_Y_-_3.;....1_---_,-""'----~T---------------­
Expiration Oate~f Currenicoverage: ----=-~~--:::~-----r---1~~~-------------­
Requested Effective Date of Coverage: --"'--..;.......::~~-----+-r-'-1f--ll~~---------------
1. List your current and past professional liability insurance carrier(s): 
Name: Sr ~l/'-
Name:--------------------------- Dates Insured: ---------
2. Medical School: UA.Jt tl. bF A7"1fh/S Date Completed: _/_.;~;,..__.~...;;;{, __ _ 
Internship: Date Completed: ------
Residency: ,d . .r; ~~~r aP.J/61llt! 1 AJf!, 1 #hJAte/.t A/, ,f', Date Completed:------
3. Are you an employee (salary or commission) of any institution(s)? __ Yes X.No 
If yes, show name(s) of institution(s) below. 
Name:---------------------------- Certificate of Insurance (COl) re-
--
quired? __ Yes __ No 
Name:------- -------------------- COl required? __ Yes __ No 
4. Are you an employee of the Federal or a State Government? __ Yes ~No Q L." . giJ 
5. Are you in active Military Service? __ Yes X No • ~ · l /11JJ 
_c.. ~ \v-'.) . 
6. What is your specialty? _ _,~"'-:"""gd..:::re. ..~=-"~'t=---l;:a;tlfT-------- Subspecialty? _______ v _ __.12..~~----
7. What is the nature of your current practice? (Please be specific. Also include any atypical patients or group(s) of patients.} 
QyAJECQLctj'/ 
8. Are you Board Certified? .X... Yos ._No If yes, date certified: --~~~-~=-'~-----------------
Specialty for which certified: ~<J;..:.L;. .  J;...-....,;;~9"'-l~~wj __________________________ _ 
9. List each institution where you have admitting privileges and estimate the number of patients admitted at each during the 
past year: lnatltutlon No. of Patient• COl Required: 
Name: h"r4#1f4!. kt?tr_4 L _Yes _No 
Name: rAt~F~t! ~rlzJtL _Yes _No 
Name: ~wuuJJ/MLt"Ji ];4~71~.5 f/8sp. _Yes _No 
10. Hours per week you engage in private practice: -----
11. States you practice in (estimate the percentage of your practice in each state): ,M . 1eo % __ ....., % __ ....., 
12. Estimate the number of hours per week you engage in outside interests/hobbies: ----
13. What percentage of your practice Inc I udes: 
__ o/o NO SURGERY-other than incision of boils and superficial abscesses or suturing of skin and superficial fascia. 
similar minor proc.edures encountered in a normal family-type practice. Administration of anesth~sia by topical 
or by means of local infiltration is included. 
_o/o MINOR SURGERY-includes above and general practitioners and specialists performing normal vaginal deliver-
ies and assisting in major surgery on their own patients. 
/ OOOfo MAJOR SURGERY -includes above and general practitioners and specialists performing vasectomies. appen-
dectomies. tonsilectomies. adenoidectomies and assisting in major surgery on other than their own patients, and 
Caesarean sections. 
.-low many hours per week do you practice in an Emergency Room? ...... 0...., __ _ . 1.43 
15. ~heck procedures below you perform (not those performed in extraordinary emergencies): 
-Cardiac catheterization 
_organ Transplants 
-Appendectomies 
__ Plastic Surgery (if specialty Is ENT) 
__ Face Lifts 
_Mammoplasty 
__ Radical Neck Dissections 
__ Myringoplasty 
__ Tympanoplasty 
__ Chemabrasion 
__ varicose Vein Stripping 
__ Nasoseptal Repair 
_caesarean Sections 
__ Abortions 
__ T&A's 
__ D&C's 
__ Tubal Ligations 
__ General, Spinal or Caudal Anesthesia 
(circle) 
_Injection of Silicones 
__ Needle Biopsy (specify types) 
__ Dermabrasion __ Radiopaque Dye Injections 
__ Radiation Therapy 
_Radioisotope Therapy 
--Diskograms 
--Electroconvulsive Therapy 
__ Pneumoencephalograms 
__ Myelogram a 
__ Endoscopy 
__ Colonoscopy 
__ Acupuncture 
__ Other Procedures (list) 
16. Has your license to practice medici}( or your permit to prescribe or dispense drugs ever been denied, revoked, suspended 
or In any way limited? __ Yes No If yes, give details on back of Application. 
17. Have your staff privileges at any institution ever been suspended or in any way restricted? __ Yes ~No If yes, give 
details on back of Application. 
18. Have you ever been denied malpractice coverage? __ Yes ~No If yes, give details on back of Application. 
19. Has any claim or suit been brought against you on account of alleged malpractice, error or mistake in the past five years? 
__ Yes __ No If yes, indicate below (for each incident): (a) malpractice insurer; (b) date of incident: (c) year suit was 
instituted or claim made; (d) claimant; (e) status or disposition; (f) amount paid or current reserve; and (g) summary of 
incident: 
..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._...-...-...--......-...-...-..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._...__ 
20. Has suit been threatened, but no action taken in the past three years? __ Yes -X No If yes, indicate the date(s) and 
details: 
...-...--...-...-...-...-......-...--...-......--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Have you·had a problem with or been treated for alcoholism, narcotic addiction or mental illness? __ Yes XNo If 
yes. piease explain: 
..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._ __ ..._ __ ..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._..._ __________________ _____ 
22. Have you now or have you eXr had a chronic illness or physical defect that impairs or could impair your ability to practice 
your specialty: __ Yes No If yes, please explain: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
23. Have you ever been convicted of a crime (other than a motor vehicle citation)? __ Yes X No If yes, please explain: 
24. Current practice: 
a. Follow-up care and/or instructions given to the patient are: 
_x_Oral .-..X-Preprinted __ Handwritten __ Hospital Form 
Please attach copies of any forms and educational materials used. 
b. Briefly explain your current informed consent practices/procedures: ------------------------------------------
Please attach forms and educational materials used. / 
c. Estimated formal or informal t:lnsultations with other physicians in the past year: I~ Requested: 
d. Hours of continuing education .pleted in. the past year: 9a . • 
__ t.....;iJ ...... Provided. 
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COVERAGE OPTIONS 
VIRGINIA SUPPLEMENT 
• 
Coverage A-Individual Physicians Professional Liability 
NOTE: See brochure for de1crlptlon of coverage• and rate1. 
25. What is the nature of your current coverage? 
Llndependent (Individual) Physician Policy 
_Institution Policy Name of Institution: 
-------------------------------------------------
26a. Primary limits requested (each medical incident/annual aggregate) (check one): 
__ $100,000/$300,000 Xs1.000.000/$3,000.000 __ Other (specify): S -----' -----
26b. Excess policy limits (check one if you desire excess coverage): 
__ $1.ooo.ooo -Xs2.ooo.ooo _s3.ooo,ooo 
_$4,000.000 __ $5,000,000 
26c. Do you request Defendants Reimbursement coverage? ..C.Yes _No 
If yes, limits requested (daily benefit/annual limit) (check one): 
__ $300/$3,000 (premium $30) X.ssoo/$5,000 (premium $50) 
26d. Do you have any employees, other than physicians, for whom coverage as additional insureds is requested? 
-Yes X No If yes, complete question #28 under "Coverage B-Corporation, Association or Partnership Liability." 
26e. If you presently have claims-made coverage, please indicate the effective date of your flrtt claims-made policy: t[ ');''Y, 7 _r' 
If you have not yet purchased the extended reporting period endorsement (or "tail") for your current coverage, do you 
request PCC Prior Acts coverage? ..A Yes ___ No 
26f. I hereby certify that, if I am requesting PCC Prior Acts coverage, I have no knowledge of any professional liability claims 
which have been asserted against me or any corporation, association or partnership for which I am making application. or 
of any occurrence or circumstance likely to result in such a claim, on or after the requested initial effective date of the Prior 
Acts coverage, except as. indicated below. (Please give a brief description of each such claim, occurrence or circumstance. 
Please note that no coverage can be provided relative to same under the applied-for policy, and notice of such claim, 
occurrence or circumstance should be provided to your current carrier or program administrator if such notice has not 
already been given): 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
I certify that the above Is true to the best of my knowledge, Information and belief, and that the failure to 
provide a true and, to the best of my ability, accurate response to the questions set forth above may result In 
the voiding of any contract of Insurance Issued In reliance on this application and/or the denial of claims under 
any policy Issued. 
Date 
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• COVE.AAGE. OPTIONS • 
Coverage A-Individual Physicians Professional Liability 
(SEE SUPPLEMENTAL PAGE) 
Coverage &-Corporation, Association or Partnership Professional Liability 
27. Do you request professional liability coverage for the professional corporation, association or partnership? .2{ Yes _No 
If yes. are you an owner in whole or in part or an employee of this e ity? ---X... owner __ employee What are the 
owner's names? ,R .S ~ J.a + . 
28. Do you have any employees, other than physicians, for whom coverage as additional insureds is requested? _Yes 2(No 
If yes. list the number of such employees: 
---X-ray Technicians 
___ shock Therapy Technicians 
___ Laboratory Technicians 
___ Pulmonary Technicians 
___ Inhalation Therapists 
___ Physical Therapists 
___ Psychologists 
___ Psychotherapists 
___ Optometrists 
___ Opticians 
___ Physician Assistants• 
___ certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNA's) 
___ certified Registered Nurse Practitioners• 
---Registered Nurses 
---Licensed Practical Nurses 
___ Other (number and type): 
• If Certified Registered Nurse Practitioners or Physician Assistants are listed, submit details of education, training, experience and duties. 
Please list physicians and surgeons with the above entity for whom malpractice coverage Is desired and attach separate 
completed Applications: -----------------------------------
AGREEMENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
I, the undersigned, AGREE: 
(a) to implement reasonable risk management and incident reporting programs; 
(b) to actively participate in the risk management and incident reporting programs in effect at the hospitals in which I practice; 
(c) to report potential claims to the Company; 
(d) to allow the Company to perform such inspections as may be necessary for the evaluation of potential liability exposures 
and claims. 
I AUTHORIZE any professional societies, prior or present business or medical associates. licensing boards, hospitals, govern-
mental entities. corporations, partnerships, organizations, institutions or persons that may have any record or knowledge 
concerning any of the statements and answers made herein to release such information to the Company upon request. I 
authorize the use of a copy of this authorization in place of the original. 
I understand and agree that the Company may issue insurance on the basis of the representations made in this Application. The 
information contained herein is true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. No material circumstance or 
information related to the questions asked on this Application has been withheld or omitted. 
I understand that if claims-made coverage is terminated at any time. additional reporting periods (tail coverage) may be 
purchased and I must exercise such right by written notice no later than thirty (30) days after coverage termination. 
Insurance Broker/Agent: 
fP..ince- WGCJ IJn,ufGMt 8etviri 
1920 OPITZ IOUlEV ARD 
WOODBllDGE, VllGINIA 22191 
~ roate 
. 1.46 
E'{HiSJT NO. ~ 
PU ~ DEFt J COMl 
. ~r: NO. L.K 
~~,,A,;..,,, 
PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
!Named Insured · 
t.nd Address: 
415 Fallowfield Rood I P.O. Box 53 I Camp Hill. PA 17011 I ( 717) 763-1422 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY· 
POLICY· 
Form 1100 (7/83) 
(Including Directors, Officers and Trustees 
Uablllty and Staff Privileges Protection) 
Claims-Made 
~ . Broker: ~ce & Wood Insurance Serv;ce, 
Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company c::::J 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company CD 
415 Fallowfteld Road I P.O. Box 53 I Camp Htll, PA 17011 
DECLARATIONS 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY POLICY 
CLAIMS MADE Policy Number: _ _:H..:.:P-.:1~2:..;:8;.....;;;6;......_ _ _ 
Item 
1. Namedlnsured 
and Addresa: 
2. Policy Period: 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
12:01 .. rn. Stll'ldn Time at 1t1e 
**"-of me,.,...,""',. •• stated"-"· From 
3. Initial Effective Date: 1/1/84 
1/1/84 To 11_1185 
._ The insurance afforded is only with respect to such of the following coverages as are indicated by specific premium charges. The limit of 
the Company's liability against such cowrage or coveragee shall be aa stated below, subject to all relevant terms of this policy. 
COVERAGES LIMITS OF LIABILITY ADVANCE PREMIUM 
Each Occurrence Aggregate 
A Personal Injury Uability Not Included Not Included s Not Included 
8 Propetty Damage Uabillty Not Included Not Included s Not Included 
Each Medical Incident Aggregate 
c InStitutional Professional Liability 1,000,000 3,000,000 s Included 
D Physician Professional Liability 1,000,000 3,000,000 s Included 
Each Loss Aggregate 
E Directors, Officers and 
Trustees Uabifity and Staff 
Not Included Not Included Privileges Protection $ Not Inc 1 uded 
ENDORSEMENTS: 122VA(7/83), 123(8/80), 106(7/83) TOTAL PREMIUM $ 11 t 258. 
5. The persons insured u·nder Coverage C include any person within the follow1ng classifications tor wh1ch coverage is indicated by an "X": 
(X ) Professional employees of the named insured. other than a physicaan. ( x l Professional students of the named insured. other than residents. ( x ) Volunteers of the named insured. 
( ) 
6. The persons insured under Coverage 0 include any physician within the following classifications for which coverage 1s 1nthcated by an 
"X'·: 
( x ) Physician employed by, or under contract with, the named insured and listed on the Schedule of Physicians. 
~ ) . . 
(· ) 
( ) 
This Declarations. with the Policy Form. the Application 
and endorsements. if any, issued to form a part hereof. 
complete the above numbered Health Care Providers 
Comprehensive Liability Policy. 
Date Issued: 3/6/84 nlh 
SIGNED BY; 
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Pennsylvania Casualty Company 
415 Fallowfield Road, PO Box 53, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011 
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which attached, effective on the inception date of the policy unless otherw1se 
stated herein. (The following Information Is required only when this endorsement Is Issued subsequent to preparation of policy.) 
Polley Number H P 1286 
Named Insured and Address 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
End. No. 1 
Audit Period Annual 
This Endorsement is effective 1 I 1 I 84 and will terminate with the policy. 
Polley Period: From 111184 To 1/1185 
12:01 a.m., standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT -VIRGINIA 
SOLE AGENT AND BANKRUPTCY CONDITIONS 
It is agreed that Part IX, Conditions, of the Policy is amended as follows: 
1. Condition 14, Sole Agent, is amended to read ~s follows: 
Sole AgenL If ~he named insured is a single corporation, the named Insured shall act on behalf of all Insureds 
with respect to g1v1ng and receiving notice of cancellation or any other notice provided for under this policy, 
accepting any endorsement issued to form a part of this policy and receiving return premium, if any, and is 
charged with responsibility for notifying the Company and the Insureds of any changes which might affect the 
insurance hereunder. If the named Insured is other than a single corporation, a designated named Insured shall 
act on behalf of all Insureds which shall empower it to so act, in writing, with respect to giving and rece1ving 
notice of cancellatiOn or any other notice provided for under this policy, accepting any endorsement issued to 
form a part of this policy and receiving return premium. if any, and shall notify the Company and such insureds 
of any changes which might affect the insurance hereunder. 
2. The following Condition is added: 
17. Bankruptcy or Insolvency. The bankruptcy or insolvency of the named Insured or of any Insured. or the 
insolvency of any Insured's estate, shall not of itself relieve the Company of any of its obligations under 
this policy. 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
ISSUED BY THE COMPANY PROVIDING THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY AS DESIGNATED ON 
THE DECLARATIONS MADE A PART HEREOF. 
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Per ylvania Hospital Insurance Com, 'Y D 
ennsylvanla Casualty Company [i] 
Camp Hill. Pennsylvania 17011 
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which attached. effective on the inception date of the pohcy unless otherwise 
stated herein. (The following Information 11 required only when thll endorMment laiAued aubaequent to preparation of policy.) 
Polley Number HP 1286 
N•mec:llnsurec:llnd Addreu 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
End. No. 2 
Audit Period Annual 
This Endorsement is effective 1/l/84 and will terminate with the policy. 
PollcyPeriod: From 1/1/84 To 1/1/85 
12:01 a.m., standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
It is agreed that: 
PRIOR ACTS COVERAGE 
(PCL) 
In consideration of the premium charged. the Company's obligations under Coverage C and, where applicable, 
Coverage 0, of this policy shall apply relative to any medical Incident occurring on or after the initial effective 
date of 9/22/75 . and relative to which a claim is first made during the policy period: 
provided. however, that no such coverage by the Company shall apply if any other insurer had a policy in effect 
which would otherwise provide coverage to the Insured for liabilities arising from such medical Incident and such 
other insurer had knowledge of such medical Incident prior to l/l/84 . nor shall such 
·coverage apply to any claim, occurrence or circumstance scheduled in the Application by the Insured/applicant 
or which the Insured/applicant should have scheduled in the Application on the basis of information available to 
the Insured/applicant at the time of the making of such Application. 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
ISSUED BY THE COMPANY PROVIDING THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY AS DESIGNATE~ QN 
THE DECLARATIONS MADE A PART HEREOF. 150 
Form e101 (AIV. 7113) 
• 
Penntt 1ania Hospital Insurance C pany 
f. .._nnsylvania Casualty Compar1y 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 
ENDORSEMENT 
Polley Number HP 1286 
Namedlnau~ CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
Endorsement Number 4 
Audit Period Annua 1 
This endorsement is effective 1/1/84 and will terminate with the policy. 
Polley Period: FROM 1/1/84 TO 1/1/85 
12:01 A.M .• standard time at the address of the named Insured as stated on the Declarations. 
SCHEDULE OF PHYSICIANS 
CLASS INITlAL 
NAME 
Chris Simopoulos 
LICENSE NO. 
010120281 
SPECIALTY 
Ob/G,yn 
COOE EFFECTIVE DATE PREMIUM-..~' 
387 9/22/75 $9650 .'CHI·· 
All policy provisions and conditions remain unchanged. 
Issued by the company providing the insurance afforded by this policy as designated on the Declarations made a part 
hereof. 1.51 
:t· .. 
• -SEIBT IS A PMT. IIi COtmACT. PLEASE ATD.CH 
rtl YOUR POLICY. 
Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which attacned. effective on tne inception date of the policy unless otnerwise stated neretn. (The 
followlnt Information 11 requited only w~ thll endorsement 11 111ued 1ub1equent to pr•paratlon of potlcy.) 
Polley Number HP 1286 
Named Insured and Address 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 · 
End. No. 5 
Audit Period Annua 1 
This Endorsement is effective 1/1/84 and will terminate with the policy. 
Polley Period: From 1/1/84 To 1/1/85 
12:01 a.m., standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
In consideration of charged premium, it is hereby understood and agreed that the 
Declarations, form #101 is amended as follows: 
Item 3: Initial Effective Date: 9/22/75 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
ISSUED BY THE COMPANY PROVIDING THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY AS DESIGNATED ON 
THE DECLARATIONS MADE A PART HEREOF. 
F'olft'l • 182 riiiQ) 
.,,,~10/c ~, 
SECTION I-INSURING AGREEMENTS 
PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
A stock insurance company, herein called the Company, 
In consideration of the payment of the premium, in reliance upon the statements in the Declara-
tions and Applications made a part hereof and subject to all of the terms of this policy, agrees 
with the .named Insured as follows: 
COVERAGE A The Company will pay on behalf of the lntured all sums which the Insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of penonallnjury to which this insurance applies caused 
Personal Injury Uablllty by an occurrence during the policy pertod. 
COVERAGES 
Property Damage 
UabiUty 
COVERAGEC 
COVERAGED 
Physician Professional 
Liability · 
COVERAGEE 
Directors, Officers and 
Trustees Uablllty and 
Staff Privileges 
Protection 
The Company will pay on behalf of the ln.ured all sums which tne Insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of property damage to which this insurance applit!s caused 
by an occurrenc. during the potlcJ period. 
The Company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily InJury to which this insurance applies caused by a 
medical Incident occurring subsequent to the Initial Effective Date, for which Claim is first made 
against the ln.,red and reported to the Company during the policy period. 
The Company will pay on behalf of the lniUred all sums whi~h the Insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay because of bodily Injury to which this insurance applies caused by a medical 
Incident occurring subsequent to the Initial Effective Date, for which claim is first made against 
the lnturecl and reported to the Company during the policy pertod. 
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured. all sums which the Insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of lou to which this insurance applies. This coverage 
applies to lou for which a ciaim is first made during the policy period. 
The Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the Insured seeking 
damages because of such injury even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless. false or 
fraudulent. The Company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it 
deems expedient. The Company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend 
any suit after the applicable limit of the Company's liability has been exhausted by payment of 
judgments or settlements or. under Coverage E. by payment of lou. The Company shall have 
sole and final authority to select and retain counsel for the defense of any Insured pursuant to the 
Company's obligations under this policy. 
SECTION II-POLICY PERIOD; TERRITORY 
The policy period is the policy period shown under Item 2 of the Declarations .. 
This policy applies to damages for any injury. for which coverage is afforded under this policy, 
occurring anywhere in the world provided the original suit for such damages is brought within 
the United States of America, its territories or possessions. Puerto Rico or Canada. 
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(i) under Coverages A, C. 0 and E. to any obligation for which an lneured or any carrier as his 
insurer may be held liable under any workers' compensation. unemployment compensation 
or disability benefits law, or under any similar law; 
(j) under Coverage A, (1) to personal injury arising out of any publication or utterance des· 
cribed in (a) under the definition of penonallnjury if the first injurious publication or utter-
ance of the same or similar material by or on behalf of the named ln1ured was made prior to 
the effective date of this insurance; (2) to personal injury arising out of a publication or 
utterance described in (a) under the definition of per1onallnjury concerning any organiza-
tion or business enterprise. or its products or services, made by or at the direction of any 
lniUred with knowledge of the falsity thereof: 
(k) under Coverage B. to property damage to: 
(1) property owned or occupied by or rented to the lniUred; 
(2) property used by the lniUNd: or 
(3) property in the care. custody or-control of the lniUred or as to which the lniUred is for 
any purpose exercising physical control: 
but (i) except with respect to liability assumed by the ln-..red under any contract or agree-
ment, this exclusion does not apply to property dam8ge to structures or portions thereof 
rented to or occupied by the na~ed lniUNd. including fixtures permanently attached 
thereto, if such property damage arises out of fire. and (ii) part (3) of this exclusion does not 
apply with respect to property dam~• (other than to elevaton) arising out of the use of an 
elevator at premises owned by, rented to or controlled by the named lniUred: or (iii) to 
property damage to aircraft when the lniUred'l control is solely traffic control over the 
movement of rotor-wing aircraft not owned in whole or in part by or leased under any lease 
agreement or lease option purchase agreement by any lniUred, and any contract or agree-
ment for rotor-wing aircraft services entered into by the named lniUNd shall not be consi-
dered either a lease or lease option purchase agreement. but this exception (iii) to exclusion 
· (k) does not apply to the conduct of any contest or exhibition permitted, sponsored or 
participated in by any lniUNd. 
(I) under Coverage B. to claims for damages because of mysterious disappearance or theft of 
personal property; 
(m) under Coverage B. to property damage to premises alienated by the named ln1ured arising 
out of such premises or any part thereof: 
(n) under Coverage B. to property damage to an Insured'• products arising out of such products 
or any part of such products: 
(o) under Coverage B. to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named 
Insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof. or out of materials. parts or equipment 
furnished in connection therewith; 
(p) to liability assumed by the lniUred under any contract or agreement, other than incidental con-
tracts: 
(q) to personal Injury or property damage arising out of the conduct of any partnership or joint 
venture of which the in1ured is a partner or member and which IS not designated in this 
policy as an lniUrecl; 
(r) to liability arising out of the violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the 
knowledge or consent of the lnsured(s) against whom liability is sought to be 1m posed; 
(s) to loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed or to 
any claims for damages resulting from the failure of an Insured's products or work performed 
by or on behalf of the named lniUred to meet the level of performance. quality. fitness or 
durability warranted or represented by the named lniUred: 
(t) to liability based upon the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. commonly 
referred to as the Pension Reform Act of 1974. and amendments thereto or similar provisions 
of any federal, state or local statutory law or common law; 
(u) to any liability arising from violations of any-law that prohibits the monopolization of. or the 
unlawful restraint of, trade, business or profession. including. but not limited to. any such 
violation involving the improper or unlawful denial or restriction of staff privileges or an 
lniUNd'l failure to act upon any application for such privileges. except that under Coverage 
E. the Company will provide costs of defense up to the limit of liability for Coverage E; 
(v) under Coverage E except to the extent the named Insured or its subsidiary may be required 
or permitted by law to indemnify their Dlrecton, Officers and Tru1tee1, to liability in connec-
tion with any claim made against the Dl~ Offlcen and Tru~t ... : 
(1) for libel or slander; 
(2) based upon or attributable to their gaining in fact any personal profit or advantage to 
which they were not legally entitled; 
(3) for the return by the Directors, Offlcera and Tru1t ... of any remuneration paid to them if 
payment of such remuneration shall be contrary to law: 1.54 
"nuclear material" means source matertal, special nuclear material or by-product 
material: 
"source material", "special nuclear material" and "by-product material" have the 
meanings given them in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or in any law amendatory 
thereof: 
.. spent fuel" means any fuel element or fuel component, solid or liquid, which has 
been used or exposed to radiation in a nuclear reactor: 
• "waste" means any waste material 
(a') containing by-product material other than the tailings or wastes produced by the 
extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed pr~marily 
for its source material content and 
(b') resulting from the operation by any person or organization of any nuclear facility 
included under the first two paragraphs of the defi~ition of nuclear facility; 
"nuclear facility" means 
(a') any nuclear reactor: 
(b') any equipment or device designed or used for (i) separating the isotopes of 
uranium or plutonium, (ii) processing or utilizing spent fuel or (iii) handling, process-
ing or packaging waste: 
(c') any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating or alloying of special 
nuclear material if at any time the total amount of such material in the custody of the 
named insured at the premises where such equipment or device is located consists of 
or contains more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 233. or any combination 
thereof, or more than 250 grams of uranium 235: 
( d') any stNcture, basin, excavation, premises or place prepared or used for the 
storage or disposal of waste; 
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all operations con-
ducted on such site, and all premises used for such operations; 
"nuclear reactor" means any apparatus designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in 
a seat-supporting chain reaction or to contain a critical mass of fissionable .material: 
With respect to injury to or destruction of property, the word "Injury"' or "destruction"' 
includes all forms of radioactive contamination of property. 
·sECTION V-PERSONS INSURED 
Each of the following is an lniUred under this insurance to the extent set forth below: 
(a) the named lniUred: 
(b) any officer or administrator employed by the named insured, while acting within the scope of 
his duties as such: and, any member of the Board of Trustees or Directors of the named 
lniUNCt while acting within the scope of his duties as such; 
(C) under Coverages A and B, any employee. student or volunteer of the named Insured while 
acting within the scope of his duties as such, but the insurance afforded to such employee, 
student or volunt.., does not apply: 
(1) to penonatlnJury to the named ln1Ured or. if the named Insured is a partnership or joint 
venture, any partner or member thereof: 
(2) to property damage to property owned. occupied or used by, rented to. in the care, 
custody or control of. or over which physical control is being exercised for an·y purpose 
by (a) anoth.er employee. student or voluRteer of the named lniUred or (b) the named 
lniUrecl. or, if the named lniUred is a partnership or joint venture, any partner or member 
thereof: 
(d) under Coverages A and B. any person or organization while acting as real estate manager for 
the named Insured; 
(e) under Coverage E. any person who is a member of a formal accreditation or similar profes-
sional body or committee of the named lniUred. while acting within the scope of his dut1es as 
such or who is charged with the duty of executing directives of any such body or committee, 
while acting within the scope of h1s duties in executing such directives; 
(f) under Coverage c. any person included in any of the classifications fgr which coverage is 
afforded under this policy, as indicated in Item 5 of the Declarations while such person is 
acting within the scope of his duties within such classification or whtle such person is 
rendering emergency care at the scene of any emergency: 155 
(3) all property ct.mqe included within the producta haard and all property damage in-
cluded within the completed operation• hazard. 
Such aggregate limit shall apply separately to the property damqe described in subparagraphs 
(1), (2) and (3) above. and under subparagraphs (1) and (2) separately with respect to each 
project away from premises owned by or rented to the named Insured. 
Coverages A and B - For the purpose of determining the limit of the Company's liability, all 
personal Injury and property damage arising out of continous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence. The total 
liability· or the Company for all claims arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke. vapors. soot. fumes. acids. alkalies, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases. waste mater~als or 
other irritants. contamanants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse 
or body of water shall not exceed $100,000 in any policy period. Any expenses. including legal 
fees incurred by the Company while exercising its right and duty to defend any suits relating to 
such. claims, shall be included in and subject to this limit of liability. 
Coverage C - Regardless of the number of lnsu,.. under this policy or the number of claims 
made or suits brought, the Company's liability is limited as follows: 
The total liability of the Company for all damages because of au injury to which this coverage 
applies shall not exceed the limit of liability stated in the Declarations as "aggregate:· 
Subject to the above provision with respect to "'aggregate", the total liability of the Company 
for all damages because of any one medical lnc1dent shall not exceed the limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations as applicable to '"each medical Incident" 
Coverage 0 - Regardless of the number of lnsureda under this policy or the number of claims 
made or suits brought, the Company's liability is limited as follows: 
The total liability of the Company for all damages because of all injury to which this coverage 
applies shall not exceed the limit of liability stated in the Declarations as "aggregate ... 
Subject to the above provision with respect to ··aggregate". the total liability of the Company 
for all damages because of all injury arising out of any one medlcallnc:tdent shall not exceed 
the limit of liability stated in the Declarations as applicable to "each medical Incident•• 
Such limits of liability shall apply separately to each ln•NCL 
CoverageE-
(1) The Company's liability for any loa under Coverage E shall be the amount as shown under 
Item 4 of the Declarations for Coverage E and shall be the maximum liability of the Company 
in each policy year (regardless of the time of payment by the Company). The maximum 
liability in the last policy year shall not be increased as a result of any extended discovery 
period. 
(2) This policy shall pay each and every lou under Coverage E. •ncluding costs, charges and 
expenses as desctlbed in (3) below. Claims arising out of the same act or interrelated acts of 
one or more of the Directors. Officers and Tru.tees shall be considered a single loss. 
(3) No costs, charges or expenses shall be incurred or settlements made without the Company's 
consent. such consent not to be unreasonably withheld: however, subject to the provis1ons 
of Condition 15. in the event of such consent being g1ven. the Company will pay. subject to 
the provisions of (1) and (2) above, all such costs. settlements. charges or expenses. The 
Company may, at its option and upon request. advance on behalf of the Directors. Officers 
and T.,.l_ or any of them. expenses which they have mcurred 1n connect1on wsth c1a1ms 
made against them, prior to disposition of such claims. provaded always that 1n the event 1t 1s 
finally established the Company has no liability hereunder. such Directors. Officers and 
T.,.t_ agree to repay to the Company, upon demand, all mon1es advanced t)y v1rtue of this 
provision. 
SECTION VIII-DEFINITIONS 
When used in this policy (including endorsements forming a part hereof): 
.. Aircraft" means any heavier-than-air or lighter-than-air a1rcraft designed to transport persons or 
property . 
.. An Insured's products" means goods or products manufactured. sold. handled or distributed by 
an insured or by others trading under his name, including any conta.ner thereof (other than a 
vehicle). but "an lniUNd's product." shall not include a vendmg mach.ne or any property other 
than such container, rented to or located for use of others but not sold • 
.. Automobile" means a land motor vehicle. trailer or sematra11er designed for travel on public 
roadS (including any machinery or apparatus attached thereto) but does not include mobile equip-
ment. 
.. Bodily InJury" means injury to the human body. sickness or disease sustained by any person 
during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom. 1.56 
• 
against a person or the named lntured for which said person or the named lnsund shall be 
legally obligated to pay by reason of an improper or unlawful denial or restriction of a claimant's 
staff privileges or a w!Ongful failure to .act upon an application for such privileges and shall 
include, but not be limited to, damages. JUdgments, settlements and costs, cost of investigation 
and defense of Legal Actions (excluding from such costs of investigation and defense, salaries of 
Officers or employees of the named insured) claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom. cost 
of attachment or similar bonds, provided always, however, such subject of loss shall not include 
fines or penalties imposed by law or other matters which may be deemed uninsurable under the 
law pursu~nt to which this policy shall be construed. For purposes of the definition of "1oM", 
"Legal Actions" means only litigation in and before a court, and shall not include any administra-
tive proceeding or any hearing or similar process, whether provided for by the articles or bylaws 
of a named Insured. or otherwise . 
.. Medical Incident" means any act or omission in the furnishing of professional health care 
servic:M including the furnishing of food, beverages, medications or appliances in connection 
with such services and the postmortem handling of human bodies. In no event shall mectlcal 
Incident mean wrontfuiiiCt as def.ned herein. 
Any such act or omission, together with all related acts or omissions in the furnishing of such 
services to any one person shall be considered one medical Incident. 
.. Mobile equipment' means a land vehicle (including any machinery or apparatus attached 
thereto), whether or not self-propelled, (1) not subject to motor vehicle registration, or (2) main-
tained for use exclusively on premises owned by or rent,ct to the nMied Insured. including the 
ways immediately adjoining. or (3) designed for use principally off public roads, or (4) designed 
or maintained for the sole purpose of affording mobility to equipment of the following types 
forming an integral part of or permanently attached to such vehicle; power cranes. shovels, 
loaders. diggers and drills: concrete mixers (other than mix-in-transit type); graders. scrapers, 
rollers and other road construction repair equipment air compressors. pumps and generators. 
including spraying. welding. and building cleaning equipment and geophysical exploration and 
well-servicing equipment. 
"Nameclln•nd" means the person or organization named in Item 1 of the Declarations of this 
policy. 
"Occurrence" means: 
(1) an accident. including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general. 
harmful conditions. or the happening of any of the offenses described in the definition of 
penonat Injury. which results in penonal Injury: or property dulage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the ln•red: or 
(2) an assault and battery not committed by or at the direction of the Insured. which results in 
bodily Injury or property damage: or 
(3) any action taken by the Insured in good faith in an emergency for the purpose of preventing 
injury or damage to the person or property of the Insured or others. which results in bodily 
Injury or property damage • 
.. Personal Injury" means bodily Injury: or injury arising out of one or more of the following 
offenses committed during tl'le policy period in the conduct of the Insured's business: 
(1} False arrest, detention or imprisonment. or malicious prosecution; 
(2) The publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or disparaging 
material, or a publication or utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy: except 
publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertising. broadcasting or telecast-
ing activities conducted by or on behalf of the lnMarect 
(3) Wrongful entry or eviction. or other invasion of the right of private occupancy . 
.. Ptlyslctan" means any individual who is licensed or approved by a state, the District of Columbia 
or other competent legal authority within the United States to provide health care or professional 
. medical services as a physician, surgeon, an osteopathic physician or surgeon, or a podiatrist. 
"Producta huard" means bodily Injury and property damage arising out of an lntured'l products 
or reliance upon a representation or warranty made-at any time with respect thereto, but only if 
the bodily Injury or property damat• occurs away from premises owned by or rented to an 
lMUred and after physical possession of such products has been relinquished to others • 
.. Prof•lional health care HtVIc•" means any professional health care service immediately inci-
dent to the care of injured or ill persons • 
.. Property damage" means physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs 
during the policy period. including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom . 
.. Suit" includes an arbitration proceeding to which the insured is required to submit by statute or 
court rule or to which the Insured has submitted with the Company's consent. 
"Volunteer" means any person whose services or labor are uncompensated for from any source 
and whose activities are directed or supervised by. and for the benefit of. the named Insured. 
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(2) The named Insured and/or the Directors, Oftlcerland Truat ... shall become aware of 
any matter which may subsequently give rise to a claim being made against the 
namec:llnaured and/or Dlrectora, Oftlcen and Truat ... or any of them for a wrongful 
act: or 
(3) The named Insured or any person seeking coverage und.er this policy shall become 
aware of any matter which may subsequently give rise to a claim being made against 
the named ln1ured or such person for improper or unlawful denial or restriction of 
staff privileges or a wrongful failure to act upon an application for staff privileges; 
and shall during such period give notice as soon as practicable to the Company of the 
receipt of such written or oral notice under Clause (1) or of such a matter under Clause 
(2) or Clause (3). then any claim which may subsequently be made against the Director~, 
Officer~ and Tru•t- arising out of such wrongful act or against the named Insured or 
any person under Coverage E shall, for the purpose of this policy, be treated as a claim 
made during the policy period in which such notice was given. 
4. Action Agalnlt Company. No action shall lie against the Company unless as a condition 
precedent thereto. there shall have been full compliance with all of the terms of this policy, 
nor until the amount of the lnturecl'• obligation to pay shall have been finally determined 
either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the 
Insured, the claimant and the Company. Any person or organization or the legal representa-
tive thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled 
to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. No person 
or organization shall have any right under this policy to join the Company as a party to any 
action against the ln.ured to determine the Insured'• liability, nor shall the Company be 
impleaded by the lniUred or his legal representative. Bankruptcy or insolvency of the Insured 
or of the lnsurecra estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its obligations hereunder. 
5. Other ln1urance. If an ln1urecl has other insurance for a loss covered by this policy. the rules 
below. shall be used to FIX THE PORTION of the loss the Company will pay. 
(a) The insurance afforded under this policy shall be excess over any other vaUd and collect-
ible insurance. 
(b) If this insurance and the other insurance are both excess, the Company will pay a 
portion of the loss under rules (c), (d) and (e). 
(c) Each insurer will first determine the amount of the loss it would pay under the terms of its 
policy as if it were the only insurer. This represents its maximum share of the loss. 
(d) If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, the Company will 
follow this method also. Under this approach, each insurer contributes equally until it 
has paid its maximum share or the loss has been paid in full, whichever comes first. 
(e) If any of the other insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares. the Company 
will contribute by limits. Under this method. each insurer's share of the loss is based on 
the ratio of its maximum share to the total of the maximum shares of all insurers. 
6. Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this policy. the Company shall be subro-
gated to all the lntured'a rights of recovery therefor against any person or organizatiQn, other 
than the United States of America. and the Insured shall execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The Insured shall do nothing 
to prejudice such rights. 
7. Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person 
shall not effect a waiver or a change in any part of this policy or estop the Company from 
asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of this policy be waived 
or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy. 
8. Aulgnment. The interest hereunder of any lntured is not assignable. If any person insured 
shall die or be adjudged incompetent, the coverage shall thereupon terminate for such 
person. but such insurance as is afforded by this policy shall cover such ln•ured'a legal 
representative as the ln1urecl with respect to liability previously incurred and covered by this 
policy. 
9. Three-Year Polley. If this policy is issued for a: period of three years. any limit of the Com-
pany's liability stated in the policy as "aggregate" shall apply separately to each consecutive 
annual period thereof. 
10. Termination. This policy may be terminated by the named lntured by written notice to the 
Company stating when thereafter the termination shall be effective. The Company will not 
terminate this policy, except for suspension or revocation of the Insured'• license or approval 
to provide health care services or for nonpayment of premium, unless notice of such termina-
tion shall have been given within sixty (60) days after the initial effective date of the lntured'l 
coverage or unless a written notice stating the reasons for the termination and the date and 
time ·upon which termination becomes effective has been mailed to the Insured sixty (60) 
days prior to termination. 
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Director. Officer or Trustee. shall, within 60 days of the original receipt by the named lniUred 
of notice from the Company of the intent to settle, present their respective positions to a 
committee composed of one person selected by the Company, one person selected by the 
named lnaured or, under Coverage e. an affected Director, Officer or Trustee, and one 
person who shall act as chairman selected by the first two committee members; except that, 
in Pennsylvania only, the committee shall be composed of the chairman, chairman-elect, and 
past chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Hospital Association of Pennsylvania or their 
designees. Said committee shall render a decision no later than 90 days from the date the 
named lnaured first received notice from the Company of the Company's intent to settle. The 
decision of said committee made by majority vote of its members shall be final and binding 
upon the Company and atllnaureda. 
16. Extenalon of Coverage E. Under Coverage e. the Company will pay all sums which the 
estate, heirs. legal representatives or assigns of deceased. insolvent. bankrupt or incompe-
tent persons who were Directors, Officers and Truat ... of the named lnaured at the time of a 
wrongful act, otherwise covered under this policy upon which the claim for recovery of such 
sums was based, shall be legally obligated to pay as damages. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed by its President and 
Secretary but this policy shall not be valid unless completed by the attachment hereto of a 
Declarations and Application and signed on the aforesaid Declarations by a duly authorized 
representative of the Company. 
Secretary President 
1.59 
I \ . \ 
a-ttnnsylvania HospHal.lnsurance Company 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which attached, effective on the inception date of the policy unless otherwise stated herein. (The 
following Information Is required only when this endorsement Is Issued subsequent to preparation of policy.) 
Policy Number HP 1286 
Named Insured and Address 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
End. No. 3 
Audit Period Annua 1 
EYH:~f ~~0. 3 
PUV'l CCrr __ ).;:::C;::;.O_M_C_I_ 
C.~SE NO. L -d / 5'.3 ~.s­
DATE~.-~~~ 
JUDO.~: -~VIIL~----
This Endorsement is effective 1 /l /84 and will terminate with the policy. 
Polley Period: From 1 11 /84 To 1 11 /85 
12:01 a.m., standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
It is hereby understood and agreed that the following Internal Medicine-No 
Surgery physicians are covered only for activities performed within the scope 
of their duties for the corporation known as Chris Simopoulos, M.D., Ltd. 
NAME 
Lisa R. V. Harper 
Visilios Papademetriou 
Mfchael B. Price 
George C. Tsokos 
LICENSE NO. 
0101-036121 
0101-035776 
0101-036169 
0101-035941 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
ISSUED BY THE COMPANY PROVIDING THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY AS DESIGNATED ON 
THE DECLARATIONS MADE A PART HEREOF. . 
Form 1 162 (8180) 
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~BB/kss VIRGINIA 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ) Indictment - Abortion 
vs. ) 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS ) Cr. #30906 
This 16th day of April, 1980, came the Commonwealth by 
her Attorney, and the Defendant, CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, who stands 
indicted for a felony, to-wit: abortion, appeared agreeably in 
accordance with his recognizance of bail; also appeared Gene 
Hines and Roy Lucas, Counsel for the Defendant. 
· Whereupon, the Court Reporter was sworn. 
Whereupon, the Court heard all of the evidence presented 
on behalf of the Defendant and at the conclusion of the evidence 
presented, Counsel for the Defendant renewed all of the Defendant's 
previous motions, which motions the Court denied. 
161 
Whereupon, the Court heard closing arguments of Counsel 
and in consideration of the evidence heard and argument of Counsel, 
the Court doth now find the Defendant,-CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, guilty 
of abortion, as charged in the indictment returned herein. 
And this case is hereby continued to the 18th day of 
April, 1980 at nine o'clock a.m. for imposition of sentence. 
And the Defendant is hereby continued on bond. 
/ 
A COPY T~STE: 
WARREN E. BP..RRY, CLERK 
..... "';,. ~ J Z:< '1.-b /-_ . 
'.p 1 .-. ( t. .... U: • I (...1 . .•. ··-~~ By· ..,.,.J . .,..,~:.--l_- ....... _ ......... ~···· . 
··· ···r;·~~~t~··c·i~rk . 
.J..~3 
E!~HI3JT NO. LJ : PlAINnFF'S l EXHIBIT PU ./, DEFC J COMC ) CASE NO. ~:~ ..•. · r:).j .~ . .,"" 
DATE (.- -..-.~~ b 
JUDGE: --.c.~~"---7 
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Syllab11s. 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D. 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
Apri124, 1981. 
Record No. 801107. 
1059 
Present: Carrico. C.J .• Harrison, Cochran. Poff, Compton, and Thompson. JJ. 
Th~ conviction of a doctor for violtuing Code I 18.2-71 
if uph~ld wh~n th~ ~vidence shows the doctor, in his 
clinic. nuh~r than in a stat~ licens~d hospitlllu requirtd 
by Cod~ § 18.2-74, inj«ted a mlint solution in the 
amniotic c1111ity of his patient during h~r second trimester 
of prtgnQifcy with intent to p1'0tiuce tzbonion and to 
dutroy the fttru: various i#un conctrning the suf/icltncy 
of the indictm~nt Qlfd the sufficiency and tht exclusion 
of c~rtain evidence are decided: the connitutionallty of 
tlr~ hospital rtquir~m~nt of Code § 18.2-74 for a ~corul 
trimester abortion is sustained. 
( 1) Criminal Law-statutory Coastrucdoa-ProdudDa an Abordoa, etc. (Code 
§ 18.%-71)-"Abortion" Includes the Use of Ally ~leans Resultblg lo 
Destrudion of an Unboru Child with the Intent to Destroy the Child. 
( 2) Crlmlaal Law-statutory Coastrucdoa-Produc:illg aa Abortioa, etc. (Code 
§ 18.2·71)-Wbea Abortion Lawful DuriDg Second Trimester of Pregaucy 
(Code I 18.2-73)- Procedures to be Performed ln Licensed Host~leal 
IDdwfe Mesas Employed with IDteat to Initiate the Abortion Process. 
(3) Crfmblal Procedure-Produda1 an Abortion. ete. (Code § 11.2·71)-ID· 
jectioa of Saline Solution into Amniotic Cavity of Pregaaat WoiiiSII II 
PrOcedure to Terminate Prepaacy-lndictment is Sufficient iD Chaqillg 
Use of Meaas Outside of Hospital wltb Intent to Produce Abortfoa and 
Deseroy Uaboru Child. 
( 4) Crimillal Procedure-Coasdtutloaal Law-Produdag an Abortloo, etc. 
(Code I 18.2-'71)-No Uacoastltudonal Burden Placed Upoa Phystdaa to 
Pnse"e Life of Fetus during Pre-VIable Stages of PregDaDcy by Cocle 
118.2·'71. 
(5) CrimiDal Proc:edure-Produdng an Abonioa, ete. (Code § 18.2·'71)-
Whea Exception made Ia Substantive Clause (Code I 18.2·74.1} Subsequent 
to the EnactiDK Clause of a Statute. the Defendaat must Assert the Defe~~~e 
aad the ladlctment is not Required to Deny it. 
( 6) Crlmhaal Procedure-Producillg aa Abortioo. ete. (Code § 18.2·71)-E.t-
deace Fully Saflldeat to Refute Defeadant's Defease of Materaal Medical 
Healtb Necessity (Code I 11.2·74.1). 
(7) Crimillal Procedure-Statutory Consuuctlon-Producina an Abortion. etc. 
(Code I 11.2·'71)-Statute Embraces Two Cases: The IDtent to Cause aa 
Abordoa aad The Causlug of 1111 Abortloa-lbe IDdlctment ·Fairly Charted 
the Defendaa&'s lnteadoaal Act Caused the Destruction of the Fetus. 
. 163 
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(8) CrlmfDal Proeetlure-Evfdeaa-Produdllg aD AbordoDt m. (Code §.18.%-
71)-Sulldeat to Show lajectfoa of Sallae Solatloa Destroyed Fetu-
Causal Coanecdoa betweea lajecdoa aDd hpulsfoa Immaterial to Oifeae 
Charged. 
(9) Criminal Procedure-Discovery-Coostftutioaal Law-Due Process-Com· 
111011wealtb's Failure to Produce Statement aad Names Immaterial to Charge 
1D llldlc:tmeat ad ~~~~material to Guilt or Punlslmlellt does DOt Deay Due 
Proass. 
(10) Crfmfaal Proaduro-Coasdtutloaal Law-Due Process-Evtdeace-5up-
pons Reasonable Reladoa of Hospital Requirement of Code I 18.%-73 to 
MatenlaJ Healtb-Due Process DOt Deaied. 
( 11) Crim.IDal Procedure-Coastltutioaal Law-Due Procesa-Statutory Coa. 
strucdoa-Collldetldoas Llmfts oa Abortions (Code I 11.2-75)-State does 
not Require Rospftala to Place Restrfctioa oo Abordoa Serftces ad 
Womea'1 EDt'dse of Free Choice Not DeaJed-Defeadaat Fails to Bear 
Burdea of Proof as to UacoastltudoDal.lty of Hospital Requirement-Code 
I 18.2·73 is Coastitutioaal as Applied. Harris v. McRae, 441 U.S. 197 
(1980) foUowed. 
A licensed physician, ill his clinic. and after be determined the patient was in her 
secoDCI trimester of preguaacy, iDjccted the patient with a saline solution to 
destroy the fetus and induce abortion. The fetus 9Ubsequendy aborted. The 
doctor was indicted under Code § 18.2·71 for "unlawfully and feloniously, 
duriDg tbe second trimester of pregDaDCy and outside of a hospital licensed by 
the State .•. [as required by Code § 18.2-731 •.. use means upon a female •.• 
with the intent to produce abortion and thereby destroy her unborn child". ID 
a bench trial, the defendant was convicted. He appeals, attacking tho validity 
of the indictment; the suftlcienc:y of the evidence to prove c:rimina1 intent and 
causation; the denial of discovery motions; the exclusion of certain testimony; 
and the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted. 
1. "Abortion" as contemplated by Article 9 of Title 18.2 and penalized. with 
exceptioM. in Code § 18.2· 71 includes the use of any means resulting in the 
destruction of an unbom child with intent to destroy the child. 
2. The exception under Code § 18.2-71 contained in Code § 18.2-73, when the 
abortion is performed in the second trimester of pregnancy, subject to the 
provision that '"such procedure is performed in a hospital'' licensed by the 
state, requires that all procedures performed during the entire process, includ-
ing the means employed with the intent to initiate the process, be performed 
in a hospital licensed by the state in order to fall within the exception. 
3. The injection of a saline solution into the amniotic cavity of a pregnant woman 
is a procedure to terminate her pregnancy. The indictment, referenced to Code 
§ 18.2-71, charged the defendant used means upon a female, outside a hospital 
Uceused by the state, with the intent to produce abortion and thereby destroy 
her unbom child. The indictment is sufficient, there being no requirement that 
the defendant be charged that he intended his patient to expel the fetus outside 
a hospital. 
4. The statutory proscription against destrUction of a fetus is not a command to 
preserve it. While a physician is required by Code § 18.~-74(c) during the third 
trimester to utilize fetal life suppon measures if thl!re li any dearly visible 
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evidence of viability, there is no affirmative duty of this nature during the pre-
viable stases of pregaancy. Thus no unconstitutional burden is imposed by the 
indictment upon the defendant to preserve the life of the fetus. 
S. When an exception is made in a substantive clause subsequent to the enacting 
clause of the statuto it is a matter for the defendant to assert the defense and 
not for the indictment to deny. Here the indictment was not required to negate 
the "medical necessity" exception of Code§ 18.2-74.1. Russo v. Commonwealth, 
207 Va. 2.51, 148 S.E.2d 820 ( 1966), followed; United States v. Yuitch, 402 
U.S. 62 ( 1971) di.ltingui.lhed. 
6. When a defendant invokes the "medical necessity" exception of Code § 18.2· 
74.1 as a defen~ tho Commonwealth bas the burden of negating matcmal 
health necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the evidence was fully suffi.· 
cient to refute ·any claim of matemal medical health necessity. 
7. Code § 18.2·71 is in two parts. Botb the intent to cause an abortiOD and the 
causing of an abortion in the sense of expulsion of the fetus arc embraced and 
penalized. Thus the Commonwealth had the option of alleging and prOYiDs 
that the saline injection caused either the death of the fetus or the expulsion 
of the fetus. By referencing tbo statute, the indictment fairly charged that de· 
fCDdant's intentiODal act caused tho destruction of the fetus. 
8. Absent evidence of other causative factors, tho evidence was sutllcient to show 
the saline solution caused the destruction of tho fetu&. Tho questiOil whether 
there was a causal colllleCtion between the injection and the ~ is iJD. 
material to the otfODSC charged. 
9. The evidence being sufficient to prove that the saline injection caused tho de-
struction of the fetus, the Commonwealth's failure to produce 011 p~trial dis-
covery an extra-judicial statement the patient had made to tho police and the 
names of tho patient's boyfriend and a physician who examined her at a mill· 
tary hospital a few days after the abortion was immaterial to the oJfense charged 
in tbe indictment and thus constitutionally immaterial to guilt or punishment. 
There was no denial of due process in the suppression of this evidence under 
tbe rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963 ). 
10. The evidence supports the reasonable relation of tbe hospital requirement of 
Code § 18.2· 73 to maternal health. The Code § 18.2· 73 relates to tho second 
trimester of pregnancy and not to the tint trimester as did the Georgia statute 
invalidated in Doe v. Bolton, .410 U.S. 179 (1973 ). The evidence indicates that 
from the moment a saline solution is injected to the time the fetus is expelled, 
the pregnant woman is exposed to risks, some minor and some major, and none 
precisely predictable. Once pregnancy has entered the second trimester the state 
has a compelling interest in maternal health and the legislature may adopt any 
measure reasonably designed to reduce health hazards inherent in the perform· 
ance of medical practices. The hospital requirement of Code § 18.2-73 is rea-
sonably related to maternal health and does not deny due proc:css. 
II. The hospital requirement of Code § 18.2-73 is constitutional as applied, the 
patient's access to medical care not being unreasonably limited. Two hospitals 
in Northern Virginia and 24 hospitals located elsewhere in the state provided 
abortion services in 1977 when the act charged occurred. While Code § 18.2-75 
permits private hospitals to place certain restrictions on abortion services or 
-----· .. ··---- --···· . . ~----
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refuse them altogether, it does not require them to do so. Although a govern-
ment may not place obstacles i_n the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom 
of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Harris v. McRae. 
448 U.S. 297 ( 1980). Statutes are presumptively constiwtional and defendant 
has not canied his burden as to invalidity of the hospital requirement. 
12. The Trial Court properly excluded the testimony of Dr. Moore who had made 
telephone calls to Virginia hospitals inquiring about their administrative policies 
concerning second trimester abortions. The testimony was ilTelevant since the 
patient testified she had not sought access to hospital services. was largely cumu-
lative and was immaterial to determination of the constitutionality of the hos-
pital requirement under Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. 
Hon. F. Bruce Bach, judge presiding. 
Afjinned. 
Roy Lucas (John H. Obrion: Lucas & Miller, P.C.: Browder, 
Russell, Little, Morris & Butchel', on brief), for appellant. 
Thomas D. Bagtvell, Assistant Attorney General (MQI'shall Cole-
man, Attorney Genel'al, on brief), for appellee. 
POFF, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Chris Simopoulos, a medical doctor licensed to practice obstetrics 
and gynecology, appeals from a judgment convicting him of a violation 
of the abortion statutes. The trial court heard the evidence without 
a jury and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment suspended 
during good behavior upon condition he serve 30 days in jail. 
P. M., a 17 year-old female, made an appointment to see the de-
fendant at his clinic on November 8, 1979. She told him that she 
was pregnant, that she was not married, and that she had decided 
to have an abortion. The defendant inquired whether she had discussed 
the matter with her parents, and she replied that she had been afraid 
to do so. The defendant examined her, informed her that she was 
five and one-half months pregnant, and agreed to perform an abor-
tion by means of an injection of a "saline solution". 1 P. M. told him 
1 This is a reference to saline amniocentesis, a means commonly employed in 
second-trimester abortion procedures. It was described as follows in a medical jour-
nal article offered at a pre-trial hearing: · 
'totbe technic utilized has been uniform. The patient assumes the supine position, 
and the abdomen is exposed. No premedication is used. The abdomen is 
cleansed, and a point representing the middle of the ·fundus of the uterus is 
identified. The skin, fascia :md peritoneum arc: thc:n anesthesized with 1 or !% 
----·- -------···---·--·· . 
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that she intended to deliver the fetus in a motel, and the defendant 
assured her that "it was okay". 
On the morning of November 10, P. M. returned with her boy-
friend to the clinic and, using money she had acquired through her 
VISA credit card, she paid the agreed fee of $4 7 5. The defendant ad-
ministered a local anaesthetic, injected a saline solution into her 
amniotic cavity, and gave her a "Post-Injection Information" sheet 
and a prescription for percodan, an analgesic. The sheet advised her 
that she had undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned her of 
••a wide range of normal reactions", including contractions, backache 
or tenderness at the bottom of the abdomen, nausea, thirst, dizziness, 
expulsion of amniotic fluid, rupture of "the bag of waters", and 
bleeding. The sheet directed her to abstain from alcoholic beverages 
and sexual activity, to call the doctor if "heavy'' bleeding began, and 
to come to the hospital when labor contractions became frequent or 
when the bag of waters broke. 
That afternoon, P. M. and her boyfriend filled the prescription and 
rented a room in a motel near the clinic. P.M.'s boyfriend stayed with 
lidocaine. The amDiotic cavity is entered with a 14-sauso thin-walled needle, 
and the stylet is removed. If a free flow of amniotic Jluid easues, a No. SF 
Teflon catheter is threaded through the needle several centimeters beyOild its 
tip •.•• Tho needle is then removed, and the rest of tho procedure is carried 
out through the catheter. 
"An effort is then made to remove all of the ftuid in the uterus. After this is 
done, a 20% NaCl (sodium chloride) solution is injected into the utenu. If 
ftuid is not obtained easily, an exchange infusion is performed-saline is in-
stilled and then an equal amount of fluid is removed. This process is repeated 
until the operator is certain that there is sufficient NaCl within the amniotic 
cavity. The maximum quantity injected should be 200 ml, wbich is 40 g of 
NaCl. A smaller volume is injected into smaller uteri when less fluid has been 
aspirated. Although the minimum quantity necessary to terminate all preg-
nancies has not been determined, we estimate that not less than .120 m1 of 20% 
solution should be injected. 
.. At the end of the procedure, one million units of aqueous penicillin is in-
stilled. In addition to providing prophylaxis. this instillation cle:us tho catheter 
of the salt solution which is caustic to the peritoneum. The patient should ex-
perience no discomfort during the procedure . 
"Symptoms of hypematremia--headache, heat, thirs~ numbness and tingling 
of the fingers-are an absolute indication for the operator to stop to re-evaluate 
the procedure. If the patient feels pain when saline is being injected, then the 
solution is being injected into tissue and, once again, the procedure must be 
interrupted and re-evaluated. The average time used for the entire process is 20 
minutes.'' \ 
Sc:bulmaD, et ~ "Outpatient Saline Abortion". 37 Ob&t~trlc.r &: Gyn~cology 521, 
522 (1971). 
-----·----~------------------ --------------
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her until 3:00 a.m. the next morning, returned at noon, and left again 
at 10:00 p.m. that night. Shortly after midnight, P. M. experienced 
the onset of labor. About 11 :00 a.m. that morning, she expelled the 
fetus, placed it and the afterbirth in a bathroom trashcan, and left 
for home. P. M. testified that she had eaten "some peanut butter and 
jelly sandwiches" and smoked a few cigarettes while awaiting her 
labor. She denied that she had ingested any drugs or medication except 
the percodan. She admitted that she never intended to abort in the 
hospital. Asked if the defendant had instructed her to abort in a motel, 
she said that "[h ]e told me that it was possible, that I didn't have to 
go to a hospital" and "[h]e made it perfectly clear what he meant." 
Responding to another question, she denied that the defendant had 
promised to meet her at the hospital after the contractions started. 
In the course of our opinion, we will detail other facts relevant to 
the multiple issues framed on appeal. These include the validity of the 
indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence to prove criminal intent 
and causation, the denial of discovery motions, and the exclusion of 
certain testimony. Aside from the constitutional questions underlying 
these issues, the defendant questions the constitutionality of the hos-
pital requirement of the statutes under which he was indicted and 
convicted. 
I. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES 
The defendant urges us to construe Article 9, Chapter 4, Title 
18 .2 of the Code as a whole. Doing so, we paraphrase the eight statutes 
set out in the margin. 2 
2 
§ 18.2-71. Procfudag abortion or Diiscarriage, etc.; penalty.-Except as provided 
in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by 
a woman, any drug or other thing, or use means. with intent to destroy her unborn 
child, or to produce abonion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or 
produce such abonion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. (Code 
1950, § 18.1-62; 1960, c. 358; 1970, c. 508; 1915, c:c. 14, IS.) 
§ 18.2·'72. When abortion. lawful duriag first trimester of prepaacy.-Notwith-
standing any of the provisions of § 18.2· 71, it shall be lawful for any physician 
licensed by the Virginia State Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, 
to terminate or attempt to terminate a human pregnancy or aid or assist in the 
termination of a human pregnancy by performing an abortion or causing a mis-
carriage on any woman during the first trimester of pregnancy. ( 1915, cc. 14, IS.) 
§ 18.2-73. When abortion lawful duriDg second trimester of preguaacy.-Notwith· 
standing any of the provisions of § 18.2· 71 and in addition to the provisions of 
§ 18.2·72. it shall be l:1wful for :1ny physician licensed by the Virgini:1 State Board 
of ~fedicine to pr:1ctice medicine and surgery. to terminate or attempt to terminate 
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1. A person who destroys a woman's unborn child. or causes her to 
abort or miscarry, by the use of any substance or by any other means 
with intent to achieve such a result is guilty of a CJass 4 fe1ony, unless 
the procedures employed and the result achieved are made lawful by 
other provisions of Article 9. § 18.2-71. 
2. The process criminalized by § 18.2-71 is Jawful when perfonned 
in the first trimester of pregnancy. § 18.2-72. 
a human pregnancy or aid or assist in the termination of a human pregnancy by 
performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage on any woman during the second 
trimester of pregnancy and prior to the third trimester of pregnancy provided such 
procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health 
or under the control of the State Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. 
(1975, cc. 14, IS.) 
II 18.%·74. When abortion or termination of pregnancy lawful after second tri· 
mester of pregaaacy.-Notwithstanding any.of the provisions of § 18.2-71 and in 
addition to the provisions of §§ 18.2-72 and 18.2-73. it shall be lawful for any 
physician licensed by the Virginia State Board of Medicine to practice medicine 
and surgery to terminate or attempt to terminate a human pregnancy or aid or 
assist in the termination of a human pregnancy by performing an abortion or caus-
ing a miscarriage on any woman in a stage of pr~gnancy subsequent to the second 
trimester provided the foJlowing conditions are met: 
(a) Said operation is performed in a hospital licensed by the Virginia State De-
panment of Health or under the control of the State Board of Mental Health and 
Mental Retardation. 
(b) The physician and two consulting physicians certify and so enter in the hos· 
pital record of the woman, that in their medical opinion. based upon their best 
clinical judgmen~ the continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death 
of the woman or substantially and irremediably impair the mental or physical health 
of the woman. 
(c) Measures for life support for the product of such abortion or miscarriage 
must be available and utilized if there is any clearly visible evidence of viability. 
( 1915, cc. 14. 15.) 
§ 18.2-74.1. Abortion, etc., when necessary to save life of womau.-In the event 
it is necessary for a licensed physician to terminate a human pregnancy or assist in 
the termination of a human pregnancy by performing an abortion, or causing a mis-
caniage on any woman in order to save her life. in the opinion of the physician so 
performing the abortion or causing the miscarriage, H 18.~·71. 18.2·73 and 18.2-74 
shall not be applicable. (Code 1950, § 18.1-62.3; 1970. c. 508: 1975. cc. 14. IS.) 
§ 18.%·75. Conscience clause.-Nothing in §§ 18.2·72. IR.2-73 or 18.2-74 shall 
require a hospital or other medical facility or physician to admit any patient under 
the provisions hereof for the purpose of performing an abortion. In addition. any 
person who shall state in writing an objection to any abortion or all abortions on 
personal, ethical, moral or religious grounds shall not ~e required to participate in 
procedures which will result in such abortion, and the refusal of such person. hos-
pital or other medical facility to participate therein shall not form the basis of any 
claim for damages on account of such refusal or for :.an~· disciplinary or recrimina-
tory action against such person, nor shall any such person be denied emplo)·ment 
because of such objection or refusal. The written objection shall remain in effect 
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3. Such process is lawful during the second trimester when per-
formed by a licensed physician in a licensed hospital. § 18.2-73. 
4. In the third trimester, the abortion process is lawful if: (a) it is 
performed by a licensed physician in a licensed hospital; (b) three 
physicians certify of record that a continuation of the pregnancy is 
likely to cause the woman to die or suffer substantial and permanent 
impairment of mental or physical health: and (c) fetal life support 
measures are available and utilized when there is clearly visible evi-
dence that the fetus is viable.~ 18.2-74. 
5. The proscribed process is lawful at any time during pregnancy if, 
in the opinion of the attending physician, such process is necessary 
to save the woman's life. ~ 18.2-74.1. 
6. Hospitals and physicians are not required to perform any process 
authorized by Article 9, and persons who register conscientious ob-
jections may refuse to participate in the procedures and are protected 
against damage suits and other recriminatory actions growing out of 
such refusal. ~ 18.2-75. 
7. No process otherwise authorized under Article 9 may be per-
formed without the informed written consent of the woman or, when 
she has been adjudged incompetent, one authorized to act for her. 
§ 18.2-76. 
8. Any person who promotes or induces the performance of a 
until such person shall revoke it in writing or terminate his association with the 
facility with which it is filed. (Code 1950, § 18.1·63.1: 1974, c. 679; 1975, cc. 14, 
15.) 
§ 18.2-76. Iaformed consent required.-Before performing any abonion or in-
ducing any miscarriage or terminating a pregnancy as provided for in §§ 18.2-72, 
18.2-73 or 18.2-74. the physician shall obtain the informed written consent of the 
pregnant woman; provided. however. if such woman shall be incompetent as adjudi-
cated by any court of competent jurisdiction or if the physician knows or has good 
reason to believe that such woman is incompetent as adjudicated by a coun of com· 
petent jurisdiction, then only after permission is given in writing by a parent. guar-
dian, committee, or other person standing in loco parentis to such incompetent, may 
the physician perform such abortion or otherwise terminate the pregnancy. 
The physician shall inform the pregnant woman of the nature of the proposed 
procedure to be utilized and the risks. if any, in her particular case to her health in 
terminating or continuing the pregnancy. Code 1950, § 18.1-6!.1; 1970, c. 508; 1972, 
c. 823; 197S, cc. 14. 15; 1979, c. 250.) 
§ 18.2-76..1. Enc:ourasinl or promoting abortioa.-If any person. by publication. 
lecture, advenisement. or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or thrc;>ugh 
the use of a referral agency for profit, or in any other manner, encourage or pro-
mote the performing of an abonion or the inducing of a miscarriage in this State 
which is prohibited under this anicle. he shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. 
(Code 1950. § 18.1-63; 1960. c. 358: 1971. c. 715: 1975. cc. 1-'. 15.) 
---~--. -- ---·-- ··-·-~,_- -- - ---- -·--··-····-·· 
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process prohibited by Article 9 is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. 
§ 18.2-76.1. 
II. VALIDITY OF THE INDICTMENT 
Referencing § 18.2-71, the indictment charged that the defendant 
''did unlawfully and feloniously, during the second trimester of preg-
nancy and outside of a hospital licensed by the State ... use means 
upon a white fe·male, aged 17. with the intent to produce abortion and 
thereby destroy her unborn child.,. 
In a pre-trial motion to dismiss. th~ defendant alleged that the in-
dictment ''fails to state a valid offense". On appeal, he raises three 
challenges to the validity of the indictment. 
A. Crimina/Intent 
[ 1-3] First, the defendant points out that the indictment did not 
charge that he acted ··with the specific intent that the patient abort 
outside the hospital", and, he says, the evidence failed to establish such 
intent. Construing § § 18.2-71, -73 together, the defendant maintains 
that, absent such a charge. the indictment is fatally defective. 
The defendant's construction rests upon his impression that the 
definition of "abortion" contemplated by Article 9 is .. expulsion of the 
fetus". That is a misimpression. "[T]he crime denounced is not limited 
to abortion in its narrow meaning of expulsion of the fetus, but 
includes ... the use of any means with intent to destroy an unborn 
child. resulting in the destruction of such child."" Coffman v. Common-
wealth, 188 Va. 553, 561-62, 50 S.E.2d 431, 436 ( 1948). Both the 
means and the ensuing process, though proscribed by § 18.2-71, are 
made lawful by § 18.2-73 when performed in the second trimester, 
''provided such procedure is performed in a hospital". Dr. Peter 
Soyster. a practicing gynecologist, agreed at trial that the injection 
of a saline solution into the amniotic cavity of a pregnant woman is "a 
procedure to terminate her pregnancy... In our view. the statutory 
proviso applies to an proc~dures performed during the entire process. 
including the means employed with intent to initiate the process. The 
indictment expressly charged that the defendant employed such means 
with such intent. It was unnesessary to charge that he intended his 
patient to expel the fetus outside a hospital. 
B. Duty to Pres_erve Fetal Life 
( 4] Because the statute referenced by the indictment forbids de-
struction of the fetus, the defendant argues that the indictment un-
. -·- ----·-------------- -----··--·-
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consitutionally burdens him with a duty to preserve the life of the fetus. 
It is true that a statute which imposes a duty upon a physician to 
take affirmative action to preserve a fetus, irrespective of the stage 
of pregnancy and the viability of the fetus, is constitutionally im-
permissible. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 83 ( 197 6). But after viability, the sovereign has a "compelling 
interest" sufficient to justify regulation reasonably designed to pre-
serve the life of the fetus. "If the State is interested in protecting fetal 
life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during 
that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health 
of the mother." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 ( 1973). 
We do not agree that the statutory proscription against destruction 
of the fetus is a command to preserve it. While § 18.2-74(c) requires 
a physician to utilize fetal life support measures during the third 
trimester "If there is any clearly visible evidence of viabilitY", nothing 
in Article 9 imposes such an affirmative duty during the pre-viable 
stages· of pregnancy, and we find no merit in the defendant's second 
argument. 
C. Medical Necessity Defense 
[S-6] In a third argument. the defendant contends that the indict-
ment is defective because it "does not attempt to negate the excep-
tion ... of a medical necessity to treat the patientn. This omission, 
the defendant says, shifts the burden of proving the exception to him 
. in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Vuitch, 
402 U.S. 62 ( 1971 ) . There, the accused was charged with violation 
of a statute in which the enacting clause proscribed abortion "unless 
the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's 
life or health". /d. at 67-68. The Court stated and then applied the 
rule that "when an exception is incorporated in the enacting clause 
of a statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead and prove 
that the defendant is not within the exception"./d. at 70. 
But when, as here, the exception is "made in a substantive clause 
1 1n Coltmtti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the Supreme Court reviewed a 
statute which imposed a fetal-preservation duty upon a physician if he determined 
that the fetus .. is viable ... or may be viable". ld at 380, n. 1. Finding that ''it is 
unclear whether the statute imports a purely subjective standard, or ... a mixed 
subjective and objective standard'" and that "it is uncertain whether the phrase 'may 
be viable' simply refers to viability .•. or whether it refers to an undefined penum· 
bral or •gray' area prior to the stage of viability••, id. at 391, the Court struck down 
the statute as impcnnissibly vague. There is nothlng unclear or uncertain in the 
language of Code § 18.2-74(c), and the standard it prescribes is purely objective. 
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subsequent to the enacting clause of the statute, ... we hold it to be 
a matter of defense for the defendant to assert and not for the indict-
ment to deny." Russo v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 259, 148 
S.E.2d 820,826, cen. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967). 
The rule in Russo is not inconsistent with that in Vuitch. Once a 
defendant invokes § 18.2-74.1 as a defense, the Commonwealth has 
the burden of negating maternal health necessity beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In a related argument, the defendant says that he raised the 
defense in his testimony and that the Commonwealth's evidence was 
insufficient to establish the absence of necessity. The defendant testi-
fied that his patient appeared "upset" and 6'depressed" when he ex-
amined her and that he became concerned about the possibility of 
suicide. But his patient, who acknowledged that her principal concern 
was to abort without her parents' knowledge, testified that she was 
"(s]cared, but nothing else." Funhermore, the defendant's hand-
written notes in the clinic's records described P. M.'s condition as 
"normal'' and showed that the saline procedure was "performed with-
out any complications". We find such evidence fully sufficient to refute 
any claim of maternal health necessity. 
III. CAUSATION 
[7 -8] Attacking both the validity of the indictment and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, the defendant declares that the Commonwealth 
failed to allege and to prove "that instillation of the saline solution 
actually caused the woman to abort the fetus." But "(a] close reading 
of[§ 18.2-71] will disclose that it is in two parts." Anderson v. Com-
monwealth, 190 Va. 665, 671, 58 S.E.2d 72, 74 ( 1950). The de-
fendant reads only one part. Affirming a conviction in a case where 
the expectant mother died and the fetus was never expelled, we said: 
''[M]ore than one intended consequence is included. If only 
the intent to cause an abonion. in the sense of expulsion of the 
fetus, and the causing of such abortion, were meant to be covered, 
the words "intent to destroy her unborn child,' and 'thereby de-
stroy such child', would be useless. It is not to be presumed that 
those words were used for no purpose and mean nothing in the 
statute.·· 
Coffman v. Commonwealth. supra. 188 Va. at 561, 50 S.E.2d at 435. 
Given this construction of the statute, the Commonwealth had the 
option of alleging and proving that the saline injection caused either 
the death of the fetus or the expulsion of the fetus. 
_...,_..__.._. ·--··-· 
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By referencing the statute, the indictment fairly charged that the 
defendant's intentional act had caused the destruction of the fetus. 
Assessing the evidence, we note that the defendant readily acknowl-
edged that he administered the saline solution with intent to tenninate 
pregnancy and that he realized that the procedure would destroy the 
fetus. P. M. testified that, before she left the clinic, "he told me ... 
that the fetus was destroyed". The medical examiner who performed 
the autopsy reported that the fetus was "born dead' •. 
Absent evidence of any other causative factor. we are of opinion 
that the evidence was sufficient to show that the saline injection caused 
the destruction of the fetus. While it is reasonable to infer that the 
fetus was expelled because it was dead, we need not decide whether 
the Commonwealth proved a casual connection between the injec-
tion and the expulsion. That question is immaterial to the offense with 
which the defendant was charged. 
IV. PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
[9] In pre-trial motions, the defendant made several general and 
specific requests for discovery. The trial court ruled that "I am going 
to require (the Commonwealth's Attorney] to give you everything ... 
that in any way could be exculpatory." The Commonwealth's Attorney 
declared that he had no exculpatory information. 
On appeal, the defendant complains that the Commonwealth with-
held an extra-judicial statement the patient made to the police 
and "the names of two important witnesses'', one, the patient's boy-
friend, and the other, the physician who examined her at a military 
hospital a few days after the fetus was expelled. 
"[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment. .. :· Brady v. ,Wal)·land, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 ( 1963). Due process requires disclosure when the 
evidence requested is such as uwould tend to exculpate [the:! accused] 
or reduce the penalty". /d. at 88. 
The defendant maintains that the information he ~\ought was ma-
terial to show whether the expulsion resulted from some cause other 
than the saline injection! While we note that th~ defc!ndant did not 
consider the information sufficiently important to seek it by subpoen-
.. Arguing his motions in the court below, he explained that the information was 
necessary to determine if his patient had '"had any other procedure ~rformed that 
could have caused the expulsion or if she took any drug or did an~ thing of any 
nature that would be an intervening superseding cause ... 
____ .. __ --------·- ---
\' 
in 
ed 
su 
ph 
inj 
the 
the 
ch~ 
W3! 
the 
1 
reqt 
he·a 
he s. 
tran. 
that 
abric 
[1 
case 
Cour 
Arne: 
that 
whetl 
that r 
"regu1 
state i 
a gains 
"'[T 
pres 
and 
prot 
sepa 
appr 
'com 
!!•'The 
the defer 
Smu.r \· .• 
--·-····-------·--- ··-----
lOS9. 
1arged that the 
~n of the fetus. 
~adily acknowl-
~nt to terminate 
mid destroy the 
·'he told me ... 
who performed 
are of opinion 
injection caused 
:> infer that the 
decide whether 
ween the injec-
the offense with 
~STS 
:ral general and 
hat "I am going 
u everything ... 
realth's Attorney 
nonwealth with-
: to the police 
1e patient's boy-
ler at a military 
favorable to an 
the evidence is 
tv v. Maryland, 
l~sure when the 
lte [the accused] 
sought was ma-
ome cause other 
~fendant did not 
:k it by subpoen-
the information was 
durc performed tbat 
did anything of any 
l 
\ 
Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059. 1071 
Opinion. 
ing the records of the military hospital or by interrogating the knowl-
edgeable witnesses at the preliminary hearing or at trial. we will as-
sume that P. M.'s statement and the names of the boyfriend and the 
physician were matters relevant· to the question whether the saline 
injection caused the expulsion of the fetus.~ But, as we have said, since 
the evidence of record is sufficient to prove that the injection caused 
the destruction of the fetus, that question is immaterial to the offense 
charged in the indictment. It follows that the information requested 
was no·t constitutionally material to guilt or punishment. and we reject 
the defendant's complaint. 
V. THE HOSPITAL REQUIREMENT 
The principal constitutional challenge is addressed to the hospital 
requirement of § 18.2· 73. The defendant's attack is two-fold. First, 
he argues that the requirement violates the Due Process clause because, 
he says, it is not reasonably related to maternal health and, therefore, 
transcends the regulatory powers of the state. Second, he contends 
that it limits a pregnant woman's access to medical care, and thus, 
abridges her constitutional right to choose abortion over maternity. 
(10] In the definition of a woman's right to abort, the watershed 
case is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 ( 1973). There, the Supreme 
Court, referring to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments as .. the roots" of a constitutional right of privacy, held 
that the right ··is broad enough to encompass a woman·s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." ld. at 153. Classifying 
that right as one of the "fundamental rights", the Court said that state 
•'regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling 
state interest'". !d. at 155. Balancing the personal right of privacy 
against the state's power to regulate, the Court explained: 
••[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in 
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman ... 
. and ... it has still another important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are 
separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality us the woman 
approaches term and. at a point during pregnancy. each becomes 
·compelling.· 
~'"The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense ... does not establish •materiality' in the constitutional sense." United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). 
.1.75 
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"With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest 
in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point ... is at 
approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of 
the now-established medical fact ... that · until the end of the 
first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality 
in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a 
State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that 
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protec-
tion of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation 
in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person 
who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; 
as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that 
is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other 
place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; 
and the like. 
"This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of preg-
nancy prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, 
in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regu-
lation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's 
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the 
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference 
by the State." 
"With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest 
in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability .... " 
/d. at 162-63. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), was decided the same day as 
Roe. Finding that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to 
show that a hospital requirement in a Georgia statute was reasonably 
related to maternal health, the Court ruled that the regulation was 
invalid "because it fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy''. I d. 
at 195. Article 9 of the Virginia Code excludes the first trimester; the 
hospital requirement applies to the second and third trimesters only. 
Under the principles and the standard of review announced in Roe 
and Doe we consider whether the evidence in this case supports a 
conclusion that "the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation 
and protection of maternal health." Roe. 410 U.S. at 163. 
A. Maternal Health 
Contending that it does not, the defendant points to the testimony 
of several medical experts. Dr. Harold Schulman testified that saline 
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injections are often administered in ill-equipped treatment rooms at 
hospitals from which the patient is discharged to await labor. He 
suggested that hospitalization during the waiting period is not neces-
sarily wise and could be dangerous to an expectant mother. He men-
tioned the possibility that some members of a hospital staff might 
be unsupportive or critical of unwed mothers and some might attempt 
to hasten expulsion by manipulation or instrumentation and thereby 
cause uterine or cervical perforation. A study he conducted showed 
that 65 percent of those injected as outpatients expelled the fetus at 
home, enroute to the hospital, or upon arrival and thereafter re-
quired no hospitalization. 
Yet, on cross-examination, Dr. Schulman conceded that the saline 
injection procedure entail~ certain risks which make it necessary to 
observe the patient to "see if there are any unusual reactions to the 
instillation of the solution." Such reactions may occur "for some 
unexplained reason" or when "a disproportionate amount of the salt 
solution somehow gets into her blood stream." This can cause "thirst 
. or headache, nausea, vomiting and on rare occasions the uterus will 
abruptly begin to swell." Dr. Schulman agreed that the saline solu-
tion can interfere with the clotting capacity of the blood and result in 
extensive hemorrhaging. He characterized this as a ''very serious 
problem", but one which occurs "for the most part" only during 
labor. He was familiar with some reponed cases of maternal death 
due to "total evacuation of blood". Although he felt that the defend-
ant's clinic was better furnished than most facilities used for saline pro-
cedures, he recalled that it was not equipped to handle blood trans-
fusions. In his own practice, Dr. Schulman instructs patients injected 
with saline to "go to the hospital" when labor begins. He follows 
this policy "because of the danger that's inherent in this whole process." 
Dr. Samuel M. Belinsky testified that he had administered 93 
second-trimester saline injections in a treatment room at Fairfax 
Hospital. As appears from his testimony, Dr. Belinsky considers an 
out-patient saline injection "a reasonably safe medical procedure"; he 
agrees that the defendant's clinic is adequately equipped for the proce· 
dure; he finds that the complication rates are uabout the same" whether 
the procedure is performed on an in-patient or out·patient basis; he 
believes it is medically reasonable to release a saline patient following 
a period of observation, with instructions such as those given by the 
defendant; and he has some concern about the possibility of patient 
ab\lSe by hospital staffs. 
On direct examination, Dr.· Thomas Gressinger concurred generally 
---~·--·---
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in Dr. Belinsky's opinions. On cross-examination, however, he ac-
knowledged that, if the saline solution enters the bloodstream too 
fast, it may cause "hypernatremia". Although that condition may 
be corrected before the onset of labor by the body's natural defense 
mechanisms, he agreed that, when bleeding results, it is a "major medi-
cal problem". He noted that Fairfax Hospital maintains a special facil-
ity apart from the operating room for delivery of patients injected with 
saline. Dr. Gressinger, who had administered numerous injections at 
that hospital, advises his patients to deliver there. He said that the 
saline process "should be closely supervised and the facility is set up 
for close supervision." "I feel," he added, "it's the best facility around 
so I feel it's best for my patients." 
Testifying in his own defense, the defendant was of opinion that the 
saline procedure is the safest method of abortion, that it rarely causes 
significant complications, that his clinic is properly equipped to per-
form the procedure, and that the statutory hospital requirement is 
medically unnecessary for the protection of the patient. The testimony 
of Dr. Soyster, a witness for the defense, was to the same effect. 
It appears that the saline method is the procedure most commonly 
employed by physicians to induce an abortion in the second trimester. 
Indeed, "saline amnio-infusion [is] the method of choice" during 
that stage of pregnancy. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379·, 398 
( 1979). And a statutory clause which forbids its use after the first 
trimester is not reasonably related to maternal health. Planned Parent-
hood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78-79 ( 1976). But the 
method employed is not the issue here. Rather, the question is whether 
the state can require that the method chosen to initiate a second-
trimester abortion be performed in a hospital. 
As Roe and Doe teach, once pregnancy has entered the second 
trimester, the state has a compelling interest in maternal health. In 
the exercise of the regulatory powers of the state, the legislature may 
adopt any measure reasonably designed to reduce health hazards in-
herent in the performance of medical practices. 6 Here, unlike the situa-
tion in Doe, the medical evidence shows that, from the moment a 
saline solution is injected to the· tirne the fetus is expelled. the pregnant 
8 
"The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety 
for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician 
and his staff, to the facilities involved. to the availability of aftercare, and to ade· 
quatc provision for any complication or emergency that might arise." 
Ro., 410 U.S. at ISO. 
------- . . --· 
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woman is exposed to certain risks'-some minor, others major, none 
precisely predictable. The state is empowered to license and regulate 
hospitals, clinics, home health agencies, and other medical care facili-
ties, see generally, Title 32.1 of the Code, and to fix and enforce differ-
ent standards of medical care for different facilities. The General As-
sembly has decided that medical procedures employed in second-
trimester abortions must be perfonned in hospitals. Based upon the 
evidence in this record, we are of opinion that the hospital require-
ment is reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in pre-
serving and protecting maternal health. 
B. Hospital Access 
[11] Advancing an alternative theory, the defendant insists that 
the hospital requirement is constitutionally defective because, he says, 
it unreasonably limits a pregnant woman's access to medical care and 
thereby abridges her right under Roe to elect to abort. Dr. Soyster 
testified that only two hospitals in Northern Virginia pennit second-
trimester abortions, and Dr. Belinsky knew of none in that area 
that did not require parental consent for abortions on minors. Noting 
that his patient, a minor, was anxious to conceal her condition from 
her parents and that she was unable to afford the expense of hospitali-
zation, the defendant maintains that hospital access was "virtually 
unavailable". This, he argues, shows that the hospital requirement is 
unreasonable as applied in this State. 
The defendant cites two opinions of federal district courts in other 
states. In MargaretS. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980), 
none of the Louisiana hospitals perfonned second-trimester abortions. 
In Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas Cit~· v. Ashcroft, 483 F.Supp. 
679 (W.O. Mo. 1980), argued, No. 80-1130 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 
1980), only one hospital in Missouri did so. But. as acknowledged by 
the defendant on brief, two hospitals in Nonhern Virginia and 24 
hospitals located elsewhere in the State were providing abortion 
services in 1977. 
More to the point, to the extent access to hospital abortion services 
was inconvenient or conditioned upon parental consent. the limitations 
:The Auomey General appended to his brief certain medic:1l journals to show 
additional risks inherent in the use of the saline procedure. :1nd 1he defendant cited 
other papers discounting the risks. None of these articles (except one offered by the 
defendant) was introduced for the benefit of the trial judge. Those out~ide the 
record do little more than illustrate diversity of medical opinion, and we do not 
rely upon them in reaching our decision. 
--------------------------- ----·--·--·- ··-----
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were not obstacles created by the state.8 While Code § 18.2-75, the 
so-called "conscience clause", permits private hospital corporations to 
place certain restrictions on abortion services or to refuse them al-
together, it does not require them to do so. And it need not forbid 
them to do so. ••[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in 
the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not 
remove those not of its own creation." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 {1980) (rejecting the contention that denial of public fund-
ing of abortion services was an unconstitutional infringement of the 
right to abort}. See also Poelker v. Doe, 43 2 U.S. S 19 ( 1977) ; Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
Applying that rule, we reject the defendant's contention here. 
Courts accord legislative enactments a presumption of constitution-
ality, and the burden rests upon those who question their validity to 
overcome the presumption. We find that the defendant has not canied 
his burden, and we hold that the hospital requirement of Article 9 is 
constitutionally permissible. • 
VI. EXCLUDED TESTIMONY 
(12] The defendant proffered, but the trial court excluded, the 
testimony of Dr. Emily Moore, an expert in demographics and family 
planning. Dr. Moore had made some 40 telephone calls. to Northern 
Virginia hospitals inquiring about their administrative policies con-
cerning second-trimester abortions. She experienced some difficulty in 
obtaining responsive and reliable information, but she concluded that 
only two area hospitals permit second-trimester abortions and that 
both require parental consent when the patient is a minor. 
s When imposed by the state, spousal and parental consent requirements are Wl· 
constitutional. Dantonh, 428 U.S. at 67-75; cf. H. L. v. Math~son, 101 S.Ct. 1164 
(March 23, 1981) (upholding statutory requirement that physician notify parents 
of a m.iDor incapable of sivina illformed CODSCnt). 
1 Several other courts have reached a similar conclusion. s~~. Gt~TY-Nonhwnt 
lndilllt4 Wom~n·s S~rvic~s v. Bow~n. 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980); Akron 
Cent~r /01' R~productio~ H~olth v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1215· (N.D. 
Ohio 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd 559 F.2d 193 (7th 
Cir.), ap[Jftll dismirMd for want of jurisdictiOII, 439 U.S. 8 (1978); Uoingston v. 
N~ 1~1'#1 Still~ B0t1rd of M~dlcal EXtUniners, 402 A.2d 961, cert. d~nied, 81 N.I. 
406, 408 A.2d 800 ( 1979). 
While the Supreme Court has never considered a challenge to a second-trimester 
hospital requircmen~ the statute reviewed in Plllllntd Parenthood of Central Mu-
.wuri v. Danforth, supra, contained such a requirement. Arguably. one of the eon· 
siderations which led the Court to strike down the proscription against the saline 
proeedure was the knowledge that the law required physicians to perform the pro-
cedure in a hospital. 
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We believe that, entirely aside from the rules on hearsay and best 
evidence, Dr. Moore's testimony was properly excluded. Its manifest 
purpose was to reinforce the defendant's position that hospital access 
wRs "virtually unavailable". First, the testimony was irrelevant; the 
defendant's patient testified that she had not sought access to hospital 
services before she went to the clinic. Second, the testimony was 
largely cumulative; Dr. Belinsky and Dr. Soyster supplied essentially 
the same information. Third, under the rule in Harris v. McRae, supra, 
Dr. Moore's testimony was immaterial to detennination of the con-
stitutionality of the hospital requirement. 
• • • 
Finding no merit in the defendant's several assignments of error, we 
will affirm the judgment. 
Af/inMd. 
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SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
APPEAL FROM TilE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
No. 81-,86. Argued 'November 30, 1982-Defided June 15, 1983 
Appellant, an obstetrician-gynecologist, was convided after a Virginia 
state-court trial for violating Virginia statutory provisions that make it 
unlawftd to perfonn an abortion during the second trimester or Jlreg-
nancy outside or a licensed hospital. ••Jiospital" is defined to include 
outpatient hospitals, and State Department of Health regulations define 
.,outpatient hospital" as including institutions that primarily furnish facil-
ities Cor the perfonnance of surgical procedures on outpatients. The 
regulationa also provide that second-trimester abortions may be per-
fonned in an outpatient surgical clinic licensed as a "hospital" by the 
State. 'lbe evidence at appellant's trial established, inter alia, that he 
peljonned a second-trimester abortion on an unmarried minor by an in-
jection of saline solution at his unlicensed flinic; that the minor under-
stood appellant to agree to her plan to deliver the fetus in a motel and did 
not recall being advised to go to a hospital when labor began, although 
such advice was included in an instruction sheet provided her by appel-
lant; and that the minor, alone in a motel, aborted her fetus 48 hours 
after the aal.ine if\jection. The Virginia Supreme Court affinned appel-
lant's conviction. 
Held: 
1. The Virginia abortion statute was not unconstitutionally applied to 
appellant on the asserted ground that the State failed to allege in the in-
di«ment and to prove lack of medical necessity for the abortion. Under 
the authoritative· construction of the statute by the Virginia Supreme 
Court, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward 
with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally pennissible. And 
appellant's oontention that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts in 
fact eaused the fetus' death is meritleu, in view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial. P. 610. 
2. ViflinJa's requirement that second-trimester abortions be per-
fonned in Hcensed outpatient clinics is not an unreasonable means of fur-
thering the State•a imJKJrtant and legitimate interest in protecting the 
woman's health, which interest becomes .. compelling" at approximately 
the end of the first trimester. In Akro11 v. Akru" Cellter fur Reprodlfc-
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live Health, Inc., ante, p. 416, and Planned Parmthood Ann. of Kaa: 
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, p. 476, oonstitutional ~hallengea 
were upheld with regard to requirements mandating that all aecopd-
trimester abortions be perfonned in "general, aeute-eare Cadlitiea." 'In 
fontrast, the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that such 
abortions be perfonned exflusively in full-senice hospitals, but pennit 
their perronnance at licensed outpatient clinics. 'lbua, the decisions in 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. Although a State's discre-
tion in detennining standards Cor the Ucensing of medical Cacilitiea does 
not pennit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from aecepted 
medical practice, the Virginia regulations on their race are compatible 
with accepted medical standards governing outpatient second-trimester 
abortions. Pp. 610-619. 
221 Va. 1059, 2'n S. E. 2d 194, aftlnned. 
PoWELL, J., delivered the opinion or the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, MARSHAU., and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and 
II of which WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CoNNOR, JJ., joined. O'CoNNOR, 
J., ftled an opinion c:oncurring In part. and ooncurrlng in the judgment, In 
which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, fJO'I, p. 619. S'I'BVBNS, J., 
ftled a dissenting opinion, posl, p. 620. 
Roy Lueas argued the cause for appellant. With him on 
the briefs was William P. Marshall. 
William G. Broaddus, Chief Deputy Attorney General of 
Virginia, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the 
brief were Gerold L. Baliles, Attorney General, and Tlumula 
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General.* 
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered th~ opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, 
p. 416, and Planned Parentlwod Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, p. 476. The principal issue here is 
whether Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is 
constitutional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Va., at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls Church , 
Va. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and facil-
ities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/ 
respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization fluids are 
on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester 
abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to this case 
the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant sought an; 
license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year-old high school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
P. M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
.Two days later, P. M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
fraend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P. M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P. M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
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undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." · App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if .. heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P. M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. · 
,; 
ld., at 200. '! 
P. M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in ' 
the motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She 
left the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication In • ; 
the wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her 
home. Police found the fetus later that day and began an 
investigation. 1 
AppeiJant was indicted 1 for unlawfully performing an abor-
tion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a li-
censed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of Fair,;. 
fax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia unanimously affinned the conviction. 221 Va. 1069, 
• Except as pennitted by statute, persona perf'onning an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory 
license revocation. Va. Code 1118.2-71, 64-316(3), M-317(1), 64.321.2 
(1982). A Class .4 felony is punishable by a sentence of2 to 10 yean In 
prison. Va. Code 118.2-IO(d) (1982). 
1 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code 118.2-71 (1982), which I 
provides: I 
.. Except as provided in other sections or this article, if any penon admin- 1 • 
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman. any drug or other thing, or uae 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute:· there Ia no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is perfonned within the ftnt trimester, ' 
118.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the aeeond trimester, 
118.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain dr· 
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is nece888ry to save the woman's Ufe, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation ofl18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense or hospitalization under 118.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under 118.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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277 S. E. 2d 194 (1981). Thitt appeal followed. We noted 
probable jurisdiction, 456 U. S. 988, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 (1982) 
was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical 
necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, 
addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier 
of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his con-
viction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden or persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not 
obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt utttil appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 s·. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of 
Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, 
required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of 
going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is 
normally permissible. See E·ngle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1976). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
Ill 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "imporlant and legitimate inlerest in the health 
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or the mother" that becomes •• 'compelling' • . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 ( 1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 428. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See 410 U. 8., at 160. Appel-
lant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non hospital 
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In 
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional 
challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue 
there. The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitaliza-
tion requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization 
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
Virginia law.' Virginia law does not, however, pennit a 
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office Is used principally for perfonning 
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(6) (1979). "Surgery" is not deftned. Ap-
pellant contends that whether his facility principally perfonns surgery is a 
question of fact that has not been resolved. and that it is uncertain whether 
his clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that q/ln he per-
Conned the abortion on P. M. he requested a certifteate or need. see 132.1-
102.3 (Supp. 1983), but was inronned by the Office of the Attorney General 
that his "clinic.office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that .. if you wish 
to perform this type or procedure, you must, in essence. build a hospltid to 
do it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he perConned the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements or the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity or the state hoe-
t•italization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
it is irrelevant to the issue berore us whether appellant's clinic and his pro-
cedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations. 
\ 
'! 
' . 
' I 
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physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perfonn an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hosJ>ital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code §32.1-123.1 (1979),• that defines "hospital" to in-
clude "outpatient . . . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the 
• The Supreme Court or Virginia views the word ,.hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as rereJTing to the definition of that tenn in 132.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to Title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the Title of the Code that oont.ains many or Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
healt.h agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Tille 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards or medical care for 
difl'erent facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be perfonned in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are or the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1076, 
271 S. E. Zd, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
118.2-'13 any differently from its interpretation in Title 32.1, and specift· 
eally in 132.1-123.1. Seen. 6, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
•••Hotpital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi· 
tala known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and ma-
temit.y hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1976 when 118.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code §32.298(2) (Supp. 1976) (repealed by 1979 Va. 
Acts, ch. 711). It s~ifically included at that. time .. out.-patient surgical 
hospitals (which tenn shall not include the office or offices of one or more 
physicians or surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for 
perfonning surgery)." 
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Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) (regulations) • 
• The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Bcwd of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations pl'elel'ibing mini· . 
mum standards for hospitals. This authority pennita it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character or treatment, care, or 
,. 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and 
requirements fot each class in confonnity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expreued or implied herein, and with due · · 
regard to and in reasonable confonnity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matten of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availabilit.y of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assist-
ants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costa to the 
patients." Va. Code 132-301 (19'13) (repealed by 1919 VL Acta, ch. 'lll) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code 1132.1-
12 and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals In Vir· 
ginia (Oct. 27, 1976). The most important diJI'erenc:e wu that the require-
ments now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
tient facilities in which abortions -could be perfonned, regardless or the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave prelimiriary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December I, 1976, and a public hearing waa held January 
26, 19'17. Or. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at thla 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two docton and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia lloe- ··· 
pital A880Ciatlon; a representative of ftve outpatient. abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the HiUcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
TidewaterOBGYN Society; the Medical DirectOr of the Ambulatory Surgi· 
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospit.al; a representative or the Virginia Society for Human Lite; and 
a representative or the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common- •; 
wealth of Virginia Department or Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed ,i 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure or Outpatient Hospitals in Vir· 
,. 
------··----. 
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defines ''outpatient hospitals" in pertinent part as u(i)nstitu-
tions . . . which primarily provide facilities for the perform-
ance of surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and IJrovides 
that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these 
clinics.' Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abor-
ginia (Jan. 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital As-
sociation stated that .. (iln general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." I d., at 4. The abortion clinics were conrc1·ned how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion ~linics 
then perfonning first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the seoond trimester .. the State may regulate the (abortion) proce-
dure in the Interest or maternal health." I d.' at 7. Rut the clinics HJJeCift-
cally "propose(dJ that clinics or other facilities that perfonn abortions 
during the ftrst trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure or Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I fl., at 
26. See also id., at28. The Medical Director or the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not .. compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in onler to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set or regulations. See id., at 30. Jt,ollowing 
the hearing, the Board added Part Ill, the regulations or which apply only 
to clinics doing flrst-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 12, infra. It there-
fore is clear that Virginia has recogniZl"tl the need for discrete and different 
seta ofregulati~ns for the two periods. The Board gave its final at,proval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was IK!rformed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
. We note that new but similar regulations now su1tersede the regulations 
1n efl'ect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, Pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§:t2.1-12, 32.1-127 (1979), enacted in 
1979. 
'Section 32.1-125 of the Code provideR: .. No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided In this article.'' See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (197'1) (similar provision speciftcally 
governing outp~tient surgical hospitalH). 
• Part II or the regulations sets minimum standanls for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
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tion IJ!aY ~ performed in an outpatient surgical hospital pro-
vided that facility has been licensed as a ''hospital" by the 
State. \ 
I; 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the perfonnance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals . 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to '~ 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be : 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first grouping relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§40.3 (1977); see also §40.1. They also require a policy and 
procedures manual, §43.2, an administrative officer, §40.6, a 
licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, §42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, 142.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
.. deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," 160.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
tation is conflnned by several sections in Part II, i. e.. 1143.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.6, 43.9.6, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part Ill, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities Ucenaed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perfonn second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the tenn 110Utpatient abortion eUnice" to refer speeiftcally 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards or Part Ill of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) I (1971). Facilities meet-
ing these standanls are limited to perfonning abortions only during the 
first trimester or pregnancy. Ibid. See id., 162.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy (in an outpatient abortion clinic) shall be 
performed prior to the end orthe ftrst trimester (12th week amenorrbear). 
o I 
·----- -·-···. 
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ices, §§62.1, 62.2, 62.3, and general building, §§50.6.1, 
60.7.1, 60.8.1, 62.4. The final group of regulations relates to 
patient care services. Most of these set the requirements 
for various services that the facility may offer, such as an-
esthesia, §43.1, laboratory, §§43.6.1, 64.1.3, 64.1.4, and pa-
thology, §§43.6.3, 64.2.4. Some of the requirements relate 
to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. §§43.2, 43.10, 
43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on medical records, 
§ 43. 7, preoperative admission, § 43.8, and postoperative re-
covery, 143.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emer-
gency services and evacuation planning. §§ 43.4.1, 43.5. 
8 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 431-432, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 481. In those 
cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during 
the early weeks of the second trimester[, 1 D&E abortions 
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a 
full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 437. There-
quirements at issue, however, mandated that "all second-
trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care 
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 481. In contrast, the Virginia 
statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester 
abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. 
Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient 
surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as .. hospitals" 
in which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be per-
formed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Asltcroft 
are not controlling here. 
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. 
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it does 
have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester 
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abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities. in 
which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gen-
erally compatible with accepted medical' standards govern-
ing outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American 
Public Health Association (APHA) (Resolution No. 7907),,·; 
although recognizing ''that greater use of the Dilatation and l 
Evacuation procedure makes it possible to perform the vast ! 
majority of second trimester ab~rtions during or prior to the·· . 
16th week after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en- i 
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 1 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979). The medical profession has not 
thought that a State's standards need be relaxed merely 
because the facility perfonns abortions: "Ambulatory care 
facilities providing abortion services should meet the same 
standards of care as those recommended for other surgical 
procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient 
clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory set-
ting." American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 64 
(5th ed. 1982). See also id., at 62 ("Free-standing or hospi-
tal-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to 
conform to requirements of state or federal legislation"). In-
deed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgi-
cal facilities are stringent: ''Such facilities should maintain the 
same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are 
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowl- j 
edge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appel- I 
lant has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to 
the State's interest in protecting health. • His challenge ·j 
'See nn. 3, 6, supra; 6 Reeord 66-66 (appellant acknowledging existence 
of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a Ucense; but 
• 
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throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortioris to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
In esseitce, appellant has argued that Virgilua's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are no different in substance from those 
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 111 At 
the same time, however, appellant took the position-both 
before the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licens-
ing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be 
constitutional.•• We can only assume that by continuing to 
challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement appellant 
either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way 
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization require-
ment that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations 
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hos-
pitalization requirement. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no rea-
son to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon 
denying that he knew or the licensing program when the abortion was 
perlonned) . 
.. AppeUant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not 
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in 
the broadest language and in conclusory tenns: that the record is silent on 
the applicability of those regulations to his facility: that the record does 
not show whether any ouliJatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonablenes:~ of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity lo dt·fend agaim•t the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had aiJfJiied for an outtmlient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opf»urtunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that l•art II of the regulations does not cover an out-
patient surgical hmtt•ilal where second-trimeater abortions are 11erfonned. 
Some of these arguments an• simply meritlcss, see n. 8, arq~ra, and others 
are irrelevant, seen. :J, :tuJmr, and none haM been raised below. 
"See 8 Reconl 196a, 214a: IJrief fur Appellant in No. 801107 eVa. Sup. 
Ct.), p. 36; Juris. Stateml'nt 16; IJrief for Appellant 32, 43, n. 75, 46. 
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proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license per-
mitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. We 
conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-triQleeter 
abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreason-
able means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." ·Roe, 410 ,· 
U. S., at 160.11 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a . 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other : 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that .. I 
insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the 
provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's 
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be hos-
pitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be perfonned in a 
Cull-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's require-
ment that second-trimester abortions be perfonned in licensed 
clinics appean to comport with accepted medical practice, and 
leaves the method and timing of the abortion precisely where 
they belong-with the physician and the patient. 
IV· 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
I agree with the Court's treatment of the appellant's argu-
ments based on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), 
"Appellant argues that Part Ill or the regulations, covering ftrat-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the 1atne services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part Ill has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Rep. (Outpatient Hospitals) ll63.l.l(b), 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m) (1971}. Appellant contends that, given these extensive regu-
lations for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more 
technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict 
them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before ua, however, 
relates to second-trimester abortions. 
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and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). Accord· 
ingly, I join Parts I and II of the Court's. opinion. . 
1 concur in the judgment of the Court ansofar as at affirms 
the conviction. For reasons stated in my dissent in Akron v. 
Akron ·center for Reproductive Health, ante, p. 416, I do 
not agree that the constitutional validity of the Virginia man-
datory hospitalization requiremen.t is contingent in any '!'ay 
on the trimester in which it is imposed. Rather, I beheve 
that the requirement in this case is not an undue burden on 
the decision to undergo an abortion. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Prior to this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 
(1973), it was a felony to perform any abortion in Virginia ex-
cept in a hospital accredited by the Joint Committee on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals and licensed by the Department of 
Health, and with the approval of the hospital's Abortion Re-
view Board (a committee of three physicians). • In 1975, the 
Virginia Code was amended to authorize additional abor-
tions, including any second-trimester abortion performed 
by a physician "in a hospital licensed by the State Depart-
ment of Health or under the control of the State Board of 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation." Va. Code § 18.2-
73 (1982). 
The amended statute might be interpreted in either of 
two ways. It might be read to prohibit all second-trimester 
abortions except those performed in a full-service, acute-care 
hospital facility. Or it might be read to permit any abortion 
perfonned in a facility licensed as a "hospital" in accord with 
any regulations subsequently adopted by the Department of 
• An' in-hospital abortion was also unlawful unless (a) it was necessary to 
protect the life or health of the mother, (b) the pregnancy was lhe product 
of npe or incest, or (c) there was a substantial medical likelihood that the 
ehild would be born with an irremediable and incapacitating mental or 
physiQJ defect. 1970 Va. Ads, ch. 608. 
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Health. The Court today chooses the latter interpretatio~. 
See ante, at 512-614. 
There is reason to think the Court may be wrong. 4t the 
time the statute was enacted, there were no regulations iden-
tifying abortion clinics as "hospitals." The structure of the 
1975 amendment suggests that the Virginia General Assem- · 
bly did not want to make any greater change in its law than it ' 
believed necessary to comply with Roe v. Wade, and it may 
well have thought a full-service, acute-care hospitalization -. ~ 
requirement constitutionally acceptable. Moreover, the 
opinion below does not suggest that the Supreme Court of 
Virginia believed the term "hospital" to incorporate licensed 
abortion clinics. It only discussed testimony pertaining to 
full-service, acute-care hospitals like Fairfax Hospital. See 
221 Va. 1059, 1073, 277 S. E. 2d 194, 203. And it stated that 
.,two hospitals in Northern Virginia and 24 hospitals located 
elsewhere in the State were providing abortion services in 
1977," id., at .1075, 277 S. E. 2d, at 204, again referring to 
acute-care fa~ilities. The opinion refers to "clinics" only 
once, as part of a general statement concerning the variety of 
medical care facilities the State licenses and regulates; even 
there, the term is included in the list as a category that is dis-
tinct from '•hospitals." ld., at 1074, 277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
On the other hand, the Court may well be correct in its 
interpretation of the Virginia statute. The word "hospital" 
in § 18.2-73 could incorporate by ·reference any institution 
licensed in accord with Va. Code §32.1-123.1 (1979) and its 
implementing regulations. See ante, at 512-514. It is not 
this Court's role, however, to interpret state law. We should 
not rest our decision on an interpretation of state law that was 
not endorsed by the court whose judgment we are reviewing. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion was written on the as-
sumption that the Commonwealth could constitutionally re-
quire all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a full-
service,. acute-care hospital. Our decision today in City of i ,. 
I 
! 
•: 
I 
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Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, 
p. 416, ·proves that assur.nption to ~ave been incorrect. The 
proper disposition of thts appeal IS therefore to vacate the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and to remand 
the ease to that court to reconsider its holding in the light of 
our opinion in Akron. 
I respectfully dissent. 
0 
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Syllabus 
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP. v. PFEIFER \ .. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
· THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 82-131. Argued February 28, 19&1-Declded June 16, 1983 
Respondent was il\lured in the coune or hla employment while employed 
by petitioner as a loading helper on petitioner's eoal barge In Pennsylva-
.i ,. 
nia. The ll\lury made respondent pennanently unable to return to his ·, : 
job or to perConn other than light work. Respondent brought an action 
in Federal District Court against petitioner, alleging that his Injury 
had been "caused by the negligence or the vessel" within the meaning 
or 15(b) or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worken' Compensation 
Aet (LHWCA). The District Court found In respondent's favor and 
awarded damages or $276,881.31, holding that receipt or compensation 
from petitioner under 14 or the LHWCA did not bar a separate recovery 
or damages for negligence. In calculating the damages, the cowt did 
not increase the award to take inflation into aecount nor did it dlacount 
the award to reflect the present value of the future stream or Income. 
Instead, the eourt followed a decision of the Penneylvanla Supreme 
Court, which had held "as a matter or law that future Inflation shall be 
presumed equal to future interest rates with theae ~n ofl'setting." 
The Court of Appeals afllrmed. 
Held: 
1. A longshoreman may bring a negUpnee action under 16(b) apinat 
the owner or a vessel who acts 88 his own stevedore, even tholllh the 
longshoreman has received compensation from the owner-employer 
under 14. The plain language or 16(a), which provides that the UabWt7 
of an employer for compensation presc:ribed in 14 •shall be exclusive and 
in place of aU other liability or euch an employer .to the employee," 
appean to support petitioner's contention that elnce, u reapondent'• 
employer, it had paid compensation to him under 14, 16(a) abeolvea It of 
all other responsibility to respondent for damagee. But such contention 
is undennined by the plain language or 16(b), whleh authorlzee • long-
shoreman whose injury Is caused by the ne11igenee or a veuel to bring a 
separate action against euch a veBSel 88 a third party, unleu the In-
jury was caused by the negligence of penona engaged in providing 
stevedoring servic:es to the veesel. 1116(a) had been Intended to bar all 
negligence suits against owner-employen, there ytould have been. no 
need to put an additional sentence in 16(b) barrlngeulte lpinat owner-
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. RUSSELL, CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
In this § 1983 action for declara~ory and injunctive 
relief, the plaintiff, a physician, sought judgment against 
the State Board of Medicine (Virginia). the Attorney General 
of Virginia, and two Virginia hospitals, that certain provisions 
1 
of the Virginia anti-abortion statute$ and the related statute 
authorizing the State Board of Medicine to suspend any licensed 
physician upon conviction of a violation of those anti-abortion 
2 
statutes, were unconstitutional, and in that connection prayed 
for injunctive relief against any restriction upon, or suspension 
of, the plaintiff's right to practice medicine within the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, or to continue as a staff member of 
the two defendant hospitals on account of his conviction under 
the anti-abortion statutes. The District Court dismissed the 
action under the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1970). and related cases. The plaintiff has appealed that 
dismissal. ~e affirm. 
This action originated with plaintiff's arrest on 
Nove~ber 29, 1979, under a warrant charging him with the cri~e 
of "perfo~ing on a minor, 17 years of age, an abortion during 
the second trimester of pregnancy and outside a hospital licensed 
by the State Department of Health or under the control of the 
State Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation," in 
1 
§§ 18.2-71, et ~.,Code of Virginia (1950) as amended. 
2 
§ 54-321.2, Code of Virginia (1950) as amended. 
. ' 192 
violation of § 18.2-73. 3 After arrest, he·demanded a preliminary 
hearing prior to submdssion of any indictment to the grand jury. 
This request was granted. The preliminary hearing, however, was 
continued at the plaintiff'~ request, from the date originally 
set until January 15, 1980. While the preliminary hearing was 
thus. delayed, the plaintiff instituted on December 27, 1979, a 
§ 1983 action in the District Court styled Simopoulos v. Horan, 
to enjoin any prosecution under the a·rrest "Warrant, as well as 
any other prosecutions under § 18.2-73, on the ground that the 
statute on which the prosecution ~as based was unconstitutional. 
The District Court being "of the opinion that it should abstain 
from interfering in that State's prosecution," dismissed that 
action on January 16, 1980. The plaintiff appealed the disrr.issal, 
and pending hearing of that appeal, sought from the Court a tempo-
rary injunction against prosecution. The request for injunctive 
relief pending appeal ~as denied and later, by consent, the appeal 
itself ~as dismissed. The prosecution in the State Circuit Cou~t 
then proceeded and resulted in the plaintiff's conviction and 
sentencing on April 18, 1980. That conviction has been appealed 
and is no~ pending before the Virginia Supreme Court. 
rpon the defendant's conviction in the State Circuit 
Court being certified to it, the defendant Board of Medicine 
3 This section was enacted in 1975 as an amendment to § 
18.2-71 in order to bring the latter "into compliance with Roe 
v. Wade, .... " Note, Twentieth Annual Survey of Develo:y-
ments of Virginia Law, 1974-5, 61 Va.L.Rev. 1627 at 1711 ( 975). 
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I 
revoked the plaintiff's Virginia license to-practice medicine on 
May 23, 1980, pursuant to § 54-321.2 of the Virginia Code (1950) 
as amended. Under the terms of that section, the defendant 
secretary of the Board of Medicine is directed to suspend 
"without a hearing, the certificate or license of any person," 
who has "suffered a conviction as described in§ 54-317.1(1) 
" One of the grounds of "unprofessional conduct" by a 
"practitioner of medicine" under § 54-317(1) is engaging "in 
any manner or by any means whatsoever to procure or perform or 
to aid or abet in procuring or performing a criminal abortion; 
••• " § 54-321.2, however, provides that any person whose 
1ic~nse to practice medicine has b~en suspended thereunder may 
apply "for termination of such suspension or revocation and 
reinstatement of his certificate or licer.se." When such 
application is tr.ade the Board of Medicine is obligated to give 
the applicant a full hearing, with the right to be represented 
by counsel, and to summon witnesses in his behalf. The proceed-
ings on such application before the Board are to be "recorded 
fornially." The revocation of a suspension requires the "affirma-
tive vote of three fourths of the oembers at the hearing." 
Should the application for revocation be denied by the Board, 
the applicant has a right to appeal "to the circuit court of the 
county or the circuit or corporation court of the city within 
whose jurisdiction he resides, for a review of such proceedings." 
§ 54-320, Virginia Code. (1950). 
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After being advised of the suspension of his license, 
the plaintiff requested orally a hearing before the Board of 
Medicine for the purpose of seeking a revocation or stay, pending 
·appeal of his criminal conviction, of the suspension. A hearing 
on that request was set for July 18, 1980. Without waiting, 
however, for such hearing the plaintiff filed this action in 
the United States District Court on June 5, 1980. He stated 
his "claims" on the basis of which he sought relief as follows: 
"(I) Va.Code § 54-321.2 is unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied, for failure 
to provide a pre-revocation hearing 
consistent with the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
"(II) Defendants cannot revoke or suspend 
.Dr. Simopoulos' license and/or hospital 
privileges because the underlying con-
viction was based on a statute, Va. 
Code § 18.2-71, - 74, which is unconsti-
tutional in violation of the due process 
and equal protection clauses, and right 
of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment." 
In setting forth his request" for judg::-.ent he asked for 
"[d]eclaratory judgcents that Va.Code §§ SL-321.2 and 
18-2-71, -74, are unconstitutional in violation of the due 
process and equal protection clauses. and right of privacy in 
the Fourteenth Amendme::nt," and for injunctive relief, both 
preliminary and perr1anent, restoring him to "his unrestricted 
license to practice medicine" and to "the hospital staff member-
ship and privileges which he previously held" at the two 
defendant hospitals. Contemporaneous with the filing of his 
complaint, the plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order 
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and preliminary injunction, accompanying such motion with support-
ing authorities. On June 20, 1980, the District Court denied the 
motion and dismissed the action. In so doing, the District Court 
restated its earlier decision in Simopoulos v. Horan to abstain 
from consideration of the plaintiff's attack on the constitution-
ality of the Virginia anti-abortion statute and found that 
§ 54-321.2 was on its face reasonable, citing Christhilf v. 
Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n., Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th 
Cir. 1974). It added that the plaintiff, if he felt aggrieved 
at the suspension of his license, might apply for a hearing before 
the Board of Medicine. From that dismissal the plaintiff has 
appealed. 
On July 18, 1980, the plaintiff was heard in person and 
by counsel on his application to the Board of Medicine for a 
revocation of his suspension, pending appeal of his con,riction to 
the Virginia Supreme Court. On July 29, 1980, the plaintiff was 
officially notified that his application was denied. The plaintiff 
has appealed this denial of his application to the State Circui~ 
Court, as authorized under the statute. He has "based" his appeal 
"upon inconsistencies between the Board's hearing on the matter 
and the requirements of the Administration Process Act, Va.Code 
9-6.14, et !!.9...:.." In his counsel's letter transmitting his notice 
of appeal the plaintiff disclaimed expressly "an attempt on [his] 
part to pursue dual appeals in state and federal courts on the same 
questions. Dr. Simopoulos' appeal before the United States Court of 
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit involves questions of federal law 
that are separate and distinct from the state law issues that 
will be raised before the Fifteenth Circuit Court, City of 
Richmond."4 
To recapitulate: the plaintiff has appealed to this 
Court the dismdssal of this action in the District Court for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, and it is this appeal which 
is before us. He has also appealed his criminal con-
viction under the abortion statute to the State Supreme Court; 
and, under the procedure for appeal from decisions of the Boarc 
of Medicine, as provided in § 54-321.2, he has appealed the 
denial of either a revocation or a stay, pending appeal, of 
his license suspension to the State Circuit Court. The 
District Court held, as ~e have said, that disreissal of the 
federal action ~as rr~ndated under the principles declared in 
~ounger v. Harris, 401 r.s. 37 (1970), and relat~d cases, leavi~g 
plaintiff to the litigation of his state and fec~ral cl&irr.s in the 
state court. The issue on appeal thus is whether the Younger 
doctrine proscribes the maintenance of plaintiff's action for 
4 This attempt of the plaintiff to limit his State appeals 
to State issues, reserving for federal review his federal 
claims, was similar to the action of the plaintiff in Scruggs 
v. Ca~bell, 630 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1980). Such procedure was 
plain~ contrary to the language of the Supreme Court in Gibson 
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), as well as our ruling 1n 
Scruggs. 
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declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal court. The 
resolution of this issue requires exaudnation of the Younger 
doctrine as it applies to the federal action and the relation 
of such doctrine to the facts of this case. 
In Younger and the five other cases decided the same 
day, 5 often described as the "February Sextet,"6 the Supreme 
Court formulated the principles restraining interference 
by federal courts with state court proceedings. Under 
these principles when relief sought by a plaintiff in a 
federal action is available in a pending state criminal 
proceeding, the federal court, except in certain specific 
extraordinary circumstances, must apply equitable estoppel 
and abstain by dismissing outright the federal suit and 
by requiring the "presentation of all claims, both state 
and federal, to the state courts."7 This rule generally known 
5 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Bvrne v. 
Kara1exis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); D!son v. Stein, 401 U.S. 
200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesoma, 40 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels 
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971). 
osal 
1 For the requirement that all claims, state and federal, 
must be presented to the state court under Younger. !!! 
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973); American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Bozardt, supra, 539 F.2d 342; see also 
Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The 
Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 Supreme Court Review. 193, 
196. 
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as the Younger doctrine, does not extend merely to direct 
relief against the state prosecution; it "denies any 
relief that depend_s on resolution of the constitutional 
issue raised in the state case."8 Accordingly, it not 
only denies federal injunctive relief .against the state 
action; it also closes the door of the federal court to an 
action for "prospective" relief by way of a declaratory 
judgment finding the statute involved in the criminal 
proceeding unconstitutionai. 9 The basis for this doctrine 
was stated to be consideration of equity, comity and 
federalism. 10 In exposition of these considerations, the 
Supreme Court observed that traditionally courts of equity 
did not interfere with criminal prosecutions, where the 
complaining party has an adequate remedy at law and will not 
suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief is not granted. 
8 Laycock, 1977 Supreme Court Review, at 196. 
9 Sat!luels v. Y.ackell, supft· 401 U.S. at 72-73. 
In reaching this conclusion, t e Court reasoned that 
a declaratory judgment "will result in precisely the 
same interference with and disruption of state 
proceedings" as would an injunction. This is true, 
it concluded, because a declaratory judgment would be 
considered "res judicata" in the state court, or because 
a declaratory judgment could serve as a basis for a 
subsequent injunction to "protect or effectuate" that 
declaratory judgment. 
10 401 U.S. at 43-47. 
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An even more vital consideration for the doctrine than 
equitable principles was stated.to be that of comity, which 
assumes that a federal government fares best where there is due 
respect accorded the separate functioning of the States. 
And, lastly, abstention by federal courts was prompted by 
consideration of federalism which recognizes that a 
"National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate 
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere 
11 
with the legitimate activities of the States." 
The Supreme Court in Younger had not dealt explicitly 
with the applic.ation of its principles to civil cases, though 
there was some language in Justice Black's opinion. for the 
Court suggesting that the same considerations that denied 
federal relief in state criminal proceedings might apply also to 
12 
certain state civil proceedings. However, we concluded in 
Lvnch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
415 U. S. 983 (1974), that, in a proper set of circumstances, 
11 
12 
401 U.S. at 44. 
See 401 U.S. at 45: 
"This brief discussion should be enough 
·to suggest some of the reasons why it has been· 
perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time 
and time again that the normal thing to do when 
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending 
proceedings in state courts is not to issue such 
injunctions." 
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Younger would apply to state civil proceedings in the same 
way as it did to a state criminal proceeding, since that 
doctrine "should never be made to turn on such labels as 'civil' 
or 'criminal' but rather upon an analysis of the competing 
interests in each case." And Justice Rehnquist, as Circuit 
Justice, in denying a stay of a Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972), 
declared that prior Supreme Court decisions had indicated that 
on purely comity grounds federal courts should not "casually 
enjoin the conduct of pending state court proceedings of either 
[criminal or civil] type." Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 
1206 (1972). Three years later, the Supreme Court itself, while 
making ''no general pronouncements upon the applicability of 
13 
Younger to all civil litigation," created "a lirrdted 'civil 
counterpart' to the Younger criminal doctrine," ur1der which the 
same restraints on federal action cornrr.anded by considerations of 
comity and federalism [in the criminal context], would extend to 
13 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). 
In his dissent in Juidice v. Vail. 430 U.S. 327, 
344-45, n (1977), Justice Brennan said: 
"I suspect that the purported disclaimer 
that '[a]s we did in Huffman, we save for 
another day the question of "the applicability 
of Younger to all civil litigation ... , '" 
ante, at 336 n. 13, is tongue in cheek, and 
that 'save' in today's disclaimer is a signal 
that merely the formal announcement is being 
postponed." 
(Continued on next page) 
. 
state civil proceedings to which the state was a party and 
which was operated in aid of and by way of facilitating 
compliance with a state's crimdnal laws. It. also, proceeded 
to declare that a party, before he was entitled to invoke federal 
intervention under § 1983 was required to exhaust all possible 
14 
state appellate proceedings. 
The extension ~f Younger to state civil proceedings of 
a "quasi-criminal" type in Huffman was further broadened in 
~uidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), Trainor v. Fernandez, 
431 U.S. 434 (1977). and Moore v. Si~. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
The Supreme Court stressing that the rationale for the Younger 
doctrine went well beyond the traditional principles of private 
equity jurisprude~ce and rested prioarily on co~ity, said in Juidice: 
·~e now hold, however, that the principles 
of Younger and Huffman are not confined solely 
to the types of state action which ~ere sought 
to be enjoined in those cases. As we e=~hasized 
in Huff=an, the 'more vital consideration' behind 
the Yo~ger doctrine of nonintervention lay not 
in the fact that the state criminal process ~as 
involved but rather 
"'in the notion of "comity,'' that is, a 
proper respect for state functions, a 
13 (fontinued) 
This statement was offered in explanation of Justice 
Brennan's opinion that the extension of Huffman's "quasi-
critriinal" rationale to a state's contempt powers in a suit 
between private parties was but a cover "for the ultimate 
goal of denying § 1983 plaintiffs the federal forum in any 
case, civil or criminal, when a pending state proceeding 
may hear the federal plaintiff's federal claims." 
14 
420 U.S. at 609-10. 
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recognition of the fact that the entire 
country is made up of a Union of separate 
state governments, and a continuance of the 
belief that the National Government will fare 
best if the States and their institutions are 
left free to perform theil5separate functions in their separate ways. '" 
This language, as well as the language of the Supreme Court 
in Trainor v. Fernandez, supra, prompted one commentator to 
declare that "[i]ncreasingly, the Younger rationale is based 
not on considerations of equity, comity and federalism, but 
upon comity and federalism alone," a result which he finds, 
tr~y foreshadow "an extension of the Younger doctrine, without 
exception, to all pending. state proceedings," despite the 
Juidice-Trainor Court's express reservation of the ouestion of 
16 
extending Younger to all pending state litigation. And the 
decisions in Juidice and later cases bore out,to some extent 
at least,this prediction. Thus, in Juidice, the Court 
applied Yo~,ger to a suit attacking a state contenpt proceeding 
arising out of a suit between p~ivate parties, holding that the 
state interest in vindicating "the regular operation of its 
15 
4 30 U. S . at 3 3 4 . 
16 
Comment, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Expanding 
Rationale of Youn~er Abstension, 19 Boston College L. 
Rev. 699, 720-21 ( 978). 
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judicial system" was sufficient on comity and federalism 
17 
grounds to foreclose federal action; in Trainor to an 
attachment proceeding incident to a state suit brought in 
the state's sovereign capacity to recover welfare payments 
18 
alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, and in MOore, 
to a proceeding under a state family code to remove an abused 
child from parental custody under which an ~~ parte removal 
of the child from parental control, subject to a later 
19 
hearing, was authorized. 
17 
This case is analyzed in Note, Constitutional Law-
Su~reme Court Extends Younger Comitv Doctrine, 46 Fordham L. 
Rev. 176 (197i), and in a Note, Federal Jurisdiction-
Yo~~ger Doctrine Extended to PreCIUde Federal Court 
Intervention Wnere Parties have an 0 ortunitv to Present 
Their C~aire ~it in t e State Civ1 Curnoer and 
L.Rev. 589 (1~17). 
18 
This case and Juidice are discussed together in the 
Comment, suora, 19 Boston College L.Rev. 699. 
19 
This case is discussed in Comment, Moore v. Si~s: A 
Further Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctr1ne, 1 Pace 
L. Rev. 149 ( 19-80) • and in a Note :Ln 49 Cinn. L. Rev. 301 
(1980). In the latter note. the author observed that Justice 
Stevens had dissented because he considered "the state and 
federal suits were independent of one another. The state 
court action concerned the parent-child relationship, whereas 
the federal suit concerned the constitutionality of the 
child's removal." Ibid. at 308. The Court majority, 
however, seems to have found the two issues related and found 
that the federal plaintiffs had a right to raise such issues 
in the state proceeding. 
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Whether Younger applies where the state proceeding is 
pending before a state administrative agency rather than a state 
court is a question which has not yet been explicitly answered 
by the Supreme Court. Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. 564, 
indicates that, under certain circumstances, such pendency would 
be sufficient to invoke Younger. There, the pending state pro-
ceedings was before the State Board of Optometry, with right of 
appeal to the state court, and involved the revocation of the 
plaintiff's professional license. The Supreme Court appears to 
have assumed that Younger could bar plaintiff's § 1983 action but 
refused to apply it because it found the Board "biased," thereby 
denying the plaintiff a fair state administrative tribunal for the 
resolution of his constitutional claims. And in Ohio Bureau of 
Employrr,ent Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), the Court 
found that, because the stat~ agency defendants had not clai~ecl, 
but had specifically \o.'"aived any claim for abstention, it "need not 
and [did] not eA~ress any view on [or decide] whether the District 
Court erred in refusing to abstain on Younger grounds." 431 U.S. 
at 480, n. 10. However, the Court did comment that Younger 
"reflects 'a system in which there is sensitivity to the legiti-
mate interests of both State and National Governments, and in 
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindi-
cate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with 
the legitimate activities of the State, '(citing cases). Younger 
and these cited cases express equitable principles of comity and 
federalism. They are designed to allow the State an opportunity 
zos· 
-to 'set its own house in order' when the federal issue is 
already before a .st~te tribtinal."20 The term "state tribunal" 
in Hodory was undoubtedly used advisedly and clearly woul_d com-
. 
prebend a state administrative proceeding. particularly if 
the decision of the administrative agency were subject to appeal 
to the state court under procedures permitting the assertion of 
constitutional claims. And in Rucker v. Wilson, 475 F. Supp. 
1164 (E.D. Mich. 1979), a case almost identical in many aspects 
with this case, the Court applied Younger in the context of a 
state administrative proceeding. 
In Rucker, the plaintiff, a physician, had been charged 
"with a number of improprieties in connection with the performance 
of abortions." These improprieties had occurred in 1973 and 1974. 
The hearings on those charges before the Michigan Board of Medi~ 
cine were delayed until the Spring of 1979. The plaintiff claimed 
the delay in pressing the charges denied him due process. ~~en 
the Board refused to sustain this claim and proceeded with its 
hearing on the charge, the plaintiff began his § 1983 federal 
action. The defendant Board sought dismissal of the action on 
the basis of the Younger doctrine. After remarking that the 
State ~as in fact a party to the administrative proceedings and 
that those proceedings were closely related to the state criminal 
laws dealing with abortions, the Court stated that if the state 
proceedings had been "before a court, this court could merely cite 
Huffman and dismiss the case." It proceeded to apply Younger to 
20 Ohio Bureau of Em ent Services v. Hodor , 431 U.S. 
471, 479- 0 Italics adde 
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the proceedings, declaring that the position of the plaintiff in 
resisting abstention differs from that of the plaintiff in 
Huffman "only in the type of tribunal before which the state 
proceedings are being held." Under such circumstances. the 
Court upheld defendant's claim of abstention with this reasoning: 
"All of the same interests exist here as 
existed there, and for all the same reasons 
of comity, equity, and federalism, this court 
holds that the Younger doctrine does apply 
to administrative proceedings like this one 
where the state is a party. The enforcement 
of state criminal laws is involved, and there 
is a right to appeal any federal constitu-
tional questions to the state courts. It is 
important to give litigants a fair opportunity 
to be heard in court, but there is no reason 
to give everyone two full bites at the judicial 
apple. The appeal process is more than 
adequate protection for the constitutional 
rights involved here."ll 
We find the reasoning of Rucker convincing, 22 though it is not 
necessary to go as far in this case as the Court did in Rucker, 
since there is pending an appeal to the State Circuit Court 
from the decision of the Board of Medicine in refusing a 
revocation of plaintiff's nuspension. 
The Supreme Court has, as the plaintiff a~gues. recognized 
certain exceptions to the applicability of Younger but these exceptions 
were restricted by Younger to what it described as "exceptional 
21 475 F.Supp. at 1166. 
22 We followed subs~antially the same reasoning as did 
the Rucker Court in the recent case of North v. Budig· et al., 
F.2d (4th Cir. 1981) (decided Jan. 9. 19 1). 
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and extremely limited circumstances," creating a threat of 
23 
great, immediate and irreparable injury. The Court added that, 
in order to meet the t~st of "irreparable injury," the threat of 
the plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that 
cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal 
24 
prosecution. Later, in subsequent cases, the Court, in shifting 
from equity, comity and federalism to comity and federalism alone 
25 
as the rationale for its abstension doctrine, had made it plain 
that, save in one situation we discuss later, "vital considerations .. 
of com~ty and federalism permit a disregard of Younger only if the 
state procedure fails to provide the federal plaintiff ~th an 
adequate opportunity to litigate in the state forum his constitu-
tional claim. In fact, this, as we have observed, is what the 
Court said in Youneer. It made the point clearer in Kugler v. 
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 {1975): 
"Only if 'extraordinary circutr.s tances' render 
the state court incapable of fairly and fully 
adjudicating the federal issues before it, can 
there be any relaxation of the deference to be 
accorded to the state criminal process." 
And recently in Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 430 (involving a civil 
proceeding), the Court, after emphasizing that the real premise for 
23 
See Younger v. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
24 
401 U.S. at 46. 
25 
See 19 Boston College Law Review, supra, at 721. 
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Younger was comity, said that: 
"The price exacted in terms of comity [to abstain 
from interference with pending state proceedings] 
would only be outweighed [by the need to allow 
federal intervention] if state courts were not 
competent to adjudicate federal constitutional 
claims- a postulate we have repeatedly and 
emphatically rejected. ~uffman, supra, [420 
U.S.] at 610-11. In sum, the only pertinent 
inquiry [in determining whether there are 
'exceptional circ~tances' justifying dis-
regard of Youn~er] is whether the state pro-
ceedings affor an adequate opportunity to 
raise the constitutional claims, .... " 26 
And, as was the case in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), 
all the exceptions based on ''exceptional considerations," have 
involved situations in which the federal plaintiff's 
claim for federal relief was not such as could be resolved 
in a pending state proceeding. Thus, bad faith or harassment. 
i.e., "official lawlessness," in the prosecution, 27 
28 
lack of an unbiased and impartial state tribunal, the 
absence of a pending state proceeding in which the federal 
29 
plaintiff might assert his constitutional claim, all present 
26 
This point was further underscored in Juidice, supra, 
430 U.S. at 337, where the Court, in distinguishing Gerstein v. 
P~ 420 U.S. 103 (1975) said that the issue in that case was 
'"one that "could not be raised in defense of the criminal 
prosecution." It was, also a basis for our decision in the 
recent case of Anderson v. Babb.632 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1980). 
See also 1 Pace L. Rev., supra, at 165-66: 
"In determining whether a particular case 
comes within the exceptions to the Younger 
doctrine, courts focus primarily on the adequacy 
of remedies available at law. Indeed, a find-
ing of adequacy may obviate the need·to consider 
the issue of irreparable harm; if an existing 
(~ontinued on next page) 
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situations which afford the plaintiff no adequate state remedy 
for the resolution of his constitutional claim. 30 The single 
"exceptional circumstance" not meeting this test is that based 
on the claim that the underlying statute for either the criminal 
or civil proceeding was "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional. 
In stating this exception initially. the Court was careful to 
point out that "facial invalidity" of the challenged statute 
would not qualify under this exception. Thus, in Huffman, the 
Court declared, referring back to Younger: 
"But we unequivocally held that facial invalidity 
of a statute is not itself an exceptional 
circunstance justifying feder9l interference with 
state criminal proceedings."3l 
2£ (~ontinued) 
27 
renedy is found to be adequate, that finding 
itself implies that any harm is repairable. 
Moreover, although Younger provides that 
irre~arable harm can be inferred from bad faith 
and harass~ent. these circu~stances can also 
be viewed as factors in measuring the adequacy 
of the state forum. The various exceotions to 
Youn£e~. therefore, can be seen as 'different wavs 
or-showing that the state legal apparatus has -
broken down so thoroughly that federal rights 
cannot be vindicated through it in a timely fashion."' 
The difficulties of establishing this exception are 
illustrated by Hicks v. }!iranda, 422 U.S. 332 at 350-51 (197 5); 
Ku~ler v. Helfant, supra, 421 U.S. at 124; Perez v. Ledesma, supra, 
40! U.S. at 85, in no one of which was the except1on susta1ned. 
In 67 Cal.L.Rev., supra, at 1328-29. the author, speaking 
to this exception, says: 
"Since Younger, however, the Court has never 
allowed federal interference with a pending 
state proceeding on these_grounds. 
"This exception seems inconsistent 
with the principles underlying the Younler doctrine-
i.e., that the state courts will normal y protect 
(Continued on next page) 210 
Later, in Juidice, the Supreme Court defined the 
"flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional exceptions 
with greater specificity and more narrowly as requiring 
invalidity "in every clause., sentence and paragraph, and 
in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might 
32 
be made to apply it," a standard so rigorous as to make 
the exception, in the words of Professor Laycock, 
33 
"meaningless." As a }ractical matter, then, "the centerpie~e 
27 (Continued) 
28 
federal rightsJ removing any threat of 
'irreparable injury' that might justify 
federal injunctive relief. Unless the 
state court cannot be relied upon for full 
and fair adjudication of constitutional 
claims (an independent exception to the 
Younger doctrine), prosecutorial bad faith 
presents no threat of irreparable injury." 
Gibson v. Berrvhill, s~ora, 411 U.S. 564; Timmerman ~-
Brown, 528 F.~d 811 (4th Cir~975). 
29 
Steffel v. Thomtson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Woolev v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 7051977). 
30 
See Note 26. 
31 
420 U.S. at 602. 
See also 19 Boston College L.Rev. supra~at 734-35, 
and 67 Cii.L.Rev. supra. at 1329. 
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of a test for the application of Jounger" is always 
the adequacy of the state forum in providing the 
federal plaintiff an opportunity to raise his constitutional 
claim and, if there is, comity commands abstention by the 
34 
federal court. 
Applying the Younger doctrine, as it has developed in 
subsequent decisions, to the facts of this case, we have no 
doubt that the attempt by the plaintiff to secure either 
declaratory or injunctive relief against the state abortion 
statute (§§ 18.2-71, et seg., Code of Virginia (1950) as amended) 
is !oreclosed by the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
which involved the exact issue posed by the plaintiff in 
this case in his attack on the present statute. In Roe, a 
physician,was charged, as the plaintiff was in this case, with 
violation of a state criminal abortion statute. He asserted 
standing as a "potential future defendant" because of threats 
of other prosecutions, he sought to intervene in a pending 
action involving a constitutional attack on a statute si~ilar 
to the one under which he was being prosecuted, and prayed for 
a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of the statute 
under which he had been convicted. The District Court upheld 
his standing, granted his motion to intervene; and entered a 
declaratory judgment against the statute's validity. On 
Appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, saying: 
"Our decision in Sanruels v. Mackell, 
401 U.S. 66 (1971), compels the' conclusion 
that the District Court erred when it granted 
declaratory relief to Dr. Hall~gra instead 
of refraining from so doing." 
212 
I~ 
The only way in which the plaintiff could challenge such a 
result would be by a claim of "official lawlessness. 11 to 
use Justice Stewart's phrase in !ounger, quoted supra, or of 
the lack of an opportunity to raise his constitutional claim 
in the state forum. The plaintiff makes no claim of "official 
lawlessness" in this case. 
His attack on the license suspension statute (§ 54-321.2, 
Code of Virginia (1950) as amended), on the other hand, falls 
within the proscription established in Huffman. Since 
§ 54-321.2 was clearly enacted in aid of and for the purpose 
of facilitating the standards established in the state abortion 
statute, it unquestionably qualified for abstension under the 
36 
"quasi-criminal" standard established in Huffman. It is true 
32 
430 U. S. at 338. 
33 
Laycock, 1977 Supreme Court Review, supra, at 198; 
see also, Note. 19 Boston College L.Rev., supra, at 734-35. 
34 
Aldisert, 11 Conn.L.Rev., supra, at 197. 
35 
410 U.S. at 126. See also, Anders v. Floyd, 
440 U.S. 445 (1979)~ reh.-aenred7 441 U.S. 928. 
36 
That the two statutes (i.e., the abortion statute and 
the suspension statute) are related and are integrated parts 
of a common legislative scheme to prevent illegal abortions is 
evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff in his prayer for a 
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality and in his request 
for injunctive relief lumps the two statutes together. 
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that the plaintiff's state remedy for challenging § 54-321.2 
is initially in the administrative proceedings before the 
Board of Medicine, but any decision in those proceedings is 
subject to broad judicial review. The plaintiff's status in 
the administrative proceedings is exactly like that of the 
plaintiff in Scruggs v. Campbell, supra, 630 F.2d 237, as 
well as the plaintiffs in Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. 564, and 
in Rucker, supra, 475 F.Supp. 1164. In those cases, as we have 
already seen, the pendency of an administrative proceeding subject 
to broad judicial review, was held expressly in Scruggs and Rucker, 
and implicitly in Berryhill, to support Younger treatment. And this 
is particularly so in this case, since before any substantive 
action in favor of the plaintiff had begun, the plaintiff had appeal-
ed the administrative decision by the Board of Medicine to the state 
court. This circumstance brought the present case within our 
language in Scruggs, 630 F.2d at 239: 
"Although no state suit was pending when the 
Scruggs filed their federal action, federal 
abstention became appropriate when the board_ 
sought review in the state court. After the 
state suit was brought to the attention of the 
district court, it properly abstained because 
no proceedings on the merits of the claim had 
been conducted in the federal courts. Hicks v. 
~1iranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50 . . . . " 
Accordingly, whether we follow the reasoning of Rucker or not, 
the fact that, before any substantial action in this federal 
action had taken place, the administrative proceedings had been 
appealed to, and its decision was under broad review before.the 
state court, brought the proceeding within the rule stated in 
37 Hicks and followed by us in Scruggs. 
It remains to note some special arguments made by the 
21.4 
plaintiff 6n this appeal. It see~ to have been the 
plaintiff's idea that in his appeal from the action of the 
Board of Medicine on his lice~se suspension, he could bifurcate 
his appeal~ submitting only state issues to the state court and 
federal constitutional claims to the federal court in his proceedings 
in the district court, thereby sustaining jurisdiction in the district 
court. But in Huffman the Supreme Court made it quite clear that no 
38 
such "truncation" was permitted. The plaintiff also complains of the 
37 
Under § 9-6.14:17, Code of Virginia (1950) as amended, the 
plaintiff has the right on the judicial review before the state 
court of the Board of Medicine's decision to raise the issue of error of 
law, which the state declares includes "constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity," language patently broad enough to include 
the plaintiff's objection to the statute on constitutional grounds. 
Actually, 'the plaintiff's constitutional objection to the statute, 
which is that his license was suspended without a hearing but 
subject to a right to a prompt hearing for revocation of that 
suspension, is one that we examined in Christhilf v. Annapolis 
Eoergency Hospital Ass'n., Inc., su?ra, 496 F.Zd 174. We held 
there that there is no absolute· rule that there be a hearing before 
a doctor's privileges are suspended. Ibid. at 180. ~~ether there 
could be a suspension without a hearing-Qepends largely on the 
gravity of the charges and the nature of the proof. In this case, 
the charge was a violation of a criminal statute as established 
by a crindnal conviction. That plainly can be said to meet the 
test for a suspension without a prior hearing, especially since 
the statute extends to the plaintiff a prompt hearing on the 
suspension if he requests it. See Morrisse~ v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 490 (1972), where the Cour~aid that 1n parole revocation, just as here in a suspension of a physician's license to practice, 
the Court mdght proceed without an initial hearing if the revocation 
"is based on conviction of another crime" since the parolee 
"canr1ot relitigate issues determined against _him in other forums." 
It is true that in subsequent proceedings the plaintiff was 
given relief in Christhilf but such relief was given because 
the defendants delayed for over three years the hearing on the 
plaintiff's earlier ex p55ie suspension, Christhilf v. Annapolis 
Emergency H.Ass'n In~, F.2d 1070 (4th Cir.1977). We have no 
_such situation here. The plaintiff in this case was given a prompt 
hearing before the Board on his request for revocation of his 
suspension and a decision on such request has been filed and is now 
on appeal to the state court. 
38 
420 U.S. at 610. 
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delay that inheres in the state appellate proceedings and suggests 
that this delay provides a basis for an exception to Younger, 
thus permitting the maintenance of his federal suit. This 
argument, too, was answered against the plaintiff in Huffman. 39 
The argument by the plaintiff that, in his district court action, 
he is not attacking his conviction but only seeking "prospective" 
relief is disingenuous. In his complaint, at least thirty-five 
h 40 t . 1 . 1 k h. . . paragrap s cons 1tute exc us1ve y an attac on 1s conv~ct~on 
and the statute under which he was convicted and, in his prayer, 
he asks for specific daiaratory relief against the specific anti-
abortion statute under which he was convicted. It may be that he 
conceives of declaratory relief as "prospective" but, if he does, 
that is not a justification for disregarding Younge~. Samuels v. 
Mackell, supra, as we have seen, declares unequivocally that 
declaratory relief is not to be distinguished from injunctive 
relief and is equally within the proscriptions of the Younger 
doctrine. 
It follows that the Distr.ict Court correctly dismissed 
this action, and remitted the plaintiff to his two pending state 
appeals for the redress of his rights, whether under state or 
federal law. Since we affirm the dismissal, the grant of an 
injunction pend~ng appeal of the plaintiff's suspension under 
§ 54-321.2 is vacated. 
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly 
AFFIRMED. 
3'9 420 U.S.. at 608. 
40 See paragraphs 30 through 67. 
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BlllTZNER, Circuit Judge., concurring and dissenting: 
I agree with much of Judg~ Russell's scholarly opinion. 
Specifically, I concur in the affirmance of the part of the 
district court's judgment that dismissed on the basis of ab-
s~ention Dr. Simopoulos's claim that certain Virginia abortion 
statutes are unconstitutional. For reasons adequately ex-
plained in the majority opinion, Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 
37 (1971), and its relateo cases provide controlling authority 
for abstention on this issue. 
I ·dissent from the part of the majority opinion that 
balds abstention is also required with respect to the doctor's 
claim that his license was revoked without affording him pro-
cedural due process of law. 
I 
In determining whether abstention is required, the Su-
preme Court has distinguished claims of the denial of substan-
~ive constitutional rights unaccompanied by denial of proce-
dural due process of law from claims that are based on the 
complainant's inability to have his substantive federal rights 
de-cided by a state forum in accordance with procedural due 
pr-ocess. Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 u.s. 564 (1973), 
with Juidice v. Vail, 430 u.s. 327 (1977). The Court clari-
fied the significance of this distinction in Gibson, 411 u.s. 
at 577, where, referring to a denial of procedural due 
process, it said: 
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Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismis-
sal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all 
claims, both state and federal, to the state courts. 
Such a course naturally presupposes the opportunity 
to raise and have timely decided by a competent 
state tribunal the federal issues involved. Here 
the predicate for a Younger v. Harris dismissal was 
lacking, for the appellees alleged, and the District 
Court concluded, that the State Board of Optometry 
was incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the 
issues pending before it. If the District Court's 
conclusion was correct in this regard, it was also 
correct that it need not defer to the Board. Nor, 
in these circumstances, would a different result be 
required simply beca·use judicial review, ce ~ or 
otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of 
the administrative proceedings. 
The Court has consistently recognized this predicate of 
Younger. See, ~, Moore v. Sims, 442 u.s. 415, 430 (1979); 
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 u.s. 434, 441 (1977) J Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 u.s. 327, 337 (1977): Huffman v. Pursue, 420 u.s. 
592, 594 (1975). 
The facts disclosed by this record establish that the es-
sential predicate for abstention explainec in Gibson is lack-
ing with respect to the doctor's claim that he was deprived of 
his license without proceoural due process of law. Time and 
again the Supreme Court has reiterated that due process encom-
passes "the opportunity to be heard • . . 'at a mea11ingful 
time and in a meaningful manner.•• See Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. 55, 66 (1979). Parts III and IV of my dissent demon-
strate that the state administrative hearing after the summary 
revocation of the doctor's license lacked these fundamental 
attributes of procedural due process. But first it is neces-
sary to recount pertinent aspects of the state criminal and 
administrative proceedings. 
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II 
The doctor was convicted of violating Virginia statutes 
that proscribe as felonies second trimester abortions unless 
they are performed in a licensed hospital. va. Code SS 18.2-
71 and 73. His principal defense was that these statutes are 
unconstitutional facially ana as applied to the circumstances 
of his case. 1 Relying on Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973), the 
doctor insisted that the statutes requiring hospitalization 
were not reasonably related to the health of his patient. In 
support, he presented as witnesses the chairman of the 
department of obstetrics and gynecology at the Albert Einstein 
College of Mecicine, an associate clinical professor in 
obstetrics and gynecology at Geor9e ~ashington University, ana 
a Virginia physician who specializes in obstetrics and 
gynecology. These wi tnes.ses testified that the procedure 
followed by the doctor is acceptable medical practice in an 
outpatient facility, and they stated that the doctor's clinic 
'-ias well equipped for such practice. One of the witnesses 
added that even when treatments to induce a second trimester 
abortion are administered at a Virginia hospital, where he hac 
served as chairman of the department of obstetrics ana 
1. The application of the statute was asserted to be 
unconstitutional because it was administered in conjunc-
tion with hospital rules that required parental consent 
for a minor's abortion. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 667 (W.D. Mo. 
1980). Cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 651 (1S79): 
Planned Parenthood of P.Iissouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
74 (1976) (statutes unqualifiedly imposing provisions 
for parental consent are unconstitutional). 
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gynecology, the patients are frequently allowed to leave the 
hospital before they abort. The state presented no witness to 
contradict this testimony. 
Although not precisely on point, Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 
179 (1973), is instructive. There the Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute requiring that abortions be performed only in 
hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Hospitals. At 410 u.s. 194-95, the Court explained the 
criteria that should govern the determination of the constitu-
tionality of statutes that require the performance of abor-
tions in hospitals: 
This is ·not to say that Georgia may not or 
should not, from and after the end of the first tri~ 
mest~r, adopt standards for licensing all facili-
ties where abortions may be performed so long as 
those standards are legitimately related to the ob-
jective the State seeks to accomplish. The appel-
lants [who challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute] contend that such. a relationship would be 
lacking even in a lesser requirement that an abor-
tion be performed in a licensed hospital, as opposed 
to a facility, such as a clinic, that may be re-
quired by the State to possess all the staffing and 
services necessary to per form an abortion safely 
(including those adequate to handle serious compli-
cations or other erreergency, or arrangements with a 
nearby hospital to provide such services). Appel-
lants and various amici have presented us with a 
ffiass of oata purporting to demonstrate that some fa-
cilities other than hospitals are entirely adequate 
to perform abortions if they possess these qualifi-
cations. The State, on the other hand, has not pre-
sented persuasive aata to show that only hospitals 
~eet its ackno~ledged interest in insuring the qual-
ity of the operation and the full protection of the 
patient. ~e feel compelled to agree ~ith appellants 
that the State must show more than it has in order 
to prove that only the full resources of a licensed 
hospital, rather than those of some other apprppri-
ately licensed institution, satisfy these health 
interests. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's explication of the 
appropriate criteria for determining the constitutionality of 
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the Virginia statute, the state trial court summarily denied 
the doctor's defense. The judge said: •I am certainly not 
going to go further than the Supreme Court, than I believe the 
Supreme Court has gone at this point." The judge then ob-
served that one hospital in the community permitted second 
trimester abortions. The evidence, however, disclosed that 
this hospital imposed an absolute requirement for a minor's 
parental consent. The judge mace no reference to this evi-
dence and did not rule on the claim that this requirement ad-
ministered in conjunction ~ith the statute raised a question 
of the statute's constitutionality. See, ~, Planned Pa-
renthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 
687 (W .D. Mo. 1980). 
The ju6ge added: "Furthermore, fro~ the evidence I have 
heard, I frankly believe that the regulations that the Vir-
g inia Legislature has imposed on second trimester abortions 
are reasonably related to maternal health and are not uncon-
stitutional in any way." Just before he sentenced the doctor, 
the judge co~~ented, ni look at your case as really one where 
you were doing that which you had a legal right to do, but you 
weren't following what I consider legitimate regulations 
handed down by the legislature of Virginia.w 
In reaching his conclusion that the Virginia statutes are 
constitutional, the judge did not advert to any of the evi-
dence. He made no findings about the factual criteria pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court in Bolton. 
After the doctor was found guilty, his license was re-
voked without a hearing pursuant to Va. Code § 54-321.2, which 
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mandates revocation or suspension when a physician is con-
victed of any felony. As allowed by this statute, the doctor 
applied to the State Board of Medicine for a hearing and rein-
statement of his license pending appeal. 
The Board granted the doctor a hearing 56 days after his 
license was revoked. Again the doctor presented evidence from 
exper~ ~itnesses in support of his claim that the procedures 
he followed in his clinic were acceptable medical practice and 
that hospitalization was unnecessary to safeguard the pa-
tient's health. The doctor gave assurances that pending his 
appe~l he would not undertake the procedures for which he ~as 
convicted. 
The Board retired to executive session, and upon its re-
turn to public session took a recorded vote. Nine members of 
the Board voted to reinstate the doctor's license; four voted 
against. Becat:se reinstatement requires a vote of three-
fourths of the members in attendance, it failed to carry by a 
fraction of one vote. 
Although the statute requires the Board to consioer the 
likelihood of irreparable harm to the physician, the risk of 
injury to patients or the public, and the seriousness of the 
offense, the Board made no findings on these issues either 
orally or in writing. Furthermore, it made no findings with 
respect to the relative safety of abortions performed in a 
hospital and those performed in the doctor's outpatient 
clinic. Instead, the Secretary of the Board simply notifiea 
the doctor that after consideration of .the evidence "it was 
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the decision of the Board that your request for termination of 
revocation of your license to practice medicine in Virginia, 
pending appeals, be denied." No reasons for this decision 
were disclosed. 
While this federal appeal was pending, the doctor filed a 
timely petition for review of the Board's action in the appro-
priate state court. 
III 
The due process clause protects a physician's property 
interest in his professional license. See Barry v. Barchi, 
443 u.s. 55, 64 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 u.s. 564 
(1973). I agree with the majority opinion that t~e doctor's 
right to due process was not offended because his license was 
initially revoked without a hearing. Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. at 64-65; Mackey v. Montrym, 443 u.s. 1 (1979); accord 
Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n., 496 F.2d 
174, 180 (4th Cir. 1974). 
Barry, ho~ever, couples its approval of prehearing revo-
cation with the admonition that the state must furnish the li-
censee with a "prompt judicial or administrative hearing that 
would definitely determine the issues. • • 443 o.s. at 64. 
In the absence of an explanation by the state that compelling 
reasons caused the delay, I would hold that a lapse of 56 days 
between surr~ary revocation and a hearing does not satisfy the 
.due process clause's requirement for a prompt postrevocation. 
hearing when a physician's license is at stake. I find it 
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unnecessary, however, to base my dissent solely on the 
application of the revocation statutes to the doctor's 
situation. Barry indicates that the denial of procedural due 
process is more deeply rooted. 
In Barry the statute providing for an administrative 
postrevocation hearing made no provision for a prompt hearing. 
The district court declined to abstain to a~ait state inter-
pretation of the statute and granted relief. The Supreme 
Court affirmed part of the district court's order, holding 
that the licensee's suspension was unconstitutional "for lack 
of assurance of a prompt postsuspension hearing." 443 u.s. at 
68. 
Conversely, in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), a 
statute mandating prehearing suspension of a driver's license 
was held to be constitutional because it afforded the licensee 
a prompt--indeed an immediate--postsuspension hearing. · 
Here, as in Barry, and unlike the sit~ation in Mackey, a 
Virginia physician has no assurance of a prompt postrevocation 
hearing. The statute provides that a physician whose license 
has been summarily revoked "shall be entitled to a hearing not 
later than the regular meeting of the Board next following the 
expiration of ten days from the receipt of such application •• 
• • " Va. Code S 54-321.2. The statute governing meetings of 
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the Soard requires "not less than one regular meeting a 
year.• 2 
We have been told that the Board customarily meets three 
times a year. But this custom affords no assurance to a phy-
sician that he will receive a prompt postrevccation hearing 
for it lacks the mandate of the statute. 3 f.loreover, by the 
exp.ress provision oi § 54-321.2, a physician \!;hose license is 
sumrnar ily revoked nine days before a regular meeting must 
await 100 days for his mandatory postrevocation hearing. 
Therefore, applying the principles explainea in Barry and 
Mackey, I conclude that the. lack of assurance of a prompt 
post revocation hearing, as \!well as the actual lapse of 56 
oays, deprived the doctor of his property interest in his li-
cense without procedural due process of law. 
2. 
3. 
,,_ 
VCle Code § 54.290 provides: 
Regular meetings of the Board shall be 
held at such tirr.es and places as the Board 
shall prescribe, and special meetings may be 
held upon the call of the presider!t and any 
eight members, but there shall be not less than 
one regular meeting each year. Nine members of 
the Board shall constitute a quorum. 
The statute makes no provision for a mandatory 
expedited hearing, although in its discretion the Board 
can convene a special meeting upon the call of the 
president and eight members. va. Code S§ 54-321.2 and 
54-290. The Board ~as polled in mid-June, but a quorum 
was not obtained for a special meeting. The district 
court found that the doctor had not made forrr.al 
application for a hearing, but that as a result of a 
telephone call from the doctor's counsel, the Board 
scheduled a hearing on July 18. This was the date of the 
next. regular meeting of the Board. The doctor's brief 
states that this call tNas made in April ana the Board . 
declined to schedule an earlier hearing. Because the 
district court made no findings a!:>out the date of the 
telephone call and its contents, I believe it would be 
improper to rely on this incident as a basis of decision. 
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IV 
The doctor's right to procedural due process of law was 
abridged for an independent reason. The due process clause 
requires an administrative agency to state the findings that 
undergird its order and the ·reasons for its decision. Vitek 
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980); Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 u.s. 388, 432 (1935). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
u.s. 539, 564 (1974), the Court held that "there must be a 
'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence re-
lied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action" meted out to 
a prisoner. Ke recently emphasized this principle in Franklin 
v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 801 (4th Cir. 1977), where speaking 
of parole hearings we said: "[A]t the present time the only 
explicit constitutional requisite is that the Board furnish to 
the prisoner a statement of its reasons for denial of parole." 
The Board did not adhere to this elemental precept of 
procedural due proce~s. One would not expect the Board to 
issue an opinion on the constitutionality of the abortion 
statutes. But because of the expertise of some of its mem-
hers, it is admirably fitted to make factual findings about 
the inquiries the Virginia statute requires it to consider. 4 
In the context of this case, these findings would also encorn-
pass the factual criteria that the Supreme Court has said are 
essential for determining the constitutionality of an abortion 
statute. As pointed out in Part II of this opinion, the Board 
4. Most of the members of the Board are medical doc-
tors. Serving with them are an osteopath, a podiatristt 
a chiropractor, and a clinical psychologist. Va. Code 
§ 54-284. 
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made no findings whatsoever and issued no opinion. Without 
furnishing any reasons, the Board simply announced that it 
would not terminate the summary revocation of the doctor's li-
cense. 
In most instances, the Board could probably rely on the 
judgment of the state trial court when a physician has been 
convicted of a felony, and it could incorporate by reference 
the record of the state criminal trial in its decision. Here 
the Board did not even do that. Moreover, as pointed out in 
Part II, the record of the criminal trial is deficient, for 
the state court made none of the evidentiary findings essen-
tial to determine whether the abortion statutes are cor.stitu-
tiona!. 
The doctor's challenge of the constitutionality of the 
Virginia abortion statutes is not frivolous. 5 Nevertheless, 
his license has been revoked despite the fact that no state 
tribunal, either judicial or adrr:inistrative, has rr.ace the 
factual findings essential for deciding whether the statutes 
he violated are constitutional. Furthermore, the Board gave 
no reasons for its action. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the doctor's license has 
been revoked without any state tribunal according him the 
s. The constitutional question, whict the doctor 
raised, has not yet been definitively resolved. T~o fed-
eral courts have held that state statutes requiring hos-
pitalization for second trimester abortions are uncon-
stitutional. M3rgaret s. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 
191-96 (E.D. La. 1980); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 685-87 (W.O. 
Mo. 1980); contra, Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 
1317, 1318 (N-.o:--Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed, 4·39 u.s. 
8, aff'd 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). E37J 
---··- ---·------· --··-------·---------------·---~-.- ---
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procedural cue process of law required by Vitek v. Jones, 445 
u.s. 480, 495-96 {1980); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 
564-65 (1974); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 
(1935), and Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 801 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
v 
The state also contends that abstention is required be-
cause review of the Board's action by a state court will sat-
isfy the requireffients of the due process clause. I cannot ac-
cept this argument. 
The doctor has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
Because of the lack of assurance of a prompt postrevocation 
hearing and the failure of the Board to state any reasons for 
its action, these remedies have not affcrded the ooctor proce-
dural due process. Under these circumstances, I believe the 
principles explained in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 u.s. 564, 577 
(1973), are applicable. Although the facts of that case dif-
fer from those before us, its rationale cannot be put aside. 
Gibson teaches that when a licensee is denied procedural due 
process by an administrative agency, abstention is not re-
quirec simply because the licensee can seek judicial review of 
the administrative action, de ~ or otherwise. 6 I think 
Gibson is dispositive, but because the point is pressed, I add 
the following observations. 
6. The pertinent text of Gib~ is quoted, suora, in 
Part I. 8s] 
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If the doctor is relegated to the state-reviewing court 
for a determination of the reasons why his license should, or 
should not, be restored, it is apparent that this forum would 
afford the only significant postrevocation hearing provided by 
the state. But such review cannot be sought until after the 
administrative hearing. The inordinate lapse of time between 
summary revocation and completion of review would not satisfy 
the requirements of Barry v. Barchi, 443 u.s. 55 (1979), and 
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 u.s. 1 (1979), for a prompt postrevoca-
tion hearing. 
Furthermore, the total absence of findings and statement 
of reasons for the Board's action render doubtful the utility 
of reviewing the administrative proceedings. Cf. S.E.C. v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 u.s. 80, 92-95 (1943). A remand by there-
viewing court to the Board to correct these deficiencies would 
not comport with the requirement of a prompt postrevocation 
hearing. 
Huffman v. Pursue, 420 u.s. 592 {1975), and Scruggs v. 
Campbell, 630 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1980), do not support the 
state's position. Neither of these cases require abstention 
with respect to the doctor's procedural due process claims. 
The complainant in Huffman had litigated a substantive 
challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute in a 
state court. Dissatisfied, he sought to relitigate the same 
substantive question in federal court. The case did not in-
volve, as here, proof that the state remedies were procedural-
ly defective. Huffman is pertinent to that portion of the 
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doctor's complaint that sought a judgment declaring the abor-
tion statutes unconstitutional--an aspect of this case in 
which I agree that abstention is proper. It did not involve, 
however, any claim that the state proceedings deprived the 
claimant of his property without affording him procedural due 
process of law. 
Scruggs also misses the mark. There a federal statute 
allowed -the party aggrieveo by an administrative decision to 
seek review in either state or federal court. Applying this 
statute when the aggrieved party had petitioned the state 
court, we held that the other party could not bifurcate review 
or forestall state revie~ by corr~encing a federal suit before 
the administrative proceedings were completed. By the terms 
of the statute, one judicial forum ~as sufficient. 630 F.2d 
at 236-39. 
Rucker v. Wilson, 475 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1979), is 
also distinguishable. In Rucker the doctor's license had not 
been summarily revoked without a hearing. The question before 
the medical board was whether his license should be revoked. 
The delay in the board's proceedings did not ceprive him of a 
property interest because, pending resolution by the board of 
the complaints against him, he was entitled to practice his 
profession. Tne absence of a prehearing revocation in Rucker 
is the critical factual distinction between that case and the 
one we are considering. If in Rucker, as here, the doctor's 
license had been surr~arily revoked and he was not assured a 
prompt postrevocation hearing before the board, the principles 
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explained in Barry v. Barchi, 443 u.s. 55 (1979), would have 
afforded him relief in a federal court because he had been de-
prived of his property interest in his license without proce-
dural due process of law. 
VI 
Finally, in addition to the legal issues involved in this 
case, there remain equitable considerations concerning the re-
lief which the doctor seeks. These involve weighing the in-
terests of the state in protecting and vindicating the public 
interest against the harm that a physician suffers by revoca-
tion of his professional license. · Although the harm to the 
doctor is substantial, the principal factor to be considered 
is the likelihood of endangering the public if he is perrraitted 
to practice pending his appeal to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. 
The record discloses the following facts. The doctor is 
a Diplomate of the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
and a Fellow of the American College of Obstetricians and Gyn-
ecologists. He has given assurances that pending appeal of 
his conviction he will not undertake the outpatient procedures 
for which he was prosecuted. At the conclusion of the state 
trial, the prosecutor described the doctor's violation of the 
abortion statutes as "victimless activity" and recommended a 
suspended sentence with community service. The juoge, who 
also was a~are of the nature of the doctor's culpability, 
stated that while he had no control over t~e license and took 
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no position concerning it, "If they determine that you should 
keep your license, that would be fine with me." 7 The two hos-
pitals where the doctor practiced filed answers in this action 
stating that his staff privileges would be reinstated if his 
license were restored. Nine of the fourteen members of the 
Board voted to reinstate his license. 
These facts persuade me that there is no showing of like-
lihood of danger to the public if the doctor is permitted to 
practice pending his a~peal. Accordingly, I would remand this 
case to the district court with directions to grant an injunc-
tion restraining revocation of the doctor's license pending 
appeal of his conviction to the Supreme Court of Virginia, 
conditioned on his compliance ~ith the Virginia statutes per-
taining to abortions. 
7. The punishment imposed by the judge would not have 
prevented the doctor from continuing his practice. The 
court suspended a two-year sentence, ordered him confined 
to the county jail for 30 days to be served on ~eekends, 
and placed him on inactive probation for two years. Exe-
cution of the sentence was suspended pendins appeal. 
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;VIRGINIA: 
BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF HEDICINE 
IN RE: CHRIS SIHOPOULOS, M.D. 
The Virginia State Board of Medicine is in receipt of certi- · 
fied copies of the Conviction and Sentencing Orders entered in the 
Circuit Court of Fa~rfax County on April 14··, :15, 16 and 18, 1980, 
in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Chris Simopou1os, in 
which Chris Simopoulos, M.D., was found guilty of a felony, 
to wit: an abortion performed outside of a_ ~ospital in the second 
trimester of pregnancy. 
~~EREFORE, the Board hereby 0 R D E R S that the license 
of Chris Simopoulos, M.D., to practice medicine in the 
1 co~~onwealth of Virginia be and is hereby REV?KED effective on idate of entry of this Order, pursuant to § 54-321.2 of the Code 
I 
:of Virginia (1950), as amended. 
I FOR THE BOARD 
GEORGE J. CARROLL, M.D. 
SECRETARY-TREASUP£R 
Entered: '0{7..~ /eo 
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I 
I Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, in and 
!ror the State I 
day of~ 
at Large, Commomvealth of Virginia, on the o<K 
' 
I 
I 
! 
I 
, 1980. 
G£GLc.. 
Notary Public 
11y commission expires: 1-lt-8$ 
fAUBCOPY TEST!: 
• CVMMI~SIO~ ~:AT BLANTON ~t.11TH 
• 
EXHlBfi NO. 1 
PLt () GE.Fl l COMl I / 
Cl\SE NO. ;/:.,_v-Y_ /5 ::?.Q ~ 
DATE &·~ 
JUOGE: _ _...,~~r7----
-
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VIRGINIA: 
BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE 
!! !! : Chris Simopoulos, ~ 
~ 
Upon petition for reinstatement by Chris Simopoulos, 
M.D., a hearing was convened before the Virginia State Board 
of Medicine on July 23, 1981, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, 
pursuant to S 54-321 of the Code of Virginia, (1950) as 
amended. Charles Poston, Hearing Officer, was present to 
onduct the hearing in an orderly fashion: to make rulings 
f law pertaining to the admissibility of evidence: and to 
the Board any required instructions which would enable 
-
to make appropriate determinations. The Board was 
epresented by Paul A. Sinclair, Assistant Attorney General. 
r. Simopoulos, who was represented by Roy Lucas, Esquire, 
de statements to and answered questions from members of 
he Board. The proceedings were recorded by a certified 
ourt reporter. 
After due consideration"of the record in the case and 
nformation presented by Dr. Simopou1os and his attorney, 
he Board made the following findings of fact: 
1) That Chris Simopoulos, M.D. was convicted of a 
elony, to wit: performing a second trimester abortion 
utside of a hospital, on April 16, 1980 in violation of S 
8.2-73 of the Code of Virginia, (_1950) as amended. 
2) That by Order entered on May 23, 1980, Dr. Chri~ 
to practice medicine in the Commonwealth 
1 of 4 
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I 
f Virginia was revoked, pursuant to § 54-321.2 of the Code 
![bf Virginia, (1950) as amended. 
3) That Dr. Simopoulos filed an action in che District 
i ourt for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging 
lis 54-321.2 and § 18.2-71-73 of the Virginia Code. The District 
I 
1 ourt denied the relief sought on or about June 20, 1980. 
I 
4) That Or. Stmopoulos• petition for reinstatement of 
I· is medical license pursuant to § 
:rppeal of his criminal conviction 
54-321.2 pending the 
was deniec by the Board on 
27, 1980. 
5) That the u.s. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 
18, 1980, entered an Order requiring the restoration 
Dr. Simopoulos• license with terms pending an appeal from 
district court order denying his request for an injunction 
the Virginia State Board of Medicine ~ascribed in 
above. 
6) That on March 19, 1981, the United States Court of 
~~~p~:a~s for the 4th Circuit, affirmed the decision of the 
trict court described in paragraph 3 above and vacated 
grant of an injunction pending appea~ of Dr. stmopoulos• 
S 54-321.2 of the Code of Virginia, (!950) 
7) In consideration of the welfare of patients under 
• Simopoulos• care, the Board, at its regularly scheduled 
on'March 28, 1981, voted to stay t~e revocation of 
• Simopo~os• medical license pending a decision by the 
Court of Virginia in the case of Simoooulos v. 
2 of 4 
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ommonwealth consti·~uting an appeal of his criminal conviction, 
r the passage of thirty cays from April 6, 1981, whichever 
irst occurred. 
8) That on April 2~, 1981, the Supreme Court of 
irqinia upheld the criminal conviction described in Paragraph 
above. 
9) That on ~~y 4, 1981, Dr. Si.mopoulos• license to 
ractice medicine in Virqinia was revoked under the terms of 
he Order described in paragraph 7 above which was entered 
y the Board on April 6, 1981. 
10) That on July 10, 1981, Dr. Si.mopoulos voluntarily 
ismissed his appeal of the decision of the Board to revoke 
his medical license. He had brought this action before the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County on or about September 15, 
1980. 
Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, it is this 23rd 
day of July, 1981, by the unanimous vote of those members of 
the Board hearing this case: 
ORDERED that the license of Chris Simopoulos, M.D., be 
reinstated on PROBATION for two years from entry of this 
order with the following terms and conditions: 
l) That he not pe:for.m any induced or elective 
abortions for a period of two yearsJ 
3 of 4 
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2) That he comply with all laws of the Commonwealth 
of Virqinia; 
3) That he comply with the rules and regulations 
promulqated by the State Board of Medicine. 
Violation of the terms and conditions of probation 
shall constitute sufficient qrounds for the revocation of 
the license of Chris Simopoulos, M.D. In ~~e event that or. 
Simopoulos should violate this Order, a formal hearinq shall 
be convened to determine whether the license of or. Simopoulos 
shall be revoked. At the conclusion of t~e probationary 
period and or. Stmopoulos• compliance wi:h this Order, or. 
Simopoulos' license shall be reinstated ~i~r. all attendant 
iqhts and privileqes. 
FOR THE BOARD 
GEORGE J. CARROLL, ~1. ::>. 
SECRETARY/TREASURER 
STATE BOARD OF MEDICI~ 
Entered: a<f«:«'~ -:·::.c. '' .??/ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, : -;, q· , ~."" . ;( ~ 
I Notary Public in and for the G!:ey /Coun -::t of . 7 .,~ ai Go:. 
mmonwealth of Virginia, this dd day of ,-;: . ..,·,'"¢ 
') 
Notaryll.C 
y commission expires: 
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Ch1·is Simopoulos, 1.1. D. 
P. 0. Box lZ 
August 25, 1980 
~oodbridge, Virginia 22194 
Dear Dr. Simopoulos: 
This letter is to inform you that your r.:cdical 
Staff privile~cs in the D·~partm~~nt of Sur~~<:ry (Gynecology) 
at Commo:au~e~tlth Doctors !-~:.-,spital have) b~cr.. rcir:.stated 
effective inuncdi~tely. 
ACW:bg 
• 
Sincc:tcly, 
Alan C. t"hi ttul~or 
Admiuist!'.'ltor 
cc: Joseph l'/. Sict"lick, M.D. 
Chni~man, Department of Sur~cry 
Thomas N. Neviascr, H.n. 
President, ~k~dical Staff 
c"Hl..,,.,. ~~~·n t-r· 
1;;,1'. T.: ' n "'*· _ ___._;..;::v:;....__ 
PLI.., ) DEFI .J CCMl J 
CASE NO. ~~u..~- /.:1.~~ •. ~>-
DATE {:.-~;:J..s .~5 
JUDGE: · ---#-~~--
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Commonwealth Hospital 
4315 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
May 6, 1981 ('i"IJ3) G01-3COO 
[) ,.I ' ./ lf. ?. -,/ ./ ;' I I c1-
l I J -/ .• (.7.... • ' \:..) ,_, ' _J -
CERTIFIED LETTER 
Chris Simopoulos, M.D. 
P. 0. Box 12 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22194 
1 • Dear Doctor S1mopoulos: 
We have been informed that your license to practice 
medicine in the Commonwealth of Virginia has been revoked 
by the Virginia State Board of Medicine. 
Pursuant to Article 9.7.2 of the Medical Staff Bvlaws 
of Common\-:ealth Hospital, your ~l<~clical Staff membership and 
clinical privileges are herewith revoked. 
ACl\': bg • 
Sincerely!/_ ~ dif~;t;_/ 
Alan C. Whittaker 
Administrator 
cc: Thomas .J. Ncviaser, M.D. 
President, Medical Staff 
William C. Dempsey, M.D. 
Chairman, Department of Surgery 
Mr. P. David Youngdahl 
Executive Vice President 
1:a irfax llospi tal Association 
FAIRfAX tcO:Ort'A~ AS!IOCIA,ION 
A wohlftt.,.,, ''•'' ,, ...... ,,,, c"'"'-"'"c.n 
Coftvfton••••tl'l th,•tpltal - 1he • •••••• .. ,., .. ,,., - I he M.,unl V••"-'" ttoapltll 
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Hay 30. 19RO 
Chris Simopoulos, ~.u. 
P. o. Box 12 
Woodbridge, VA 22194 
Dear Doctor Simopoulos: 
We have been informed by the Office of the Attorney General of 
the-Commonwealth of Virginia that your license to practice 
medicine in this state was revoked effective ~~y 23, 1980. 
Thi• is to notify you that your clinical privileges and ~ember­
ship on the Medical Staff of The Fairfax Kospital are automatically 
revoked as provided in Article 9.7.2 of the Bylaws of the Medical 
Staff. 
Very truly yours, 
William P. Jacobs. Jr. 
Ad~.inistrator 
fh 
cc: Ira s. Yowtg, H. D., President, !·!edic:al Staff 
James G. Sites, t-f.D., Chairman. Dept. of Oilstetrics-Cynecology 
Ronald J. Bortnick, t~.D., Chai~, Credentials Committ~~ 
P. David Youngdahl, Vice Pres. , Operations , F. H. A. 
I -. 
I . 
--~------
' ..... \·ri I 
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CERTIFIED LETTER 
May 6, 1981 
Chris Simopoulos, M·.D. 
Poet Office Box 12 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22194 
Dear Doctor Simopoulos: 
I 
i; (\ i}<-· I ""' . 
. / 
Inasmuch as your license to practic~ f-.,iedicint! .ill the:1 C\Jmmonwc<tlth 
of Virginia has been revok~d by the Vu·ginia Stato Doard of ~\·1 edicine, 
pursuant to the Bylaws of the Medical Staff vf The Fairfax Hospital 
your Medical Stat£ membership and clinical p1•iviloges are herewith 
revoked. 
Very b.-uly yours, 
'William F. Jacobs, Jr. 
Administrator 
WFJ: dsb 
cc: Ira S. Young, i'il .D., President. Ml.~icul St:1fi 
James G. Sites, l\1 .D. , Chail:•man, Dcpartrnent of Ob-Gyn 
Cur los B. Odictgu, i"l.D . ·• Chairman, Credentials Com mitten 
P. David Youngdahl, V .P., Operations, F .H.A. 
bee: William C. Bauknight 
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UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 
OFFICIAL ausiNUS 
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS 
frlnt your name. lddraa. and ZIP Code iD tht IPICI Wow. 
• Complall ltama l. Z. tnd 3 cua lbl mera 
• AetiiCb to front of wtkla it IPa pmaahl. 
odl.wiae affix to back of enicl&. 
• Eo.,_IJ1Id1 .. Retuna Rec~lpt Re......-
adja~l to numbtr: -- '~ 
... . . 
~~n •CM fl'RIVAfl 
U$1 fO AVOIO •A'tMENf 
0# f'OafAQI. .., 
'mDICAL STAFF OFFICE 
THE FAIRFAX UOSPI·rAL 
3300 Gall~wn Road 
Falls Church, Va. 
;I • SENDER: Complete 1101111 1, l. u4 3. l 
Add your addro~~la die .. lfET'li1Uf 1'001 ._ _. OD 
l'"etM. 
:_. I. The f<'lllowtng~ed (che..:k oao.) 
• ~ Slmtt. to whom and date deUvcrecL ••• •••• •••• -• 
. 1m Show to whom, cbte and addresa ol ~··-• 
"}0 RESTRICTED DEUVERY 
Show to wham and date clellverod •••••••••••• - e 
.) 0 RESTRICI'ED DELIVERY. ,, 
Show to whom. date, and acldsea of deltnry .s_ 
(CONSULT POSTMASTER FOR FF.ES) 
2. ARnc&.E ADORUUD TO: 
~ Chris Simopoulos, M.D. 
:D P • 0 • Box 12 
: Woodbridge, Va. 22194 
~ I. ARTJCU OESCRtntoNt 
!! RIGISTEAEO NO. ceRTI~I!D NO. _,RIO NO. 
~ 
:D 2660237 ~ CAiw-vs abtlfn sil:aature of adG •• 1 011 8tlfld 
., . 
. . ' 
i;.'· \ 
r 
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.SENDEa: ~ 1'-11. 2. ud l. 
M4 .,_ ........ •JtEnJUTCr .... -
...... 
1. nw roDowlfta..mc. 11 NquestM (cbeck a..) 
• Kl Show to whaal and dace deltlend. •• ••••••• •• -• 
0 Show to whom, date md addresa ol cla:llwly. •• _ c 
0 R.ES'l'1UC1'EI) DEUVER.Y 
Show to whCIID lftd date cleliYercHl. ••••••••••• _ • 
C RPSI'RJCTED DEIJVERY. 
Show to wham. date, aul adch•• of ddltery .s_ 
(CONSULT POSntASTER FOR FE~") 
&. ARTICU ADDRISIID TOa 
I Chris Simopoulos, M'.D . i P. 0. Box 12 
: Woodbridge, Virginia 22194 
~ J. ARTICU DESCRII'T10N1 
~ A&o.snAm NO.I ccAnPIID NG. I INIURID NO. 
~ . 641250 
m --~~--~~~----~~--------~--·• 2 tAh • .,ays obtain liQI1•tuN of eddr ..... • ao-nd 
ot --· ;;I I have recebaltd the arti&:le described above. 
~ SIGNATUAI OAddra.. 0Aadlortud ..... 
!' 
UNAIII.I TO CaUVIA BECAUUa 
. .-· 
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SENDER INSTRUCTIONS ·; 
Print your namt, lddna. and ZIP Code In thHI.ei biiM i 
• Comptatl iUml 1, 2. and 3 on the ~ ! \ 
• Atlleh to frant of lrdclt H IPICI perma. 
om-ill Ifill to bldt of lltida. 
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.. , .. 
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edi~D&-e~aamblr-. ~. :: ·. -. !'AL 
. _,.· jiETURN • 
. _ ,,··' TO · 
: ·' . 
,· 
:: .... ·) c~~-~.1v·.: ... i> ._;J 
}'c:.ll& Chi.Uch, .Va. 22046 
~ofSender) 
'i (' ··~~----------~--~~~~~-------------
·' (Street or P.O. Bal) 
· .. 
·· .. · . ) 
- . ~- .' ·, :'/ (0 Stale lllld 2lP Code) J 
. ; .. ; .. :: •. ::· / ty, • 
. .. : .. · ......... -
'· 
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·ndow or ha .. u ' . • ..... •-··" • -I .. ,i• _ .... ,.,. • ' 't\ 
"""' ~" .......... ,.. ... . st class or airmah,, . • 
. TO COVER pQSl~'-E ,nr RVICtS {see tronU 
.. stJ.MPS tO "at\Clt SELECtlO OPHONAL SE .. adcress ') • I StlCKE~n~~~~EE. ~KD CN~RG[S fCI\ AMY mcd stul.l on the _le!l ptortt:;sto~~~e ~ervice (;Jfttlrf ,. 
:ERllf\ • ,r\J.ed st~t~ thl! ~u~nd. n•esenl tha aructe a a i ~ 
· •~t ?Oc.,nt.. • t cl!•d 31\ .,. · f 
ou want Un.!t rece ·n Ule receip~ al a. . .. ;xtra tfl ~rgP.l the lett port~on o EVA R o Je ot the ~rttc\~. tea~& ~r rural c:uner. ,nCI . t~e gummed ~tub~:,. !t,,,, t~e· ,lfttc\e. • 
•1ndoW or h.!~d ll \il ~~ ,.e·1r.t "Cstm3t~ed_. Sh~~·~·-:- •"'" ""'" 0 '"WOOOBRIOGE. VIR~INIA 22191 , . ·- ... re.. .. " 
.. 
• . 
TELEPHONE t7031 1570·1313 
October 25, 1974 
Chris Simopoulos, M.D. 
14416 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22191 
13300 Polaris Way 
Fairfax, .Virginia 22030 
Dear Dr. S~mopoulos: 
This letter is to inform you as I did by telephone last night, Thursday, 
Oc~ober 24, 1974. that the Chairman of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Depart-
ment, Dr. David R. del Rosario, informed me that he was giving you a 
summary suspension in accordance with Article IV, Section'S, subsection 
2.d of the Medical Staff Bylaws of Potomac Hospital, Woodbridge, Virgini_a. 
This further is to .inform you that you may appeal this action in accordar.ce 
with Article IV, Section 8, subsection 2.b and 2.c of the fviedical Staff 
Bylaws of Potomac Hospital, Woodbridge, Virginia. 
Until this matter has been processed, your privileges to. admit patients 
to Potomac Hospital is suspended. 
Any patients presently admitted and under your care at Potomac Hospital 
will be cared for by the President of the riedical Staff, Dr. Ni.cholas 
Colletti, Dr. David R. del Rosario, Chairman of the Obstetrics-Gynecology 
Department or physician designated by them. 
cw 
cc: 
Sincerely yours, 
/.£ ;fvt~,_&:-g 
L. E. Richardson, Jr. ~ 
Administrator 
- President, Medical Staff Nicholas G. Colletti, M.D. 
Pavid R. del Rosario, M.D. 
Mr. Howard L. Greenhouse 
- Chairman, Department of Obstetrics-Gynecology 
- Presi.dent, Potomac HoseArta-1. ~Co11poration !,· 
. ..:.~ : ",· [·t:F' ; vJr~u 1 
.: :,:.;:. ~ :·~. ·~~.'.~-~·- ,'·-:• _;-;.'·r· 
0:0.'r: ·- ~~:·. 
JlJiJG~:... -
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f!/Jolo~nac dfoJjl.~fat 
2300 OPITZ BOULEVARD 
WOODBRIDGE. VIRGINJA 22191 
Chris Simopoulos, M. D. 
P. 0. Box 12 
Woodbridge, ·virginia 
22194 
Dear Dr. Simopoulos: 
'June 2, 1980 
In view of the fact that the State Board of Medicine acted 
on May 23, 1980, to suspend your medical license and in 
view of the fact that the Potomac Hospital became aware of·. 
this action on· May 29, 1980, this is to inform you that 
your membership on the Potomac Hospital.Yedical Stiff has 
been revoked effective immediately in conformity with 
Article 4 of the Medical Staff bylaws. 
WMM/map 
Attachment 
Sincerely, 
William M. Moss 
President 
C'7031 670-1313 
., ( Z'/:. ~r (J.., ,, ·'" 
• · ·i~l'. /.r ·Jint.rtJII "•1111'!9" 
249 
..-------------PROVIDERS' UMBRELlA POUCV --------------. 
~~~Au,~,, 
0 PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
0 PENNSYLVANIA CASUALTY COMPANY 
415 Fallowfield Rood. P.O. Box 53 
.~ ~.XHiG,J' NO. i ' 
Camp Hill. PA 17011 I (717) 763·1422 
PLt tl) Ot:fl l ~OMt ) 
,...~~s- NO ... p, · -·- I~:. "A • .:,~· \.If"\ c. ~.... . . • . 
: PLAINTIFF'S 
~~ .~~~~ . 7&; 
PROVIDERS' UMBRELLA POLICY 
The above designated stock insurance company, herein called the Company, in consideration of the payment of 
premium, the undertaking of the insured to pay the retained limit as described herein and stated in the Declarations 
and in reliance upon the statements in the Application and Declarations attached hereto and made a part hereof and 
subject to all of the terms and conditions of this policy, agrees with the named insured as follows: 
I. INSURING AGREEMENTS 
The Company shall pay on behalf of the insured ultimate 
net loss (subject to the limits of liability hereinafter stated) 
which the insured may sustain by reason of liability imposed 
upon the insured by law because of: 
A. Prof ... lonal Uablllty. This coverage is subject to the terms. 
conditions and exclusions of the underlying Professional 
Liability insurance policy shown on the Schedule of Under-
lying Insurance; provided that. Professional Liability insur-
ance hereunder shall not apply to claims arising out of the 
rendering of or failure to render services prior to the initial 
effective date stated in the Declarations. If such underlying 
Professional liability insurance is written on a claims-made 
basis. Professional liability coverage under this policy shall 
apply on a claims-made basis. The provisions relating to 
when a claim is to be considered first made as set forth in 
the underlying Professional Liability insurance policy shall 
apply also to this policy. If such underlying Professional 
Liability insurance is written on an occurrence basis. Pro-
fessional Liability coverage under this policy shall apply on 
an occurrence basis; or 
B. Umbrella Liability, which means liability other than Profes-
sional Liability, for a personal injury, property damage or 
advertising injury arising out of business activities con-
ducted by or on behalf of the insured caused by an occur-
rence during the policy perio.d. 
II. DEFENSE AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS 
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy, 
if no underlying insurer is obligated to do so due to exhaustion 
of its policy limits, the Company shall have the right and duty 
to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on 
account of bodily injury, personal injury, property damage or 
advertising injury, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent and may make such investiga-
tion and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. 
but the Company shall not be obligated to defend any suit after 
the applicable limit of liability has been exhausted. 
The Company will pay, in addition to the applicable limit of 
liability: 
(a) All expenses incurred by the Company, all costs taxed 
against the insured in any suit defended by the Com-
pany and all interest on the entire amount of any judg-
ment therein which accrues after entry of the judgment 
and before the Company has paid. tendered or depos-
ited in court that part of the judgment which does not 
exceed the limit of the Company's liability thereon. but 
the Company shall have no obligation to pay prejudg-
ment interest: 
(b) Premiums on appeal bonds required in any such suit, 
• 
premiums on bonds to release attachments in any such 
suit for an amount not in excess of the applicable limit 
of liability of this policy, but the Company shall have no 
obligation to apply for or furnish any such bonds; 
(c) Reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at the 
Company's request. including actual loss of wages or 
salary (but not loss of other income) not to exceed 
$100.00 per day because of attendance at hearings or 
trials at such request. 
In any jurisdiction where the Company may be prevented 
by law or otherwise from carrying out this agreement, the 
Company shall pay an expense incurred with its written con-
sent in acc~rdance with this agreement. · 
This policy does not apply to defense, investigation. settle-
ment, trial attendance (see (c) above) or legal expenses 
covered by underlying insurance. However, the Company shall 
have the right to associate with the insured in the defense of 
· any claim or proceeding for which coverage may be afforded 
by this policy and to make such investigation relative to any 
such claim or proceeding as it deems expedient. In such event. 
the insured shall. as a condition of coverage, cooperate fully 
with the Company. 
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Ill. EXCLUSIONS 
This policy does NOT apply: 
(a) To any obligation for which an insured or any carrier as 
its insurer may be held liable under any Workers' Com-
pensation, Unemployment Compensation or Disability 
Benefits Law or any similar law: provided, however, that 
this exclusion does not apply to liability of others as-
sumed by the insured under any valid and legally en-
forceable contract executed prior to a covered injury: 
(b) To liability arising out of the violation of a penal statute 
or ordinance, committed by or with the knowledge or 
consent of the named insured: 
(c) To punitive or exemplary damages or any sum awarded 
in excess of compensatory damages or any fines or 
penalties imposed by law: 
(d) To liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
operation, use, loading or unloading of: 
(1) Any aircraft owned, operated by. rented or loaned 
to any insured: or 
(2) Any other aircraft operated by any person in the 
course of his employment by any insured; 
(e) To loss of use of tangible property which has not been 
physically injured or destroyed resulting from: 
(1) A delay in or lack of performance by or on behalf of 
the insured of any contract or agreement or 
(2) The failure of the insured's products or work per-
formed by or on behalf of the insured to meet the 
level of performance, quality, fitness or durability 
warranted or represented by the insured; 
but this exclusion does not apply to loss of use of other 
tangible property resulting from the sudden and acci-
dental physical injury to or destruction of the insured's 
products or work performed by or on behalf of the in-
sured after such products or work have been put to use 
by any person or organization other than an insured; 
(f) To damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, re-
pair, replacement or losa of use of the insured's ·pro-
ducts or work completed by or for the insured of any 
property of which such products or work form a part, if 
such products, work or property are withdrawn from 
the market or from use because of any known or sus-
pected defect or deficiency therein; 
(g) To advertising injury out of: 
(1) Failure to perform a contract: 
(2) Infringement or misappropriation of a trademark, 
service mark or trade name (but this shall not apply 
with respect to titles or slogans); 
(3) Incorrect description of any article or commodity; 
or 
(4) Mistake in advertised price; 
(h) To any liability for personal injury, including' back pay, 
to any employee, including former or prospective em-
ployees, which results from knowingly violating any 
statute, law, ordinance or regulation prohibiting dis-
crimination or humiliation in employment practices be-
cause of race, creed, age. sex. color, sexual· preference 
or national origin by any insured as an employer or 
prospective employer; 
Price Discrimination Act of June19. 1938, as amended· 
the Federal Trade Commission Acts: or any simila; 
state statute. or any regulation issued pursuant to any 
of the foregoing statutes unless endorsed hereon: 
(m) To personal injury or property damage: 
{1) With respect to which an insured under this policy 
is also an insured under a nuclear energy liability 
policy issued by Nuclear Energy Liability Insur-
ance Association. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability 
Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance Association of 
Canada or would be' an insured under any such 
policy but for its termination upon exhaustion of its 
limit of liability. 
(2) Resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear 
material and with respect to which: 
(i) Any person or organization is required to 
maintain financial protection pursuant to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any law amenda-
tory thereof: or 
(ii) The insured is, or had this policy not been 
issued would be, entitled to indemnity from the 
United States of America or any agency there-
of, under any agreement entered into by the 
United States of America or any agency there-
of, with any person or organization. 
(3) Resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear 
material, if 
(i) The nuclear material (a) is at any nuclear facil-
ity owned by or operated by. or on behalf of, an 
insured or (b) has been discharged or dispersed 
therefrom: 
(ii) The nuclear material is contained in spent fuel 
or waste at any time possessed, handled, used, 
processed, stored, transported or disposed of 
by or on behalf of an insured; or 
(iii) The personal injury or property damage arises 
out of the furnishing by an insured of services, 
materials, parts or equipment in connection 
with the planning, construction. maintenance, 
operation or use of any nuclear facility, but if 
such facility is located within the United States 
of America, its territories or possessions or 
Canada. this exclusion (iii) applies only to 
property damage to such nuclear facility and 
any property thereat. 
As used in this exclusion (m) 
''Huardout propertl•" includes radioactive. toxic 
or explosive properties: 
"Nuclear material" means source material. special 
nuclear material or byproduct material: 
"Source material," "1peclal nuclear material" and 
"byproduct material" have the meanings given them in 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or in any law amenda-
tory thereof: 
"Spent fuel" means any fuel element or fuel compo-
nent, solid or liquid, which has been used or exposed to 
radiation in a nuclear reactor; 
"W•te" means any waste material ( 1) containing 
byproduct material and (2) resulting from the operation 
by any person or organization of any nuclear facility 
included within the definition of nuclear facility under 
paragraph (a) or (b) thereof: 
"Nuclear facility" means: 
(1) any nuclear reactor; 
(2) any equipment or device designed or used for ( 1) 
separating the isotopes of uranium or plutonium, 
(2) processing or utilizing spent fuel, or (3) han-
dling. processing or packaging waste: -· ~ 251: 
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(i) To any claim baaed upon the violation of any statute. 
law, ordinance or regulation prohibiting discrimination 
or humiliation because of race, creed, color, age, sex, 
sexual preference or national origin; 
0) To any liability of the insured directly or indirectly oc-
casioned by, happening through or in consequence of 
war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities 
(whether war be declared or not), civil war, rebellion, 
revolution, insurrection, military or usurped power or· 
confiscation or nationalization or requisition or de-
struction of or damage to property by or under the 
order of any government or public or local authority; 
(k) To liability arising out of the Employee Retirement In· 
come Security Act of 197 4 or any amendments thereto; 
(I) To any claim based upon or arising out of an alleged 
conspiracy, contract or combination in restraint of 
trade, or to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade, 
or a violation or alleged violation of the Sherman Act of 
July 2. 1890, as amended: the Clayton Antitrust Act of 
October 15, 1914, as amended; the Robinson-Pattman 
(3) any equ1pment or devace used for the processing 
fatSricating or alloying of special nuclear material ii 
at any time the total amount of such material in the 
custody of the insured at the premises where such 
equipment or device is located consists of or con-
tains more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 
233 or any combination thereof, or more than 250 
grams of uranium 235; 
(4) any structure. basin, excavation, premises or place 
prepared or used for the storage or disposal of 
waste: 
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is 
located, all operations conducted on such site and all 
premises used for such operations: 
"Nuclear reactor" means any apparatus designed or 
used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting 
chain reaction or to contain a critical mass of fission-
able material; 
''Property damage" includes all forms of radioactive 
contamination of property • 
. 
IV. PERSONS INSURED 
Each of the following is an insured under this policy to the 
extent set forth below: 
(a) the named insured designated in Item 1 of the Declara-
tions and any subsidiary of the named insured and any 
other entity under the named insured's control and ac-
tive management, if designated as an insured in the 
Declarations or endorsements to this policy: 
(b) Any officer, administrator, supervisor, or member of the 
Board of Trustees, Directors, or Governors, of the 
named Insured. while acting within the scope of his 
duties as such: 
(c) Any other person or organization if included as an in-
sured under the provisions of the underlying insurance 
stated in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance and 
then only for the same coverage. except limits of liabil· 
ity, afforded under such underlying insurance: 
(d) If the named insured is designated in the Declarations 
as a partnership or joint venture. the partnership or 
joint venture so designated and any partner or member 
thereof, but only with respect to his liability as 
such. 
(e) This insurance does not apply to personal injury or 
property damage arising out of the conduct of any 
partnership or joint venture of which the insured is or 
was a partner or member and which is not designated in 
this policy as a named insured. 
V. LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of: 
(a) Insureds under this policy; or 
(b) Persons or organizations who sustain personal injury, 
property damage or advertising injury; or 
(c) Claims made or suits brought on account of Profes-
sional Liability or Umbrella Liability: 
the Company shall only be liable for the ultimate net loss in 
excess of: 
(a) The total of the applicable limits of underlying insur-
ance (including any catastrophe loss fund applicable to · 
Professional Liability, or other financial mechanisms, 
whether public or private, established for the purpose 
of paying awards, judgments or settlements for loss or 
damages against an insured entitled to participate in 
such fund) as stated in the Declarations and Schedule 
of Underlying Insurance and any other underlying in-
surance collectible by the insured; or 
(b) As respects Umbrella Liability, if the occurrence is not 
covered by underlying insurance so as to make (a) 
above applicable, the retained limit as stated in the Dec-
larations (including any financial mechanism. whether 
public or private, established for the purpose of paying 
awards, judgments or settlements for loss or damages 
for which an insured Is legally obligated); 
subject to the policy limits of liability stated in the Declarations 
for '"each occurrence" or .. medical incident" and in the aggre-
gate for each annual period. 
The total liability of the Company for all damages because 
of all injury to which Professional Liability coverage applies 
arising out of any one event; including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, shall not exceed the limit of liability 
shown tor "each medical incident" stated opposite Profes-
sional Liability in Item 4 of the Declarations. The total liability 
of the Company for all damages because of all injury or liabil-
ity to which Umbrella Liability coverage applies arising out of 
any one event, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, shall not exceed the limit of liability shown for 
··each occurrence" stated opposite Umbrella Liability in Item 4 
of the Declarations. 
Subject to the above provisions respecting "each medical 
incident", the total liability of the Company for all damages 
because of all injury to one or more persons to which Profes-
sional Liability coverage applies shall not exceed the limit of 
liability shown for aggregate opposite Professional Liability in 
Item 4 of the Declarations. 
Subject to the above provisions respecting "each occur-
rence", the total liability of the Company for all damages be-
cause of all injury or liability to which Umbrella Liability cover-
age applies shall not exceed the limit of liability shown for 
"aggregate" opposite Umbrella Liability in Item 4 of the 
Declarations. 
In the event of reduction or exhaustion of the aggregate 
limits of liability under underlying insurance by reason of 
losses paid thereunder, this policy shall, subject to this limits 
of liability provision and to the terms and conditions of the 
underlying insurance: 
(a) In the event of reduction, continue ;·n force as excess of 
the reduced underlying insurance: 
(b) In the event of exhaustion, continue in force as under-
lying insurance. provided that at the inception of this 
policy. the insured had no knowledge or could not have 
reasonably foreseen that such claims would be made. 
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VI. DEFINITIONS 
When used in this policy (including endorsements forming 
a part hereof): 
"Advertlllnt lnlury" means if committed or alleged to have 
been committed during the policy period in any advertising, 
publicity, article, broadcast or telecast and arising out of the 
insured's advertising activities. the insured's liability for libel, 
slander, defamation. infringement of copyright. title or slogan, 
piracy, unfair competition, idea misappropriation or invasion 
of rights of privacy. 
••Aircraft" means any heavier-than-air"or lighter-than-air air· 
craft designed to transport persons or property. 
"Automobll.,. means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semi· 
trailer designed for travel on public roads (including any 
machinery or apparatus attached thereto), but does not in-
clude mobile equipment. 
.. Bodily lnlury" means injury to the human body. sickness or 
disease sustained by any person during the policy period, in-
cluding death at any time resuttfng therefrom. 
.. Completed OperatloM Hazanl' means personal injury a"nd 
property damage arising out of operations or reliance upon a 
representation or warranty made at any time with respect 
thereto, but only if the personal injury or property damage 
occurs after such operations have been completed or aban-
doned and occurs away from premises owned by or rented to 
the Insured. Operations include materials, parts or equipment 
furnished in connection therewith. Operations shall be 
deemed co~pleted at the earliest of the following times: 
(a) When all operations to be performed by or on behalf of 
the insured under the contract have been completed; 
(b) When all operations to be performed by or on behalf of 
the insured at the site of the operations have been 
completed; or 
(c) When the portion of the work out of which the injury or 
damage arises has been put to its intended use by any 
person or organization other than another contractor or 
subcontractor engaged in performing operations for a 
principal as part of the same project. 
Operations which may require further service, maintenance 
work, correction, repair or replacement because of any detect 
or deficiency. but which are otherwise complete, shall be 
deemed completed. 
The completed operations hazard does not 'include per-
sonal iniury or property damage arising out of: 
{a) Operations in connection with the transportation of 
property, unless the personal injury or property dam-
age arises out of a condition in or on a vehicle created 
by the loading or unloading thereof; or 
(b) The existence of tools, uninstalled equipment, aban-
doned or unused materials: or 
(c) Operations for which the classification stated in the 
underlying insurance policies or in the Company's 
manuals specifies "Including completed operations". 
uextended Reporting Pertocr is a term which shall be applica-
ble to Professional Liability claims-made coverage only and-
means the time after the end of the policy period for reporting 
claims arising out of a medical incident occurring subsequent 
to the initial effective date and prior to the end 'of the policy 
period and otherwise covered under Professional Uability 
insurance. 
"Incidental Contract" means any written (1) lease of premises: 
(2) easement agreement, except in connection with construc-
tion or demolition operations on or adjacent to a railroad: (3) 
undertaking to indemnity a municipality required by municipal 
ordinance. except in connection with work for the municipal-
ity; (4) sidetrack agreement or (5) elevator maintenance 
agreement. 
"lnwrect• Producta" means goods or products manufactured. 
sold, handled or distributed by the insured or by others trading 
under its name, including any container thereof (other than a 
•• I •• • •• -· ...... .. • •At~~~~ A; .. ,. 
(b) Arising out of service by any persons as members of a 
format accreditation, standards review or similar pro-
fessional board or committee of the insured or as a 
person charged with executing the directives of such 
board or committee. 
Any such act or omission, together with an related acts or 
omissions. in the furnishing of such services to any one per-
son. shaU be considered one medical incident. 
"Mobile Equipment" means a land vehicle (including any 
machinery or apparatus attached thereto), whether or not setf· 
propeUed, ( 1) not subject to motor vehicle registration: (2) 
maintained for use exclusively on premises owned by or 
rented to the insured, including the ways immediately adjoin· 
ing: (3) designed for use principally off public roads or (4) 
designed or maintained for the sole purpose of affording 
mobility to equipment of the following types forming an inte-
gral part of or permanently attached to such vehicle: power 
cranes, shovels, loaders. diggers and drills: concrete mixers 
(other than mix-in-transit type); graders, scrapers. rollers and 
other road construction repair equipment: air compressors, 
pumps and generators, including spraying, welding. and build· 
ing cleaning equipment: and geophysical exploration and 
well-servicing equipment. 
.. Occurrence" means: 
(a) An accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions, or the happening of any of the of· 
fenses described in the definition of "personal injury", 
which results in personal Injury or property damage 
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured: or 
(b) An incident occurring dtlfing the policy period which 
results in advertising injury; or · 
(c) An assault. with or without battery, not committed by or 
at the direction of the naq1ed insured. which results in 
bodily injury or property damage: or 
(d) Any action taken by the insured in good faith in an 
emergency for the purpose of preventing injury or dam-
age to the person or property of the insured or others 
which results 1n bodily injury or property damage. 
••personal lnlury" means Bodily Injury; or injury arising out of 
one or more of the follow1ng offenses comm1tted during the 
policy period in the conduct of the insured's business: 
(a) False arrest. detention, imprisonment or malicious 
prosecution: 
(b) The publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of 
other defamatory or disparaging material. or a publica-
tion or utterance in violation of an individual"s right of 
privacy, except publications or utterances in the course 
of or related to advertising, broadcasting or telecasting 
activities conducted by or on behalf of the insured: 
(c) Wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right 
of private occupancy. 
..Phystclan" means any individuat who is licensed or approvec 
to provide health care or professional medical services as c 
physician, an osteopathic physician or surgeon, or c 
podiatrist. 
"Product• Hazard" means personal injury and property dam· 
age arising out of the insured's products or reliance upon ' 
representation or warranty made at any time with respec 
thereto. but only 1f the personal injury or property damagt 
occurs away from prem1ses owned by or rented to the insure. 
and after phys1ca1 possesston of such products has been relin 
quished to others. -
.. Profeutonal Liability" means any liability of an insured undE 
this policy aris1ng out of a medical incident. 
"Property Damage" means (1) physical injury to tangibt 
property which occurs during the policy period. inctuding th 
loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom or (2) loss c 
use of tangible property which has not been physically injurec 
provided such loss of use is caused by an occurr~~aurin 
"tnaured'a Productl" means goods or products manufactured, 
sold, handled or distributed by the insured or by others trading 
under its name, including any container thereof (other than a 
vehicle). but .. Insured's products" shall not include a vending 
machine or any property other than such container, rented to 
or located for use of others, but not sold. 
"Loading or Unloading" means the handling of property after it 
is moved from the place where it is accepted for movement 
into or onto an aircraft or automobile or white it is being moved 
into or onto an aircraft or automobile or while it is being moved 
from an aircraft or automobile to the place where it is finally 
delivered, but "loading or unloading" does not include the 
movement of property by means of a mechanical device (other 
than a hand truck) not attached to the aircraft or automobile. 
''MecUcsl lnctdent" means any act or omission during the pol-
icy period. 
(a) In the furnishing of professional health care services, 
including· the furnishing of food, beverages. medica-
tions or appliances in connection with such services 
and postmortem handling of human bodies; or 
property wh1ch occurs durtng the policy per~od, 1ncluding th~ 
loss of usa thereof at any time resulting therefrom or (2) loss of 
use of tangible property which has not been physically iniured 
provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during 
the policy period. 
"Retained Umlt" means the sum stated in the Declarations 
which, with respect to Umbrella liability, in the absence of 
underlying insurance. the insured shall retain as self· 
insurance with respect to each occurrence. 
••suit .. means litigation and includes any arbitration proceed-
ing to which the insured is required to submit or to which the 
insured has submitted with the Company's consent. 
"Ultimate Net Lou" means the total sum. in excess of the "re-
tained limit" or the insured's underlying insurance. as sched-
uled, or both, which the insured shalt be obligated to pay, 
whether actually expended or payable, to procure settlement 
or satisfaction of the insured's legal obligation for damages, 
either by (1) final adjudication or (2) compromise with the 
written consent of the Company, by reason of Professional 
Liability, or Umbrella Liability. 
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VII. CONDITIONS 
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A. Premium. All premiums for this policy shall be computed in 
accordance with the Company's rules. rates. rating plans. 
premiums and minimum premiums applicable to the insur-
ance afforded herein. 
Premium designated in this policy as "advance premium" 
is a deposit premium only which shall be credited to ~he 
amount of the earned premium due at the end of the policy 
period. At the close of each period (or part thereof terminat-
ing with the end of the policy period) designated in the 
Declarations as the audit period. the earned premium shall 
be computed tor such period and, upon notice thereof to 
the insured. shall become due and payable. If the total 
earned premium for the policy period is less than the pre-
mium previously paid, the Company shall return to the 
named insured the unearned portion paid by the named 
insured. 
The named insured shall maintain records of such infor-
mation as is necessary for premium computation. It shall 
send copies of such records to the Company at the end of 
the policy period and at such times during the policy period 
as the Company may direct. 
a. Inspection and AudiL The Company shall be permitted, but 
is not obligated. to inspect the named insured's property 
and operations at any time. Neither the Company's right to 
make inspections nor the making thereof nor any report 
thereon shall constitute an undertaking, on behalf of or for 
the benefit of the named insured or others. to determine or 
warrant that such property or operations are safe or health· 
ful or are in compliance with any law. rule or regulation. 
The Company may examine and audit the named in-
sured's books and records at any time during the policy 
period and extensions thereof and within three years after 
the final termination of this policy, as far as they relate to 
the subject matter of this insurance. 
C. Alllatance and Cooperation of In lUred. 
(a) The insured shall give written notice to the Company as 
soon as practicable of any claim made against the in-
sured or of any specific circumstances likely to result in 
a claim hereunder. The notice shall identify the insured 
and contain reasonably obtainable information with re-
spect to the time, place and circumstances giving rise 
to the claim, including the names and addresses of the 
injured and of available witnesses and the extent of the 
injury and type of claim anticipated. If a claim is made 
or suit is brought against the insured. the insured shall 
immediately forward to· the Company every demand, 
notice. summons or other process received by the in-
sured or the insured's representatives. 
(b) The insured and each of its employees shall cooperate 
with the Company and, upon the Company's request, 
assist in investigation, in making settlements, in the 
conduct of suits and in enforcing any right of contribu-
tion or indemnity against any person or organization 
who may be liable to the insured because of injury or 
damages with respect to which insurance is afforded 
under this policy and the insured and any of its mem-
bers, partners, officers, directors, stockholders and 
employees that the Company deems necessary shall 
attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and 
giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of wit-
nesses. The insured shall not. except at the insured's 
own cost. voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation or incur any expense. 
icy applies), this policy shall apply as though such under-
lying insurance was in force and collectible. 
Endorsement changes to the underlying insurance poll· 
cies with other carriers shall be submitted by the insured to 
the Company at its Home Office within 30 days of the effec· 
tive date of any such change. 
H. Subrogation. In the event of any payment by the Company 
of ultimate net loss hereunder, the Company shall be sub-
rogated to all ·the insured's rights of recovery therefore 
against any person or organization and will act in concert 
with all other interests (including the insured) concerned. 
The apportioning of any amounts which may be so recov-
ered shall follow the principle that any interests (including 
the insured) that shall have paid an amount over and above 
any payment hereunder. shall first be reimbursed up to the 
amount paid by them: the Company is then to be reimbursed 
up to the amount paid hereunder: lastly, the interests (in-
cluding the insured) for whom this coverage is in excess are 
entitled to claim the residue. Expenses necessary to the 
recovery of any such amounts shall be apportioned be-
tween the interests (including the insured's) concerned, in 
the ratio of their respective recoveries as finally settled. 
I. Chang•. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by 
any agent, or by any other person, shall not effect a waiver 
or a change in any part of this policy or stop the Company 
from asserting any right under the terms of this policy, nor 
shall the terms of this policy be waived or changed, except 
by endorsement issued by the Company to form a part of 
this policy. 
J. BxhauaUon of Underlying Aggregate LlmiL Upon notice 
that any underlying aggregate limit has been exhausted. the 
named insured shall immediately make all reasonable ef-
forts to reinstate that limit. The named insured shall notify 
the Company in writing as soon as practicable of any 
change in the scope of underlying coverage or in the limits 
of insurance available under any underlying policy and of 
the termination of any coverage or exhaustion of underlying 
aggregate limits. 
K. Assignment. The interest hereunder of any insured is not 
assignable. If any person insured shall die or be adjudged 
incompetent. the coverage shall thereupon terminate tor 
such person. but such insurar:1ce as is afforded by this pol· 
icy shall cover such insured's legal representative as the 
insured with respect to liability previously incurred and 
covered by this policy. 
L. Termination. This policy may be terminated by the named 
insured by mailing to the Company written notice stating 
when, not less than 10 days thereafter, such termination 
shall become effective. This policy may be terminated by 
the Company by mailing to the named insured at the ad-
dress shown in this policy written notice stating when. not 
less than 30 days (15 days for nonpayment of premium). 
thereafter, such cancellation shall become effective. The 
mailing by registered or certified mail of notice as aforesaid 
shall be sufficient proof of notice. The effective date and 
hour of cancellation stated in the notice shall become the 
end of the period of this policy. 
If the named insured or the Company cancels, earned 
premium shall be computed pro rata. Premium adjustment 
may be made either at the time cancellation is effected or as 
soon as practicable after cancellation becomes effective. 
but payment or tender of unearned premium is not a condi-
tion of cancellation. •. 
255 
. -· ·---·· -· ···--· _., --· .. ···--· 
· D. Settlement of Claim or SuiL With regard io Professional 
Liability, the Company will not settle any claim or suit with· 
out the written consent of the insured, except, however, that 
if the insured and the Company fail to agree that such claim 
or suit should be settled within 10 days of delivery of written 
notice to the insured by the Company of the terms and 
conditions of the proposed settlement, the decision of the 
Company as to such settlement shall be flr:tal. With regard to 
Umbrella Liability, the decision of the Company as to set-
tlement of any claim or suit shall be final. 
E. Action Agalnat Company. No action shall lie against the 
Company unless. as a condition precedent thereto. there 
shall have been full compliance with all of the terms of this 
policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to 
pay shall have been finally determined, either by judgment 
against the insured after actual trial, or by written agree-
ment of the insured, the claimant and the Company. Any 
person or organization or the legal representative thereof 
who has secured such judgment or written agreement shatl 
thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy to the 
extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. 
No person or organization shall have any right under this 
policy to join the Company as a party to any action against 
the insured to determine the insured's liability nor shall the 
Company be impleaded by the insured or his legal repre-
sentative. Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the 
insured's estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its 
obligation- hereunder. · 
Any limitations as to time within which an action may be 
brought against the underlying policies of insurance, if any, 
shaU also apply to any action to t;e brought against the 
Company pursuant to this policy of insurance. 
F. Other lnaurance. The insurance afforded under this policy 
shall apply as excess over other collectible insurance. in-
cluding any catastrophe loss fund applicable to Profes-
sional Liability, or other financial mechanisms, whether 
public or private, established for the purpose of paying 
awards, judgments or settlements for loss or damages 
against an insured entitled to participate in such fund. 
G. Maintenance of Underlying Insurance. It is a condition of 
this policy that while this policy is in effect, the insured shall 
maintain in force, without alteration of terms and condi-
tions. the underlying insurance set forth in the Schedule of 
Underlying Insurance as collectible insurance. In the event 
the Insured fails or neglects to maintain such scheduled 
underlying insurance as required (except for any reduction 
or exhaustion of the aggregate limit contained therein 
solely by payment of damages to which the underlying pol-
Any termination provision which is in co.nflict with ttie 
statutes of the state (or other applicable jurisdiction) where-
in this policy is issued is hereby amended to conform to the 
minimum requirements of such statutes. 
M. Declaration• and AppllcatlonL By acceptance of this pot-
icy, the insured agrees that the statements in the Declara-
tions and Applications are his agreements and representa-
tions, that this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of 
such representations and that this policy embodies au 
agreements existing between himself and the Company or 
any of its agents relating to this insurance. 
N. EJCte"ded Aeportlnt Period Option. With resoer.t to claims-
made Institutional Professional Liability coverage only, 
under Professional Liability. upon termination or nonre-
newal of this policy, the insured shall have the right to have 
issued coverage providing an extended reporting period in 
which claims otherwise covered by this policy may be re-
ported by giving written notice to the Company within 30 
days of such termination or nonrenewal and by paying to 
the Company promptly, when due, such premiums as may 
be required by the Company's rules. rates and rating plans 
then in effect. 
With respect to claims-made Physician Professional Lia-
bility coverage only, under Professional Liability, the physi-
cian insured shall have the right to have issued coverage 
under extended reporting period coverage obtained by the 
named insured, in accordance with the above provision, or 
such physician insured shall have the right to have issued 
coverage providing an extended reporting period in which 
claims otherwise covered by this policy may be reported by 
giving written notice to the Company within 30 days of such 
termination and by paying to the Company promptly, when 
due, such premiums as may be required by the Company's 
rules. rates and rating plans then in effect. 
0. Sole AgenL The named insured set forth in Item 1 of the 
Declarations shall act on behalf of all insureds with respect 
to giving and receiving notice of cancellation. accepting 
any endorsement issued to form a part of this policy, receiv-
ing any and all notices from the Company of any type what-
soever, and receiving return premium. if any; and is charged 
with the responsibility for notifying the Company and all 
insureds of any changes which might affect the insurance 
hereunder or the risks covered. 
P. Arbitration. In the event of exhaustion of the aggregate limit 
of the underlying insurance set forth in the Schedule of 
Underlying Insurance, the Company shall be entitled to ex-
ercise all of the insured's rights in the choice of arbitrators 
and in the conduct of any arbitration proceeding. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed by its President and Secretary, but this 
policy shall not be valid unless completed by the attachment hereto of a Declarations and countersigned on the 
Declarations by a duly-authorized Representative of the Company. 
Secret11y 
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Item 1. 
Item 2. 
Item 3. 
Item 4.. 
Item 5. 
Item e. 
ltem7. 
Item a. 
Item 9. 
Named lnaured: 
Addreec 
Pet ••• sylvanla Hospital Insurance Company 0 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company [j] 
Home Office at 415 Fallowfield Road, P. 0. Box 53 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011 
DECLARATIONS 
Polley Number: EP 1286 
Producer Name: PrtiiCa-Wied Ia 
S.Wtce. I•. 
Producer Code t: Ill 
Polley Period: From 111,. To 1/1/11 
12:01 a.m. standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
Initial EHec:Uve Date (Profft81onal Uablllty): 111/M 
Umlta of Uablllty: 
The medical incident/occurrence and aggregate limits of liability specifiac:l below apply separately to Professional Uability" 
and Umbretla Uability and are excess of the underlying limits set forth in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance or .,.. - ... 
retention specified below (as respects Umbrella Liability). The aggregate limits shown under Professional Uabillty are:~~ 
apply separately to physician and institutional Professionall!iability. . "' ....., · -~ 
COVERAGe 
A. ProfessionaiUability 
(1) 
(2) 
Physician 
lnstitutionaJ 
B. Umbrella Liability 
Retained Umlt: $ 
(Applicable to ~rage B [Umbrella Uability) only) 
Special Provtllone, If any: 
Premium: $3111. 
Audit Period: ._1 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
I 
~ ..... 
I 
s,¥.OGO.OGD 
I ~aaa.oao 
s .. , 
sl•l-.. 
each medical incident 
aggregate 
aggregate 
each occurrence 
aggregate 
AUTHORIZED COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE 
.~ . 
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Pe .... sylvania Hospital Insurance Company 0 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company LiJ 
Home Office at 415 Fallowfield Road 
P.O. Box 53, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17011 
SC.HEDULE OF UNDERLYING INSURANCE 
This Schedule forms a part of Policy Number EP 1m 
Named lniUNCI and AddrMa: 
Cov•-(lnclude ca.&m•Made or 
ln..,., •. Poll!r Numw and Polley Period Occurrence 1_..) !ee!lcUieUmlla 
IICC • 1211 111/lt ·,-............. _.. -.. ~ . . .. 
.II'! Institutional ... rofessional Uability 
fCC .1211 1/1/IWI . -·. 
c: ... -. ., • .,., 112'~ 
<a...... ) 
Physician Profeuional Uability 
( . 
Personal Injury Uability 
Property Damage Uability 
Contractual Personal Injury 
Uability 
Contractual Property Damage 
Uability 
Automobile Uability 
Bodily Injury 
Automobile Uability 
Property Damage 
Employer's Uability 
-·-----·~·· ... __ ,..._.,.. 
Slit 
SZ.CJ .... 
Slat 
Sial .... 
Slat 
SJ•l .... 
Slit 
SJKl .... 
s II& 
SJal .... 
s Ia& 
SJ•J .... 
s II& 
bel .... 
' eacl'l medlcllll'lcl-.a· 
aggreglll~ . 
; 
.:.t. 
eactf medlcattncidlnt 
aggregat• 
each occurrence 
aggregate 
eacn occurrence 
aggregate 
eacn occurrence 
aggregate 
eacn occurrence 
aggregate 
eacn person 
eacn accident 
eacn person 
eacn acc•dant 
eecn accident 
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..• 1nsylvanla Hospital Insurance Compan, CJ 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company U:J 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which attached. effective on thelnceotion date of the policy unless otherwise stated herein. (The 
followtne Information 11 reqund only when tflla endorMIMftt 11 luuecl aubMquant to preparation of policy.) 
Polley Number EP 1286 
Named Insured and Address 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, M.D., LTD. 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Woodbridge, Virginia 22039 
End. No. 
Audit Period Annua 1 
This Endorsement Is effective 1/l/84 and will terminate with the policy. 
Polley Period: From l/l/84 To l/1/85 
12:01 a.m., standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein. 
AUTOMOBILE EXCLUSION 
Th;s policy does not apply: 
(a) to personal injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of: 
(1) any automobile owned or operated by or rented or loaned to 
any insured, or 
(2) any other automobile operated by any person in the course of 
his employment by any insured; 
except that this policy shall apply to such claims involving an 
automobile not owned by or rented or loaned to any insured when 
such automobile is being parked upon premises owned by, rented to 
or controlled by the named insured or the ways immediately adjoining 
such premises. 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
ISSUED BY THE COMPANY PROVIDING THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY AS DESIGNATED ON 
THE DECLARATIONS MADE A PART HEREOF. 
,_., .... 
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FL'&~ISS. DAVIS aad RASHKlND SEP 0 4 1984 ~ 
ROBERT M. PURNISS, JR. li8Z:S.18771 
DONNELL P. DAVIS 
131 Z PIRST VIRGINIA BANK TOWER 
POST OP'P'1c:E BOX 37 .. Claims Department 
ALAN BRODY RASHKINC 
RIC:HARD A. SAUNDERS 
NORP'OLK. VIRGINIA 23!114 
lecMI 82!5•8288 
August 31, 1984 
VIC:KJ H. DEVINE 
Mr. David Windsor, Claims Supervisor 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company 
P. 0. Box 53 
Camp Hill, PA 17011 
Re: Robin Roundtree v. Chris Simopoulos 
Insured: Chris Simopoulos. 
Claim No. 73-M-37652-HO 
Our File No. 5847 
Dear Mr. Windsor: . 
We thank you for your assignment dated August 24 with 
regard to the above medical malpractice claim. 
We presume that we are to report directly to you rather 
than going through your Richmond office as I see no notation 
of this case having been assigned to Rick Genter. If we are 
to report to Rick Genter, please advise. 
Your insured, Dr. Chris Simopoulos, has received very 
heavy attention in the local newspapers over the past four 
to six weeks. As a result of criminal charges placed against 
Dr. Simopoulos, a preliminary hearing is set for September 7 
in the General District Court in Norfolk. He may be indicted 
prior to then. I have just finished a telephone conversation 
with Chris Christie who is Dr. Simopoulos' personal attorney 
locally in regard to all of his problems with the authorities, 
and I have ag~eed to wait until after the preliminary hearing 
in order to sit down with Simopoulos and gather particulars 
necessary for us to look into this specific malpractice claim. 
Attached is a newspaper clipping from the Norfolk Ledger 
Star, dated July 26, 1984. Also attached to that is a news 
clipping, pertaining to Dr. Simopoulos and others, from the 
same paper of November 30, 1982. 
As soon as I reviewed your assignment letter, I went 
to the public library to get the enclosures, and I also read 
through some other old papers and I should ·report that in the 
Ledger Star, dated July 28, 1984, there was an article stating 
that the State Board of Medicine Executive Committee had voted 
to suspend the licenses of both Drs. Simopoulos and Modaber. , / t:'' fl f "- I. . ,. 
....... - ---------- ·-·----·-· 
"··J. ~ ·-;s \ 
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The article stated that Dr. Sinnpoulos was arrested on Wednesday, 
July 25, 1984, while preparing to perform an abortion on a police-
wo~an who was not pregnant. The Board also subpoenaed records 
pertained to our particular case with regard to an abortion that 
was performed by Dr. Modaber. 
The article went on to state that 16 women from the Norfolk 
Newspapers, NOW and the Police Department went to the American 
Women's Clinic, apparently owned by Dr. Simopoulos, and 14 of those 
16 were advised they were pregnant. Each of these 14 had just been 
elsewhere for examination and found not to be pregnant. Two of 
them, while at the American Women's Clinic, are supposed to have 
substituted male urine for their own, in the process of their 
examination for pregnancy. Dr. Simopoulos was preparing to 
perform an abortion on one. of the policewomen when she stopped 
him and called to her male police partner, who was waiting in 
the lobby, to come in and Dr. Simopoulos was arrested on the charge 
of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses. This is the 
matter which will go before the General District Court in Norfolk 
on September 7 and is a preliminary hearing. 
It turns out that Dr. Simopoulos has a considerable history 
in our Court system. On November 8, 1979 he performed an abortiQn 
on a 17 year old girl in Northern Virginia who was in her fifth 
month of pregnancy. I do not know whether there was Civil litigation 
arising out of that incident, but Dr. Simopoulos was convicted 
in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County for violating sections of 
the Virginia Code pertaining to performing an abortion in the 
second trimester of pregnancy in his clinic, rather than in a 
licensed hospital. He was convicted and appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia. Tnat case is styled Simopoulos v. Commonwealth 
of Virginia, 221 Va. 1059 and was decided in April, 1981, upholding 
the conviction. 
Dr. Simopou1os then appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court and that Court, in a decision handed down in June, 1983, 
styled Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S.Ct. 2532, affirmed the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. In essence, the United 
States Supreme Court stated that the Virginia Code Section requiring 
second trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital or licensed 
clinic is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's 
compelling interest in protecting a woman's health and safety. 
The Virginia Statute was being attacked as unconstitutional by 
Simopoulos, and Section 18.2-73 stated that it "shall be lawful 
for any physician licensed by the Virginia State Board of Medicine 
to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate or attempt to 
terminate a human pregnancy ... during the second trimester of 
pregnancy and prior to the third trimester of pregnancy provided 
such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State 
Department of Health or under the control of the State Board of 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation." 
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Simopoulos's activity did not comply with this statute and 
the conviction was upheld. 
In the meanwhile, Dr. Simopoulos brought a Declaratory 
Judgment Action under Section 42 USC 1983 against the State 
Board of Medicine, contesting the action of the State Board 
in suspending the doctor's license from May 23, 1980 for one 
year. The United States District Court found in favor of the 
State Board of Medicine and the case was then appealed by 
Simopoulos to the Fourth Circuit and is found at 644 F.2d 321. 
Therein, the decision of the District Court was affirmed, 
principally on the grounds that the plaintiff had not followed 
through with the other administrative actions that were available 
to him in contesting his suspension. It appears that before the 
usual administrative proceedings had been held, this action was 
prematurely brought in the United States District Court. 
I would assume that after the one year suspension and the 
subsequent two years probation, Dr. Simopoulos had his license 
returned to him to practice medicine, as he had apparently 
opened this clinic in Norfolk as well as the one in Woodbridge, 
Virginia. 
I need to know from you immediately whom do you insure under 
the policy issued to Dr. Chris Simopoulos? Does the policy extend 
coverage to Dr. Modaber who actually performed the abortion on 
Robin Roundtree? Does the policy cover American Women's Clinic, 
2460 East Little Creek Road, Norfolk? Incidentally, Dr. Sirnopoulos 
has since closed that Clinic, but he may still be operating the 
one in Falls Church, Virginia or in Woodbridge, I am not sure. 
Obviously, we need to find out exactly what is the American 
Women's Clinic. Is it a sole proprietorship of Dr. Sirnopoulos 
or is it incorporated? What is Dr. Modaber's relationship to 
either Dr. Simopoulos and/ or the American \-/omen's C 1 inic? t.Jho 
are we to represent? 
In talking to Mr. Christie today, he has promised to help 
me get the answers to some of these questions which will require 
us to go through the records of the clinic and also a personal 
conference with Dr. Simopoulos. I will proceed to do that, but 
I am sure that we will not have any answers back until after the 
preliminary hearing on September 7. Incidentally, Mr. Christie 
tells me that he believes that there are two or three, or more 
other malpractice claims that are "lurking" in the background 
and may arise in the relatively near future. 
truly yours, 
Donnell P. Davis 
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Tbe Ledger-Star, Thursday, July 26, 1984 A bcY/-t~ 
ealth Board licen~~~ 
~-091 re_quired fOr clin·i? 
"For the purpose of regulation," the 
Ameriean Women's. Clinic "is equivalent 
to a doctor's office perfonning first-
trimester abortions." 
-Dm:id Hathcock, spoltesman, state attorney general's office; 
NORFOLK- The American Wom. 
~n 's Clinic. a facility 3t which abor-
•Jons a"' perfonned, is rtot licensed 
::~y tfte 5t2t~ Baud of Health. 
· ·; ! ~ i!= not in..cpected by state offi. 
~~cials, rr. does It offer other servto.-s. 
:~!t-uch as pa!IH:t ~ling. that are 
r':"q•Jin"d of 1=tate-regulated clin!cs 
P'. :1orm•ng abonicns in the first 
·r~a months of pregnancy. 
r. ~t th·: .4\m~ril·an Women's Clinic 
! •· ·J! t:'P''r.:~:.,r r-ur~ide the Jaw. 
. ! he :t:-6son, stilt~ officials said. is 
1ha1 the cammon""e3ltb has rKt choice 
l:ur to cla!~ify the facility as a doc-
: .lt'!''~ office. 
:. ;"'f.cu,n. wbo perform 11bn: lions a.-. 
' 3 r~'5'!Jar p.in of pn,·ate pn~atct! are 
• t!'Ot r?qui~d to meet Health ~>epan. 
• tne"!t h.:er&Si~~ requi~ents, the of-
fic:als sPt· ·. 
·. !.:,.:t ye:.r. the U.S. Surr~e Conrt, 
f:!ui!dinr. on its lamdmart 1113 dfM:t. 
Jim l('f.ftlizi~ abortion, ruled that 
•:.tz·~ canr:ot interfe!"e wiL'I private 
· ~~~or.p.Hi~?nt reiP.tion3hips during 
• h~ far:.t t imester - tbe ftnt three 
mt•nthi- of preenanc:y. 
·. ••Fer the purposr of regulatl-~' 
~:1td J)~,·jf! Hatl.ct'Ck, a spokesman 
,,.. tb! :otcte 31lo~· gnteral's of. 
. 'ite" Am~rican Women's Clinic 
'" '~tuvalent to a dc:ictor'J office 
r:rr~~.r.rnh1J: ~irst~lrfmester abor-
w·.!\c:. 
Hallcrest. a similar c!lnic that Is 
eight blocks a•-ay from the Ameli-
can Women's Clinic on Little Creek 
Road. Is Ucensed by .\he state to per-
form abortions. 
It provides coun..qfing to patients, 
offers emergency medic:tl care, 
opens its doors lD state bl4irecrors 
and abides by tJther regulations the 
Board of Health has adopted for out-
patient hospitals perfonnir.g abor· 
tions. 
Statte cffki:lis nr.lL-::>·.:;!e-~£~~. :.,_.·~'· 
ever, that HiJfrrest's cumpliance 
with the regulations Is oaly volwt-
tary. • 
In fnterp~ ht'W tbe Supremf! 
Court ruUng affects abortion clinic.; 
Ia VIrginia, Assistant AUorney Gen. 
eral Robert T. Adanas told the 5tate 
Board of Hee.lth Jc:t~ !ast year that, 
in hi!~ opinion, ~ dt.ooston ~cred 
unenforceable the utstin& :;tala J"e~C­
ulatioas tor first-trimesler e~atittn 
dinfcs. 
SJnce traat ruling, lbe state bas not 
-:equin!d tha( new first-trimester 
aborttan fadlities obtain II,~. 
And because Its regtlJ:!tlms for thP. 
dinlcs seem to be ut~Jorceable. ti~ 
Boa:d of Health is consfdcr!ng n. ... 
scfndt:Jg them. 
If the regul:~tim.q are rescfn:!fod:. 
the state Board ·>~ Medidne, which 
licenses doctors, wt-uld be the !Ole 
mcmftor or tM cnmpetency o• doctors 
rertorming abortions and of the pro-
c.::1t&J~ t!:~y foH•"~"·· VirJ;,lmn kw re-
QUires that flrst-nimcsrer abortions 
be performed by doctors licensed tn 
the ~...Pff: and L.,at sec:UIId-trimester 
abortions be perionned in a licensed 
hospital « licensed outpaUent surgj-
cal racility. 
American Women's Clinic -which 
•~ 0\\'ned by Dr. Chri!l Slmopoulos-
may haw. forced t~ f$S~ or regula-
~~~s rept-al. Nid t.riary Frc~nds, the 
dtre~r "' the state Departmftt of 
Health's divi3icn of medical and 
nursing fadbUe; services. 
Simnpm•Jos. who nms anotl1er unll-
cen.;cd abortion dluJc In Fairfax 
Cotrnty, opened American Woanen•s 
Clinic at 24t0-A F.a..c;t Uttle Creek 
Rl'l'd In October. In November, the 
:ntomey gmeral's offi-:e advi~ the 
&tate D<'&rd of Health that lbe regula-
tinrts probahl)• lackM legal muscfe. 
··n Is my opinion that the board 
would not be in a guod legal position. 
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on abortion 
Uy RIC11AP.D CARELU 
A"ocletll ,.,... 'llrUw 
WASHINGTON - Statet c:~nnnc. · 
~lake it a crime lor ,tc;,cton to p~r-: 
·~rm S•lme nbortlons mtt1ide a hclpl< 
ad, the Supreme Court waJ t01ld. 
.oday. . . · 
.. There Is no matemal-henl:h ba~ls 
·or (such a law),'' lawyer n,j Lucas: 
: raued for a d\)Ctor convicted . for: 
l\!rformlng an Slbortlon In his Fa11s • 
:burch, va., office on a J7.ycer-old. 
tlrl who 'NP~ more than tbree mo."1ths ·: 
'regnant. . 
Lucas' argt•ments ber.an nearly a 
·un day of argumt-m.s on varlo,.w 
toortlun-rcgul&t:on tssur.: as the ~ ..... 
"~reme Court 1ntP.nrurted It• mcst 
vtde.ranglr.g study of tt~ em,ltlon. 
3dcn Issue since rltt! Jusrlct1 ICflDI· 
zed nbort!on In 1973. 
Separate ca!~ from MIS!fjurl and 
.\kron, Ohio, abo were to be h,..artl. 
Lucas said the VlrRJnla Jow usrd to 
·onvlct Dr. -Chris StrnoaJOinus, who 
1¥IS sentenced tcJ 30 d~yg in jat:. un-
-:onstltuUonall}' interfe"e~ w1th a 
Noman's rtght ·tc, h:.ve •1ft ab'll"tiOi1. 
The state law requtres tft.al Wl)r:t~n 
heyond their r:rst Uu-ee month~ of 
pregnancy have their t~bortlf>ns per. 
formed In a h~ptt::ll. The VIrginia 
Board of Health has nmendl-d the 
~aw through replatlons to allow 
;ome abortion r.Unlcs to be "emaed 
as out-paUent ho~pltal!l. 
Contendln& U.a\ the Vlr3lnla law 
potentially .. crlmlnftlltel au abor- ~ 
tlons,'' Lucas said the law II lnvvUd. CD 
But \\'llllam Broadclu'l. the state's N 
chief assistant attorney aenmt~. cJe. 
fended the law. lie said It's an exam-
ple of .. legitimate, pennlallb1e atate 
regulation" of abortions. 
l
i1:not Incumbent on. Vlrgtnli to ' 
• fl Its statutes.to ·at;COmmodete ... ; 
a ons, "· Broaddul Ald. · . · . · 
.. 
After Broaddus cont.nded thst the 
mandatory.hoiJpttallzatloa law Ia. de-
rlped to protect a mother's hM1tb, 
Justice John Paul SteveN qulued 
him abo~ wby abortton was the only 
SUI AICtal procedure CO\"ered by the 
criminal law. . 
•·He (the phy!4iclnn) could perform 
·iJraln surgery In hls •Jfnt~ wlth<r.tt 
runnlna afoul of the Jnw. Ht could do 
that at hom~. 1. cues.tt.'' Steven., 'atd. 
When Broaddus answflr~ that 
such un occltrcnce is very unltt.~ly to 
oc..cur, Justice Hamr 1 ... Blackmun 
interrupted hlm to sey, "A d~JCt:Jr 
could lonce a cnrbunl'.lt •m the ~~c-k 
(af a pnllent•, n~ck" lu hi3 off!te 
WithoUt cnmanitl.lng R crtr.ae. 
Broadc1•JI argued thut the b,.pltal· 
lzaUon r~tremcnt I• a good pne 
becauJe mortality rates for women 
who" undergo s~cond·trlm~r.r nbor-
tlons nre .. at Jeaat equal to or greater 
than those· for natur~tl chlldblnh." 
Blackmun challertsed that, but w~ 
silent when Broaddus sald the. mor• 
tallty rate for women wt.o DOOrt their 
pregnancies In the seconct trimester . 
Is. "sub\tantlally higher'' than for I 
those who have bable~ under medical : 
care. · . · ·:-- · · ~ 
Sltllnaln on ber ftrat' aborttori-rfi: . ·: 
ulatton araument 11s a member'of tM : 
Supreme Court, Jttst!ee Sandra·~ 
O'Connor uked Broadc!U about VIr~ 
glnla's procedures ·for llc:elll'lnl non-
conventional holpltala .. - •uch' u 
abonlon cllniet- to perform SeettOde 
trimester abortions. · • 
Her early questioning save no hint 
or how she . mlaht view Vlr&l"tA ~··· . . ~{.~ . ') 
\ ~··~ ~~--'' r"" A .• r.ot;·_4/, 
policies. Count III was nonsuited before trial and no 
evidence was introduced on that sUbject. 
The trial court conducted an ~ tenus hearing on 
June 25; 1985. The primary issue was whether Pennsylvania 
Casualty was estopped from relying upon the material 
misrepresentations to avoid the policy. On November 25, 
1985 the court entered a final order declarinq that 
Pennsylvania Casualty was estopped. Pennsylvania Casualty 
timely filed a Notice of Appeal and a transcript of the 
evidence. 
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial 
court correctly ruled that Pennsylvania Casualty was 
estopped from relying upon the material misrepresentations. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Holding That 
Pennsylvania Casualty Company was Estopped 
from Relying upon Simopoulos' Material 
Misrepresentations to Avoid the Policy. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
. . 
I. Whether a Medical Malpractice Insurer Is 
Estopped from Avoiding Its Policies for 
Deliberate Material Misrepresentations In the 
Application, Simply Because Other Unrelated 
Questions Were Not Answered? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. Pennsylvania 
Casualty Company is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in 
the business of providinq medical malpractice insurance in 
several states, including Virginia. On November 18, 1983, 
Dr. Chris Simopoulos applied for insurance with Pennsylvania 
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Casualty through Robert Rousseau, an insurance agent in 
Woodbridge, Virginia. At the time, Rousseau was 
transferring his physician clients from St. Paul Insurance 
Company to Pennsylvania Casualty because Pennsylvania 
Casualty's premiums were substantially lower. (Tr. at 32). 
Simopoulos' policy with St. Paul was due to expire on 
December 1, 1983 so Rousseau went to Simopoulos' office in 
Woodbridge on November 18, 1983 and reviewed a Pennsylvania 
Casualty application with him. (Tr. at 16). Rousseau went 
over the questions and filled in the answers in Simopoulos' 
presence. Unknown to Rousseau, Simopoulos gave false 
answers to three questions. Question 16 asked: "Has your 
license to practice medicine or your permit to prescribe or 
dispense drugs ever been denied, revoked, suspended or in 
any way limited?" Simopoulos answered "No." Question 17 
asked: "Have your staff privileges at any institution ever 
been suspended .or in any way restricted? 1' Simopoulos again 
answered "No." In answer to question 23, Simopoulos denied 
that he had "ever been convicted of a crime (other than a 
motor vehicle citation)." (Tr. at 19). Simopoulos signed ., 
the application. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1; Tr. at 17). 
Rousseau then submitted the application to Pennsylvania 
Casualty's underwritinq office.· (Tr. at 20). The 
application was reviewed by an underwriter and the 
underwriting manager (Tr. at 102-03, 165). The company, 
unaware of the misrepresentations, issued two policies of 
medical malpractice insurance, No. HP-1286 (Plaintiff's 
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Exhibit No.2) and No. EP-1286 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18), 
2 to Simopoulos and his corporation. (Tr. at 103, 165). 
Each of the three misrepresentations concealed 
startling facts about Simopoulos. The Virginia State Board 
of Medicine had revoked Simopoulos' license to practice on 
May 23, 1980. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8). When the Board 
reinstated his license by order dated August 4, 1981, it put 
Simopoulos on probation and imposed several conditions, 
including the condition that he not perform any induced or 
elective abortions for a period of two years. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 9; Tr. at 70-71). In addition, Simopoulos• staff 
privileges had been revoked at the three hospitals at which 
he practiced in the Northern Virginia area. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17). Simopoulos 
had also been convicted of a Class 4 felony on April 16, 
1980. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4). He was sentenced to two 
years in prison but his sentence was suspended on the 
condition that he serve thirty (30) days in jail. His 
conviction and the sentence were affirmed by the Virginia 
Supreme Court in an opinion dated April 24, 1981. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No.5). The United States Supreme 
Court also affirmed the conviction on June 15, 1983, just 
five months before Dr. Simopoulos applied for insurance with 
Pennsylvania Casualty. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6). 
2No. EP-1286 was an excess policy. 
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In late Auqust of 1984, Pennsylvania Casualty 
received notice that Robin Roundtree, Sandra Stokes and 
Barbara Lynette Smith intended to bring medical malpractice 
claims against Dr. Simopoulos and his corporation. (Tr. at 
117; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 19). Pennsylvania Casualty 
hired Donnell Davis, a Norfolk lawyer, to defend its 
insureds. On September 4, 1984, Pennsylvania Casualty 
received a letter from Davis advising the company of stories 
in the Norfolk press that Simopoulos had recently been 
arrested for attempting to perform an abortion on a police 
officer who was not pregnant. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 19; 
Tr. at 118). The letter revealed Simopoulos' conviction and 
license revocation to the company for the first time. 
Alerted by Davis' letter, Pennsylvania Casualty immediately 
canceled Simopoulos' policies and brought this action. 
To escape the liability under the policies, 
Pennsylvania Casualty had the burden to clearly prove (1) 
that representations contained in the application were 
untrue at the time that they were made and (2) that they 
were material to the risk. Va. Code Ann. §38.1-336 (Repl. 
Vol. 1981); Mutual of Omaha v. Echols, 207 Va. 949, 952, 154 
S.E.2d 169, 171 (1967). It met its burden at the ore tenus 
hearing on June 25, 1985. The defendants conceded in 
post-trial memoranda that Simopoulos' answers to questions 
16, 17 and 23 were false at the time they were made. 
(Modaber's Post-Trial Brief at 4; Post-Trial Memorandum of 
Robin L. Roundtree and Sandra Stokes at 4). The company 
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proved that the misrepresentations were material. 3 Maynard 
Stufft, Pennsylvania Casualty's Vice-President of 
Underwriting, testified that the company would not have 
issued the policies had Simopoulos answered questions 16, 17 
and 23 truthfully. (Tr. at 110-12, 122-27 & 133-34). 
The defendants offered no evidence. Instead, they 
argued that Pennsylvania Casualty was estopped from relying 
upon the material misrepresentations because other questions 
on the application were unanswered. 4 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1) The defendants contended that the company's 
acceptance of an application that lacked five answers 
estopped it from objectinq to three false answers. Counsel 
for Pennsylvania Casualty duly objected. (Tr. at 77). The 
trial court held that Simopoulos made material misrepresent-
ations in questions 16, 17 and 23, but it agreed over 
objection that Pennsylvania Casualty was estopped to rely 
upon them to avoid the policies. (Judgment Order, November 
2?, 1985). 
3
under Virqinia law, a misrepresentation is 
material if "reasonably careful and intelliqent men would 
have reqarded the fact communicated at the time of effecting 
the insurance as substantially increasinq the chances of the 
loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the 
risk or charqinq an increased premium." Buckeye Union Cas. 
Co. v. Robertson, 206 Va. 863, 866, 147 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1966) 
quoting Standard Acci. Ins. co. v. Walker, 127 Va. 140, 147, 
103 S.E. 585, 587 (1920). Materiality is "fully 
established" by the testimony of insurance company officials . 
that an applicant would not have met company standards had 
there been accurate disclosure. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
National Indemnity Co., 210 Va. 769, 774, 173 S.E.2d 855, 
858 (1970). 
4
see questions 10, [~j 15, 19 & 24(b). 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies of the 
foregoing Appendix were mailed, postage prepaid, to H. Joel 
Weintraub, Esquire, 201 East Plume Street, Norfolk, VA 
23510, Stanley E. Sacks, Esquire, P. 0. Box 3291, Norfolk, 
VA 23514, Richard Fox Aufenger, III, Esquire, 414 w. Bute 
Street, Norfolk, VA 23510, Chris Simopolous, M.D., Ltd., 
14904 Jefferson Davis Highway, Woodbridge, VA 22191 and to 
Chris Simopolous, 7352 Thi3J~e9on Trail, Fairfax 
Station, VA 22039 on this, __ ~-- day of September, 1986. 
Chri~t(f.; -_ 
